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Abstract
Conventional DSGE models that include labor search-and-matching frictions assume that only
unemployed workers are job seekers. Without taking the behavior of employed job seekers into
account, these standard models overestimate the true magnitude of uctuations in the entire
population of job seekers. Hence, our rst chapter proposes augmenting the standard DSGE
model with on-the-job search by employed workers. Using Bayesian estimation methods, I show
that this augmented model not only well explains the 25 percent decline in hiring that was seen
during the Great Recession, but also successfully predicts the subsequent actual ve-year-long
recovery period of hiring. In contrast, the standard models, which do not incorporate employed
workers’ on-the-job searches, fail to explain the sharp declines in hiring seen during the Great
Recession and the slow job recovery aerward. Furthermore, I nd that if on-the-job-search is
incorporated in the model, the decline in matching eciency of the unemployed workers would
explain 54 percent of the increase in U.S. unemployment during the Great Recession, as opposed
to 27 percent suggested by the standard DSGE models without on-the-job search.
e second chapter uses Bayesian methods to estimate a search and matching model that per-
mits job rationing featuring demand and matching eciency shocks. In such a model, unem-
ployment can exist even in the absence of search frictions. ese models have been used to show
that jobs rationing, rather than search frictions, causes unemployment to rise during recessions.
Previous studies relied on calibration methods to show the extent of job rationing, but it remains
unknown how sensitive this result is to the choice of parameters. Based on the parameters in
literature, I set the prior probability that job rationing to occur as 1/2, and estimate these models
with jobs rationing to update parameters according to observed data. Using these updated pa-
rameters (posterior means), I found no instances of unemployment due to jobs rationing in the
United States between 1964:Q1–2015:Q3. Although the estimation results do not support the ex-
ii
istence of job rationing, I found that the features such as wage rigidity and diminishing marginal
productivity of labor that could lead to job rationing make the model do a beer job of ing the
data than the fully exible wages model.
In the United States, there is substantial heterogeneity in labor market outcomes across de-
mographic groups. Not only do young workers, non-white workers, and those without college
degrees have persistently higher unemployment rates than other demographic groups, but these
groups also experience substantially larger increases in unemployment rates during recessions.
To understand the source of these dierences, in the third chapter we decompose the unem-
ployment rate for each demographic group into ows between unemployment, employment, and
out-of-the-labor-force. We nd that the gap in unemployment rates between these disadvantaged
groups and other demographic groups can be primarily aributed to the fact that disadvantaged
groups have higher rates of exit from employment, although hiring also plays a small role. In con-
trast, we nd that the cyclical increase in unemployment is primarily driven by a reduction in
hiring, which can explain 2/3 to 3/4 of the cyclical uctuations in the unemployment rate across
all demographic groups. us, policies that can reduce exit rates from employment for these dis-
advantaged groups can reduce both the persistent and cyclical disparities in the unemployment
rate across demographic groups.
iii
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Chapter 1
e Role of On-the-Job Search in Hiring Dynamics and
Matching Eciency: A Bayesian-Estimated DSGE
Model
1.1 Introduction
Standard Dynamics Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models that include labor search-and-
matching frictions, along the line of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), conventionally assume that
only unemployed workers are job seekers. However, the number of all new jobs in the United
States lled by employed workers is one and a half times as large as that of unemployed workers.1
In addition, Faberman et al. (2017) showed that the number of oers that employed job seekers
received is no less than that of the unemployed. e actual population of job seekers is composed
of both unemployed workers and employed workers who want to change jobs, thus raising the
question of whether unemployed workers are an appropriate proxy for the entire population of
total job seekers. By investigating hiring dynamics and matching eciency, I nd that omiing
employed job seekers in the models is problematic.
e dierences in search behavior and matching processes between employed and unemployed
job seekers are actually nontrivial. As shown in Figure 1.1, these two groups trend in dierent
directions: the number of the unemployed workers increases during recessions, while the popu-
lation of employed job seekers declines. In the models with labor search-and-matching frictions,
hires (as output) are positively related to job seekers and vacancies (as input), through matching
functions. In addition, the components in total hires that cannot be explained by changes in job
seekers or vacancies in matching functions are accounted for by uctuations in matching e-
ciency (or mismatch) shock (see, e.g., Blanchard and Diamond 1989 and Elsby et al. 2015b). In
particular, the changes in matching eciency played an important role in the labor market dy-
namics during the Great Recession. For example, researchers such as Barnichon and Figura (2015)
1Data source: hps://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200434/200434abs.html
1
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
60
40
20
0
20
40
60
Lo
g 
De
vi
at
io
n 
fro
m
 M
ea
n
Unemployed 
Job Seekers
Employed 
Job SeekersVacancy
Figure 1.1: Job Seekers.
Note: e green doed solid line represents unemployment, while the black solid line represents employed job
seekers, as constructed in this paper. e blue dashed line with circle markers represents vacancies. e gray shaded
areas indicate NBER recession periods. Data source for unemployment and vacancies: Federal Reserve Economic
Data (FRED).
have claimed that the decline in matching eciency during 2008–2012 caused the job nding rate
to decrease by 30 percent. Because of the dissimilitude between employed and unemployed job
seekers, the assumption about the composition of job seekers is particularly important for the
models to correctly predict hiring and estimate matching eciency.2
is paper rst assesses the ability of DSGE models that include labor search-and-matching
frictions in explaining hiring dynamics. Because these standard models do not take the behavior
of employed job seekers into account, and instead consider only job seekers who are unemployed,
the standard models predicted a much smaller decline in hiring than actually took place during
the Great Recession (only 10 percent, as opposed to the 25 percent that actually occurred). In
addition, they indicated that hiring would return to pre-recession levels in two years, rather than
2In this paper, employed workers also face employed-specic matching eciency shock which inuences the
uctuations in the number of employed job seekers, as seen in Figure 1.1. For the sake of clarity, I call employed-
specic matching eciency as employed workers’ matching technology shock. From now on, matching eciency
or mismatch always apply to that of the unemployed.
2
the actual ve-year-long recovery period that transpired. en, I show that the models incorpo-
rating on-the-job searching by employed job seekers are able to depict sharp declines in hiring
and subsequent slow job recovery, such as was seen during and aer the Great Recession. ird,
I examine the accuracy of the models’ estimates of matching eciency. I nd that in the standard
models that assume only unemployed workers are job seekers, matching eciency declined less
than half as much as the estimates of the models that incorporate on-the-job search during the
Great Recession; therefore, around 27 percent of the increase in unemployment aributed to the
changes in matching eciency during the Great Recession is not included in the standard models.
ese standard models fail to correctly predict hiring and accurately oer the estimates of
matching eciency because they do not paint a complete picture of the entire population of job
seekers. During the Great Recession, the number of unemployed workers (i.e., job seekers in
the standard models) increased by 50 percent, while vacancies decreased by 60 percent. Because
the increase in unemployment canceled out the decrease in vacancies, these standard models
therefore only predicted a moderate decline in hiring. Aer the Great Recession, the number
of unemployed workers remained higher than had been the case before the Great Recession.
According to the standard models, hiring should have returned to pre-recession levels much
sooner–in less than half the ve years that, in fact, passed before hiring again reached these levels.
Such failure of the standard models to accurately predict hiring dynamics has also been explored
by Leduc and Liu (2017)3. Because the numbers of employed and unemployed job seekers move
in distinctive directions, a model that incorporates both groups into the population of total job
seekers can portray hiring dynamics that are mainly determined by uctuations in vacancies.
Because vacancies declined dramatically during the Great Recession, this model would predict
that a sharp decline in hiring occurred. erefore, this model can explain the slowness of job
recovery, as witnessed in the aermath of the Great Recession, when the number of vacancies
and employed job seekers recovered sluggishly. erefore, introducing on-the-job searches of
employed workers into standard models can beer match the hiring dynamics.4
3Unlike this paper, Leduc and Liu (2017) used a standard model that assume that only unemployed workers are
searching jobs. eir paper only focused on slow job recovery and proposed workers’ search intensity and rms’
recruiting eort in the standard model as a solution. In contrast, this paper argues that the models that incorporate
the behavior of employed job seekers can well explain both the sharp declines and the slow job recovery.
4is paper divided job seekers into two types according to their labor force status. We can also consider using,
for example, unemployment duration and demographic factors, such as race, gender, and age, to include more types
3
Without taking the dynamics of the number of employed job seekers into account, the stan-
dard models overestimate the magnitude of the decline in labor market tightness, dened as the
ratio of vacancies to unemployment. is causes the standard models to fail to oer accurate
estimates of matching eciency. In the labor search-and-matching model, during the recession,
the decline in unemployed workers’ job nding rates can be aributed to two procyclical compo-
nents: uctuations in matching eciency and uctuations in labor market tightness. During the
Great Recession, because of the marked increase in unemployment together with the decrease in
vacancies, the standard models suggest a sharp drop in market tightness. In contrast, the models
that incorporate both unemployed and employed job seekers into the population of total job seek-
ers suggest less of a decline in labor market tightness because unemployment is countercyclical
while job searches from employment move procyclically. erefore, when the models consider
the behavior of employed job seekers, the fraction of the decline in the job nding rate during
the Great Recession that is aributed to the changes in matching eciency enlarges. is paper
shows that in the model that incorporated employed job seekers, matching eciency declined
more than twice as much as the estimates of the standard models did during the Great Recession.
erefore, these standard models only suggest that approximately 27 percent of the unemploy-
ment increase during the Great Recession are accounted for by matching eciency while the
models that incorporate on-the-job searching by employed job seekers suggest 54 percent.
In the real world, matching eciency shock can be composed of, for example, skill or de-
mographic mismatches (e.g., S¸ahin et al. 2014 or Herz and van Rens 2015).5 e composition
of heterogeneity among unemployed workers (e.g., Barnichon and Figura 2015) also inuences
matching eciency uctuations. In addition, the changes of matching eciency shock are also
related to rms’ search behavior, such as recruiting eorts (as emphasized by Davis et al. 2013)
and hiring standards (as presented in Sedla´c˘ek 2014); and to workers’ search eorts, which were
studied by Hornstein and Kudlyak (2016). erefore, this paper argues that these factors should
be further examined for researchers and policy makers to beer decompose the source of match-
of job seekers in the model. For example, Kro et al. (2016) uses the heterogeneity in unemployment duration to
explain long-term unemployment rates. I do not consider these various types of job seekers since the main message
of this paper is the importance of incorporating on-the-job search in a labor search-and-matching model.
5Researchers therefore also refer matching eciency shock to mismatch shock. See Furlaneo and Groshenny
(2016) and Sedla´c˘ek (2016).
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ing eciency to understand the increase in unemployment rate during the Great Recession.
Another potential issue resulting from the underestimation of the decline in matching e-
ciency shock during the Great Recession is that the standard models could overestimate the con-
tribution of other channels to unemployment uctuations. One such channel that is frequently
cited in the literature is unemployment insurance. I incorporate unemployment insurance ac-
cording to Zhang (2017) because her paper analyzed both matching eciency and unemployment
insurance by a standard model. I nd that aer on-the-job searching by employed job seekers is
introduced to the standard models, the percentage of increase in the unemployment rate during
the Great Recession aributed to changes in unemployment insurance decreased by 15 percent.
I conducted my analysis in the framework of an estimated medium-scale DSGE model that
included labor search-and-matching frictions featuring two mechanisms: on-the-job search and
time-varying matching eciency. Both unemployed and employed workers are considered job
seekers. In this revised model, dierent search behavior of both unemployed and employed job
seekers can be generated to account for the distinctive shocks each faces in their job nding
rates. Following other estimated medium-scale DSGE models, I introduce standard supply-side,
demand-side, and labor market-related shocks that can oen be seen in literature (e.g., Gertler
et al. 2008 or Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa 2013). e purpose of incorporating these shocks is to
avoid incorrectly aributing unemployment rate increases caused by these channels to uctua-
tions of matching eciency. In my model, when employed workers switch to new jobs, they are
recognized as experienced workers with higher productivity. According to the Nash bargaining
problem, workers and rms split the total surplus so that employed workers receive higher wage
incomes than they received at previous jobs. erefore, employed workers have incentives to
search jobs. I introduce the mechanism of on-the-job search based on Martin and Pierrard (2014),
but their model only considers technology shock and labor only. In contrast, my model incorpo-
rates multiple shocks, including matching eciency shock and the features of the medium-scale
DSGE models.
To evaluate the models’ performances in predicting hires, variables such as total hires or the
ows from unemployment or employment to new hires are not used in the estimation. For com-
parability, the data used for the estimation are standard macroeconomic variables, which have
been used by, for example, Gertler et al. (2008) and Cheremukhin and Restrepo-Echavarria (2014),
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among others. e baseline model is a real business cycle (RBC) model that does not include price
stickiness. Because the New Keynesian (NK) DSGE models are also widely used, in robustness
checks, I modied the proposed model to a NK DSGE model based on seminal works such as
those of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) so that sticky prices, nominal in-
terest rates, and ination could be considered. is paper’s main results about hiring dynamics
and matching eciency still hold in my NK DSGE model.
is paper is related to the following areas of literature. First, this work belongs to studies on
improving the performance of DSGE models that include labor search-and-matching frictions.
According to Shimer (2005), such DSGE models fail to accurately generate a high volatility of un-
employment and vacancies (volatility puzzle). One potential solution is incorporating on-the-job
searches by employed workers in the model.6 Although the issue of on-the-job searches has been
widely discussed in the partial equilibrium literature since Pissarides (1994), the importance of
on-the-job search in improving the performance of DSGE models has been examined by only a
few researchers. Krause and Lubik (2006), Zandweghe (2010), and Krause and Lubik (2012) intro-
duced two types of jobs (good and bad) as a mechanism to generate on-the-job search. Tu¨zemen
(2017) extended their models by incorporating capital and workers from outside of the labor force.
Tasci (2007) and E´va Nagypa´l (2007) introduced on-the-job search through matching quality. In
their models, employed workers only switch to new jobs (matches) with a higher quality than
that of their current jobs. ey use these models to address the volatility puzzle. Martin and
Pierrard (2014) determined when on-the-job search helps to generate a high degree of volatility
in unemployment rates and vacancies.7 My contribution is that I show the importance of incor-
porating on-the-job search in generating accurate models of hiring dynamics and in correctly
identifying the causes of unemployment uctuations. In contrast to existing DSGE models with
on-the-job search, my model considers on-the-job search in the environment of medium-scale
6Other potential solutions include introducing wage rigidity or procyclical vacancy costs in a model. For wage
rigidity, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) proposed a calibration strategy related to the wage bargain to introduce
wage rigidity. Gertler et al. (2008) introduced wage rigidity based on staggered Nash bargaining and Furlaneo
and Groshenny (2016) considered a wage adjustment cost. Christiano et al. (2016) proposed a model in which the
real wage is determined through alternating oer bargaining, so that wage rigidity emerges endogenously. For
mechanisms to generate procyclical vacancy costs, for example, Fujita and Ramey (2007) proposed costly entry, and
Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) connects vacancy postings to credit constraints.
7Unlike these works based on random search, Menzio and Shi (2011) introduce on-the-job search into the directed
search framework.
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DSGE models.
Second, this paper is related to the studies that examine the importance of matching eciency
(or mismatch) in explaining uctuations in the unemployment rate. Studies based on the DSGE
approach all assume that only unemployed workers are job seekers. ese works (e.g., Chere-
mukhin and Restrepo-Echavarria 2014, Furlaneo and Groshenny 2016, and Zhang 2017) showed
that mismatch can explain no more than 30 percent of the increase in the unemployment rate
during the Great Recession and its aermath. Among the works based on a partial equilibrium
model or matching functions, most follow such standard assumptions. ese works, such as
Barlevy (2011), Dickens (2009), S¸ahin et al. (2014), and Barnichon and Figura (2015), reported
similar contributions of mismatch as were seen in studies based on DSGE. In contrast, Hall and
Schulhofer-Wohl (2015) and Sedla´c˘ek (2016) relaxed this assumption to incorporate individuals
who are employed and job seekers who are outside of the labor force in their estimations based
on a non-DSGE approach.8 Hall and Schulhofer-Wohl (2015) found that mismatch accounts for
40 percent of the uctuation of the unemployment rate, and Sedla´c˘ek (2016) suggested that it
accounts for 49 percent. My contribution is that this is the rst paper which states that even in
the DSGE models that fully characterize demand and supply sides, aer I take the behavior of
employed workers into account, the contribution of mismatch still increases. Moreover, I con-
tribute to this literature by showing that incorporating employed job seekers into DSGE models
can also improve their ability to predict hires.
ird, this paper contributes to the work on slow job recovery. Researchers in this area have
used dierent channels in their models to account for slow job recovery. Where Schmi-Grohe
and Uribe (2012) and Shimer (2012b) focused on wage rigidity, Cantore et al. (2014) introduced
deep habits in consumption and government expenditure and the constant elasticity of substitu-
tion technology, Siemer (2014) considered nancial constraints, and Leduc and Liu (2017) intro-
duced rms’ recruiting eorts and workers’ search eorts. However, these authors all assumed
that the population of job seekers is comprised only of unemployed workers. I contribute to this
literature not only by showing that introducing on-the-job search into models can help generate
8ey estimate matching eciency based on matching functions, which incorporate both unemployed and non-
unemployed job seekers. Veracierto (2011) uses a similar approach but only considers job seekers from outside of
the labor force.
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this feature of hiring but also by indicating that the failure of standard models for generating
slow job recovery causes the contribution of matching eciency to unemployment uctuations
to be underestimated.
is paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 explains how incorporating job searches from em-
ployment aects the prediction of model hiring and the estimates of matching eciency. Section
1.3 presents the proposed revised model. Section 1.4 explains my estimation methodology and
the data I used for estimation. Section 1.5 reports the empirical ndings, and Section 1.6 is the
conclusion.
1.2 Main Mechanism and Concepts
e standard models assume that only unemployed workers should be included as job seekers.
In this section, through the lens of the matching function, I rst analytically show why it is
inappropriate to impose such an assumption. en, I explain why standard models fail to generate
hiring dynamics that have been observed and why these models underestimate the declines in
matching eciency during the Great Recession.
1.2.1 Hires
Although in reality the total population of job seekers is comprised of both unemployed workers
and employed workers looking to switch jobs, standard DSGE models that include labor search-
and-matching frictions usually dene job seekers as unemployed workers. However, Figure 1.2
shows that the number of unemployed workers is not an appropriate proxy for the total popu-
lation of job seekers. First, the majority of hiring is from the pool of employed workers rather
than unemployed ones. Before the Great Recession, the number of hires from the ranks of the
employed was twice as high as those from the ranks of the unemployed; aer the Great Reces-
sion, hires from both categories were equal. Second, the number of hires from employment is
procyclical, while hires from unemployment are countercyclical.
is dierence in cyclical dynamics is due to heterogeneity in the job seekers’ search behavior
and their matching processes. For example, staying unemployed may erode a worker’s human
8
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Note: is gure presents the percentages of hiring from employment, unemployment, and outside of the labor
force, respectively. Hiring from employment is procyclical, while hiring from unemployment is countercyclical. In
contrast, hiring from outside of the labor force is acyclical. e gray shaded areas indicate NBER recessions periods.
Data source: hps://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200434/200434abs.html.
capital. Due to information asymmetries, employers may also screen workers’ abilities or skills
by their unemployment durations. us, unemployed workers may feel particularly compelled to
accept oers during recessions. In contrast, employed workers are likely to stay at their current
jobs and only switch jobs when they get beer oers.
Because unemployed and employed job seekers behave dierently in searching for jobs, and
because most (or at least half of) hires are from those who are employed, unemployed workers
cannot serve as a good proxy for total job seekers. e main message of this paper is that unem-
ployed workers are not an appropriate proxy for job seekers, meaning that standard models fail
to explain hiring dynamics and are unable to accurately estimate matching eciency. erefore,
this paper does not consider workers from outside of the labor force as job seekers. Including job
search from employment in my model shows the importance of considering non-unemployed job
seekers in modeling more generally. As shown in Figure 1.2, in the comparison with the other
two series, the hiring from outside of the labor force is acyclical and does not uctuate as business
9
cycles change. In the appendices, I show that including workers from outside of the labor force
does not inuence the argument of this paper.9
To rigorously understand the dierences between unemployed workers and all job seekers, I
introduce matching functions in the following discussion, and I show how to analytically con-
struct the number of total job seekers based on the observed job nding rates to oer direct
evidence.
1.2.2 Matching Functions and Job Seekers
In the standard DSGE model with labor search-and-matching frictions, the matching process is
usually described by a reduced-form matching function,
ht =m(jst ,vt ), (1.1)
where the function m is increasing, concave, and homogeneous for both job seekers jst and job
vacancies vt . ese functional properties are supported by the empirical ndings in Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001). In my following analysis, I adopted the Cobb-Douglas matching function
with constant returns to scale, as with the majority of the literature.
In the standard models, the matching function is
ht = (ϵµt · ut )ξv1−ξt , (1.2)
where job seekers are only comprised of unemployed workers, and ξ describes matching elasticity
for job seekers. Matching eciency, ϵµt , captures the ability of a market to match unemployed
workers and job postings. Because rms may not be able to identify the workers who fulll their
job requirements, workers may not nd jobs that satisfy their needs; at the same time, because
of factors such as information asymmetry, employers are unsure of workers’ skills and abilities,
9Although incorporating job searches from outside of the labor force does not change my argument, it is im-
portant to consider worker ows between unemployment and nonparticipation. Elsby et al. (2015a) argued that
the ows between individuals who are completely outside of the labor force and those who are just currently un-
employed are important for understanding unemployment uctuations. I do not address this here and recommend
future research on the issue.
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thus making the matching process time consuming and costly. Matching eciency is used here
for capturing these frictions or mismatches in the labor market.
As job seekers from employment are considered, job seekers jst will consist of not only un-
employed workers ut but also job seekers from employment ϵn,µt nt . Here, nt is the number of
employed workers, and ϵn,µt can be seen as a combination of the search participation of these
employed job seekers and their specic matching technology. Aer job search from employment
is incorporated, the generalized matching function can be wrien as
ht = (ϵµt ut + ϵn,µt nt )ξv1−ξt . (1.3)
us, this generalized matching function is similar to (1.2). e only dierence here is that job
search from employment, ϵn,µt nt , is considered in the total number of job seekers, as seen in, for
example, Martin and Pierrard (2014) and Sedla´c˘ek (2016). is generalized matching function is
used in DSGE models with on-the-job search, as seen in Zandweghe (2010), Krause and Lubik
(2012), Martin and Pierrard (2014), and Tu¨zemen (2017), although these previous papers do not
consider time-varying matching eciency shock ϵµt as I do here.10
Next, I explain the accounting exercise for constructing the pool of employed job seekers from
data. Before I move to the details of this exercise, I need to emphasize that this accounting exer-
cise is used for oering brief information regarding the business cycle property of employed job
seekers. is paper does not use hires ht or employed job seekers constructed according to this
exercise as observed variables in my estimation. e ndings and results of this paper are based
on model estimation rather than this accounting exercise.
In this exercise, rst, we can rewrite Equation (1.3) as
ht = (ϵµt )ξ · (ut + Φnt nt )ξv1−ξt .
By the assumption of random search and according to Equation (1.3), the job nding rate for
10In Zandweghe (2010), Krause and Lubik (2012) and Tu¨zemen (2017), there are good and bad jobs. In general,
currently employed workers are only searching in the market for good jobs. is generalized matching function is
used to describe the matching process in the good jobs market.
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unemployed workers will be11
f ut = ϵ
µ
t ft ,
and the job nding rate for employed workers will be
f nt = ϵ
µ,n
t ft .
Here, job seekers jst is ϵµt ut +ϵ
n,µ
t nt , and ft = ht/jst is the average job nding rate, dened as total
hires ht divided by total job seekers jst . Because unemployed workers face matching eciency
uctuations, while employed workers’ job searches also depend on their search participation and
specic matching technology, job nding rates for these two types of job seekers are related to
these two distinctive shocks. us, according to this model structure, we have Φnt = f nt /f ut .
Second, since job nding rates f nt and f ut are publicly available,12 we can derive Φnt from the data.
ird, because hires ht , unemployment ut , employment nt , and vacancies, vt , are all available,
matching eciency can be computed according to (1.3) aer we choose specic value ξ , which
is estimated by this paper. erefore, employed job seekers ϵµ,nt nt = ϵ
µ
t Φ
n
t nt can be constructed.
Figure 1.1 shows the uctuation of unemployed workersut and employed job seekers based on
this accounting exercise. e number of unemployed workers moves countercyclically, while the
number of employed job seekers moves procyclically. is dierence conrms that the number
of unemployed workers is not an appropriate proxy for the total number of job seekers.
1.2.3 Model Hires and Matching Eciency
As shown in Equation (1.1), whether or not a labor search-and-matching model can generate
accurate hires depends on the proxy of job seekers we use. Because the numbers of unemployed
and employed job seekers move in dierent directions, assuming only unemployed workers are
job seekers thus fails to capture the actual dynamics of job seekers. e standard models thus
cannot generate correct estimates of hires.
11I explain why the assumption of random searches can lead to these job nding rate formulas in the appendices.
12ese transition rates are constructed by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) based on the data from the Current
Population Survey from 1994 on. ese data series are continuously updated. Data link: hps://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/feds/2004/200434/200434abs.html
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e proxy of job seekers we use also aects the accuracy of the estimates of matching eciency.
In the labor search-and-matching model, the employment transition equation can be wrien as
follows 13:
nt = (1 − s) · (nt−1 + f ut ut ),
where s is the exogenous separation rate, and the unemployed workers’ job ning rate f ut is
ϵ
µ
t (vt/jst )1−ξ according to Cobb-Douglas matching functions. In steady state, this equation can
be wrien as
s · n = (1 − s)ϵµ(v
js
)1−ξu,
which explained that the total separation from employment (le-hand side) is equal to hiring
from unemployment (right-hand side). erefore, unemployed workers’ job nding rate is f u =
sn/((1 − s) · u) = ϵµ(θ )1−ξ , where θ is labor market tightness, the ratio of vacancy v to total job
seekers js . e uctuations of the unemployed workers’ job nding rate can be decomposed to
an exogenous shock, matching eciency, and an endogenous variable, labor market tightness.
We can further derive
fˆ u = ϵˆµ + (1 − ξ ) · (vˆ − jˆs).
I place a hat over a variable to denote this variable’s log deviation from the mean (i.e., uctu-
ations). Because the numbers of unemployed and employed job seekers move in dierent di-
rections, uctuations in the number of job seekers decrease aer employed job seekers are in-
corporated into the population of job seekers. Because standard models dier from the models
that incorporate employed job seekers only in the denition of the population of job seekers, the
models that include employed job seekers suggest that during the recession, the larger decline
in the job nding rate is aributed to the decrease in matching eciency. erefore, matching
eciency in the models that include employed job seekers declined more than in the standard
models during the recession.
We can also show this argument on matching eciency above analytically. By s · n = (1 −
13Section 1.3 explains how this equation is derived.
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s)ϵµ(vjs )1−ξu, and normalizing labor force as unity (u + n = 1), we can have
js1−ξ
ϵµu
=
1 − s
s
· v
1−ξ
1 − u .
For standard models, by Equation (1.2), job seekers js is equal to ϵµu, so we have
(ϵµu)1−ξ
ϵµu
=
1 − s
s
· v
1−ξ
1 − u .
However, in the models that consider employed job seekers, total job seekers js becomes ϵµu +
ϵµ,nn. erefore, we have
(ϵµ · u + ϵµ,n · n)1−ξ
ϵµu
=
(
1
(ϵµu)ξ +
ϵµ,n · n
(ϵµu)1−ξ
)1−ξ
=
1 − s
s
· v
1−ξ
1 − u .
Given the same separation rate s and matching elasticity ξ , when observed unemployment u and
vacancy v are fed back to both models, the models that incorporate employed job seekers have
higher estimates of the decline in matching eciency ϵµ during the Great Recession because of
the decline in eective employed job seekers ϵµ,n ·n. In my analysis, I actually use dynamic models
and estimate matching elasticity ξ rather than the same xed value for both models. I nd that
this argument about matching eciency still holds.
To quantify these biases in hiring and matching eciency, I developed a DSGE model with
on-the-job search featuring matching eciency shock in the dynamic environment.
1.3 Model
is section presents the model used for measuring bias in hiring and for quantifying the bias
in estimated matching eciency in standard models. e baseline model is a RBC medium-scale
DSGE model with labor search-and-matching frictions. In the appendices, I extend the model to
a NK DSGE model with labor search friction to check its robustness.
My proposed model builds on standard medium-scale DSGE models with labor search frictions,
such as those presented in Gertler et al. (2008), Cheremukhin and Restrepo-Echavarria (2014), and
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Christiano et al. (2016), among others, but I introduce the on-the-job search based on Martin and
Pierrard (2014). us, this proposed model bridges DSGE models with on-the-job search and
medium-scale DSGE models.
1.3.1 Labor Market
e processes by which rms and workers meet are described by the generalized matching func-
tions presented in (1.3), as I consider employed job seekers in my model. I rst impose the as-
sumption of random search, following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Second, I assume no
ows between the labor force and outside of it. erefore, the labor force is normalized to unity.
According to the matching function shown in equation (1.3) and the assumption of random
search, the job nding rate for unemployed workers is f ut = ϵ
µ
t · ht/jst , the job nding rate for
employed workers is f nt = ϵ
µ,n
t · ht/jst and the vacancy lling rate is qt = ht/vt . Aer the job
nding rate and vacancy lling rates are dened, I discuss the dynamics of employment and
unemployment in the labor markets.
In each period, there are three consecutive stages: matching, separation, and production.14 In
the beginning of a period, rms and workers meet, and a new match is formed. Here, I assume
that when a match is formed, workers in this new match cannot search again until the matching
stage in the next period. Aer the matching stage, separation occurs with exogenous probability
s . For the matches that suer separation,15 workers become unemployed and cannot search for
jobs until the next period, and only those unseparated matches that survive in the production
stage are productive.
To create on-the-job search, the productivity of a new match depends on the workers’ labor
force status in the last period. For rms, the new matches with employed workers generate higher
productivity than those with unemployed workers because employed job seekers are experienced
workers. For those employed workers who cannot nd a new job, their matches with rms have
the same productivity as the new matches with unemployed workers. However, following Martin
14is sequence of stages is based on Christiano et al. (2016).
15Although Krause and Lubik (2007) and Trigari (2009) consider endogenous separation in their models, based on
the ndings of Shimer (2012a), separation only explains one-quarter of the uctuations in unemployment rates. is
paper thus assumes a constant separation rate in the model.
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and Pierrard (2014), I assume that the human capital of these experienced workers decays and
the increase in productivity only lasts for one period. I make this assumption about employed
workers’ productivity particularly for comparability purposes. By this assumption, all employed
workers are going to search in each period in my model so that I can use the matching function as
seen in Equation (1.3). Because this is the rst paper using DSGE models to examine the changes
in the estimates of matching eciency aer the behavior of employed job seekers is incorporated
into the population of job seekers, I can only compare my results with existing works based on
non-DSGE approaches, such as Sedla´c˘ek (2016), which used similar matching functions to those
in Equation (1.3). In addition, this assumption helps me avoid keeping track of the distribution
of matching quality and workers’ labor force status. Without creating history dependence, the
diculty of estimating this model is greatly reduced so that I can conduct the analysis based
on DSGE model estimation. is allows me to compare my model’s prediction of hiring and the
estimates of matching eciency with previous works based on DSGE models that do not consider
on-the-job search.16
Because of higher productivity, employed workers who switch to new jobs can receive higher
wages for one period, while unemployed workers who nd jobs or other employed workers who
stay at current jobs receive lower wages. In my model, I normalize the productivity of unem-
ployed workers as unity, and the relative productivity of employed workers is χ > 1 to induce
on-the-job search to occur.
us, in the beginning of period t , the total number of employed workers includes the new
hires (matches) from unemployment f ut−1ut−1 and employment at the end of period t − 1, which
is nt−1. Aer the matching stage, separation occurs, and the total number of employed workers
at the end of the period is represented by those who are not separated from their current jobs.
Hence, the law of motion of aggregate employment n can be wrien as
nt = (1 − s) · (nt−1 + f ut−1ut−1). (1.4)
16Because most employed workers usually stay at their current jobs rather than search in each period, the as-
sumption that human capital decayed aer one period is strong. In the appendices, I propose a dierent seing.
e employed workers only search jobs when they suer disutility shock; otherwise, they will stay at their current
jobs. Given this seing, employed workers do not have to leave current jobs and can continue to higher wage. Aer
estimating the model with this new seing, I nd the main results hold.
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At the end of period t , in the production stage, nt workers are hired by rms for producing goods.
Because on-the-job search is introduced into the model, two equations that describe the hiring
dynamics of employed workers: one that applies to those who nd a new job and a second one
for those who do not. For those employed workers who nd new jobs, the transition equation is
nnt = (1 − s) · f nt · nt−1. (1.5)
Here, the superscript n stands for new (or high-wage) jobs, and nnt are the employed workers
who switch to new jobs in the end of period t . In the beginning of period t , f nt · nt−1 matches
from employment are formed. en separation occurs, so in the end of the period t , only (1 −
s) · f nt · nt−1 matches can survive in the production stage. Because these workers have higher
productivity, they can receive the higher wagewnt . For those unemployed workers who nd jobs
or for currently employed workers who fail to switch to new jobs, the transition equation is
not = nt − nnt = (1 − s) · ((1 − f nt ) · nt−1 + f ut−1ut−1). (1.6)
Here, o stands for their old (that is, current or lower-wage) jobs. In the matching stage, (1− f nt ) ·
nt−1 employed workers are going to stay at current jobs, and f ut−1ut−1 new matches are formed
from unemployment. Aer the separation stage, only (1 − s) · ((1 − f nt ) · nt−1 + f ut−1ut−1) matches
survive and can be productive in the production stage. ese workers receive lower wage wot .
ese wages wnt and wot are determined through the Nash bargaining problem in this model.
e size of the labor force in the end of time t is normalized as one:
ut + nt = 1. (1.7)
Here, ut is the number of unemployed workers.
1.3.2 e Representative Household
e representative household consists of a continuum of innitely lived family members of mea-
sure one. Following Merz (1995), in the model, the family members pool their consumption risk.
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Following Christiano et al. (2016), Furlaneo and Groshenny (2016), and Zhang (2017), for a rep-
resentative household, utility depends on consumption Ct . e expected lifetime utility of the
representative household is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtϵ
pr
t
[ (Ct − ξ cCt−1)1−σ c
1 − σc
]
, (1.8)
where E is the expectation operator, β is the discounter factor, ξ c is the habit formation param-
eter, and σc is risk aversion. Here, I follow Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013) and introduce
preference shock to capture uctuations in consumption. e representative household chooses
consumption Ct and bonds Bt for saving to maximize their expected lifetime utility, subject to
budget constraints,
Ct +
Bt
rt
+Tt = w
n
t · nnt +wot · not + btut + Πt + Bt−1, (1.9)
where rt is the real interest rate. e representative household uses labor income from employed
workers who nd new jobs, wnt · nnt , labor income from employed workers who stay in their old
jobs,wot ·not , unemployment insurance, btut , dividends Πt from capital producers, and nal goods
rms for expenditure and lump-sum taxes Tt . e rst-order conditions (FOCs) are
∂Ct : λt = ϵprt U
′(Ct )
∂Bt : λt = βrtEt+1λt+1,
(1.10)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with Equation (1.9). e rst equation in (1.10)
is the marginal utility of consumption, and the second equation is the Euler equation. With
Equation (1.10), I dene βt+1 = βλt+1/λt as a stochastic discount factor.
I use V ot as the marginal value from having one additional worker employed from unemploy-
ment. We can also interpretV ot as the marginal asset value from having one additional employed
worker who stays at their old job. Due to on-the-job search, I also dene the marginal asset value
from having one additional employed worker who switches jobs asV nt . e marginal value from
having one additional worker separated from employment is denoted by Vut . Because employ-
ment and unemployment evolve according to Equations (1.4), (1.5), (1.6), and (1.7), these asset
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values can be wrien as
Vut = bt + Etβt+1
[
(1 − f ut (1 − s))Vut+1 + f ut (1 − s)V ot+1
]
,
V ot = w
o
t + Etβt+1
[
(1 − s)((1 − f nt )V ot+1 + f nt V nt+1) + sVut+1] , and
V nt = V
o
t +w
n
t −wot .
(1.11)
e rst equation denotes that the asset value of unemployed workers consists of unemploy-
ment benet bt and the expected return of the job searches. Because separation occurs aer new
matches are formed, when unemployed workers nd jobs, they can be productive with probabil-
ity f ut (1 − s) and enjoy the asset value of being employed V ot+1; otherwise, they become unem-
ployed and receive the asset value of being unemployed Vut+1. e second equation shows that
employed workers who stay at their current jobs receive wages wot and future expected returns
from on-the-job searches. Because separation occurs aer the matching stage, the probability
that employed job seekers can be productive in new jobs at the end of the period is (1 − s)f nt ,
and these workers receive the asset value V nt+1. In contrast, the probability for those who can
be productive in current jobs at the end of the period is (1 − f nt )(1 − s), and these workers still
receiveV ot+1. In the separation stage, workers become unemployed with probability s and receive
Vut+1. When workers nd new jobs, they receive a higher wage than workers who stay in their old
jobs. us,wnt is larger thanwot . In the following period, new jobs become old ones, and workers
receive wot , so the wage premium wnt − wot of new jobs only lasts for one period. e marginal
asset value for employed workers who nd new jobs V nt in the third equation is, therefore, the
wage premium wnt −wot plus the asset value of employed workers who stay at their old jobs V ot .
When there is no on-the-job search, the wage premium returns back to zero, so V ot = V nt .
1.3.3 Capital Goods Producers
For model tractability, I introduce capital goods producers by following Brzoza-Brzezina and
Kolasa (2013). ese capital goods producers are identical and act in a perfectly competitive
environment. ey purchase the nal goods as investment It for accumulating physical capital
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K˜t , according to
K˜t = (1 − δ )K˜t−1 + ϵ It
[
1 − κI2 (
It
It−1
− 1)2]It , (1.12)
where κI2 ( ItIt−1 −1)2 is the adjustment cost for investment. e rst part, (1−δ )K˜t−1, is the undepre-
ciated capital. e second part, ϵ It
[
1− κI2 ( ItIt−1 − 1)2
]
It , is the new capital produced at time t . Here,
ϵ It is the investment-specic technology shock, which is used to capture dynamics in investment.
Capital goods producers also choose capital utilization µkt and transform K˜t−1 to eective capital
Kt , according to linear transformation technology, which is
Kt = µ
k
t K˜t−1, (1.13)
and the corresponding cost of capital utilization µkt is
a(µkt ) = ϕ1(µkt − 1) + ϕ2
(µkt − 1)2
2 , (1.14)
where the steady state of µkt is set at one. Capital goods producers own capital and rent this ef-
fective capital to nal goods rms to earn a real capital return rkt . us, the optimization problem
of these capital goods producers is
max Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
[
rkt Kt − It
]
(1.15)
and is subject to equations (1.12), (1.13), and (1.14). Hence, the investment demand It , supplies of
eective capital, and optimal utilization of capital are, respectively,
∂It : 1 = κIEt
[
βt+1λ
q
t+1ϵ
I
t+1(
It+1
It
− 1)( It+1
It
)2]
+
λ
q
t ϵ
I
t
[
1 − κI ( It
It−1
− 1)2 − κI ( It
It−1
− 1) It
It−1
]
,
∂Kt : λqt = Etβt+1
[
(1 − δ )λqt+1 + rkt+1µkt+1 − a(µkt+1)
]
, and
∂µkt : rkt = a′(ukt ).
(1.16)
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1.3.4 Final Goods Firm
Final goods rms use capital and labor as inputs and face a perfectively competitive environment.
e production function of a nal goods rm is
Yt = at (χnnt + not )αK1−αt , (1.17)
where Yt is the output, nnt are the workers who switch to new jobs, and not are the workers who
nd jobs from unemployment (or those who stay at their current jobs). Employed workers who
switch to new jobs are experienced workers and, thus, have relatively higher productivity χ > 1.
e aggregate technology shock is denoted by at . Due to search-and-matching frictions, these
nal goods rms need to post vacanciesvt with unit costs cv to recruit workers. e lifetime real
prot for nal goods rms is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
[
at (χnnt + not )αK1−αt −wnt nnt −wot not − rkt Kt − cvvt
]
, (1.18)
which describes how nal goods rms rent capital and hire labor for producing goods, but need
to pay wages to households, capital rent to capital goods producers, and vacancy costs. us, we
can solve the rms’ FOCs as follows:
∂nnt : Jnt = χαyt/(χnnt + n0t ) −wnt + Et
[
βt+1(1 − s)(1 − f nt )Jot+1
]
,
∂not : Jot = αyt/(χnnt + n0t ) −wot + Et
[
βt+1(1 − s)(1 − f nt )Jot+1
]
, and
∂Kt : rkt = Yt/Kt .
(1.19)
Here, we can interpret Jnt as the marginal asset value function when rms hire one additional
worker from employment, while Jot is the marginal asset value function when rms hire one
additional worker from unemployment. For a rm–worker match, rms can receive workers’
marginal productivity, but they need to pay wages to the workers. When these workers are
unable to switch to new jobs and these matches survive the separation stage, the probability that
rms can maintain the asset value of existing matches is (1 − s) · (1 − f nt ). Because new jobs
become old jobs in the following period, the asset value of this existing match is Jot+1. e last
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equation, the rst-order condition with regard to capital, describes the capital demand of nal
goods rms. e free entry condition for rms is
cv = qt (1 − s)Etβt+1
ϵ
µ
t ut J
o
t+1 + ϵ
n,µ
t nt J
n
t+1
ϵ
µ
t ut + ϵ
n,µ
t nt
. (1.20)
When a vacancy is posted in the stage of matching, a rm meets job seekers with probability
qt . Due to the assumption of random search, the probability that this rm can meet employed
workers (or unemployed workers) depends on their percentage of total job seekers, which is
ϵ
n,µ
t nt/jst (or ϵµt ut/jst ). Here, job seekers are denoted by jst = ϵµt ut + ϵn,µt nt . Although these
matches are formed, only 1 − s of them can be productive.
1.3.5 Wage Determination
e exible wage is determined through the Nash bargaining problem over the total surplus.17
e bargaining problem for the rm–employed worker match is
max
wnt
(V nt −V ot )ηt (Jnt −V ft )1−ηt , (1.21)
and for the employer–unemployed worker match, it is
max
wot
(V ot )ηt (Jnt −V ft )1−ηt . (1.22)
rough the FOCs of these bargaining problems, wages wnt and wot are determined according to
ηt (Jnt −V ft ) = (1 − ηt )(V nt −V ot ), and
ηt (Jot −V ft ) = (1 − ηt )(V ot −Ut ),
(1.23)
Here, I introduce bargaining power shock ϵηt , proposed by Shimer (2005), to capture the uctua-
tion in wages. e average wage wt is dened as wt = (nntwnt + notwot )/nt .
17When the production function is decreasing return to scale, researchers also use Nash bargaining over the
marginal surplus, as proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), such as in Michaillat (2012) and Elsby and Michaels
(2013). I do not follow this approach, however, since most works in the DSGE literature use total surplus spliing.
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1.3.6 Closing the Model
e resource constraint in the model is
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + cvvt + a(ukt )Kt . (1.24)
Total output will be used for consumption, investment, government expenditures, vacancy costs,
and capital utilization cost. e budget constraint of government is
Tt +
Bt
rt
= utbt +Gt + Bt−1. (1.25)
As in standard medium-scale DSGE models, I assume scal policy as Gt = ϵGt yGyt , where yG
is the steady-state ratio of government spending Gt to total output yt . Here, ϵGt is government
spending shock, which captures demand-side uctuations. In the baseline estimation, I assume
unemployment insurance as a constant b, which will be calibrated in the next section. I con-
sider the time-varying unemployment benet only when I aempt to qualify its contribution to
unemployment uctuations aer on-the-job search is considered.
Seven exogenous shocks are included in this proposed revised model. ese shocks can be
divided to three groups. Technology shock at represents supply-side shock. Preference shock
ϵ
pr
t , investment specic shock ϵ It , and government spending shock ϵGt represent demand-side
shocks. e third group is labor market-related shocks: match eciency shock ϵµt , employed
workers’ matching technology ϵµ,nt , and bargaining power shock ϵ
η
t . I assume that logarithms
of these shocks follow the AR(1) process with coecient ρj and innovation εj,t , which follows
N (0,σ 2j ). Here, j is the index for these shocks. e shock propagation process in the model is
ln jt = (1 − ρj) ln j¯ + ρj ln jt−1 + εj,t ,
where j¯ is the steady state of these shocks.
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1.4 Econometrics Strategy
My quantitative analyses are based the model proposed in Section 1.3. I estimate the log-linearized
approximation of both the proposed model with on-the-job search and the one without it.18 Be-
cause the data used for estimating the log-linearized models are detrended or demeaned, the pa-
rameters related to steady states cannot be determined in the estimation procedure. I pin down
such parameters using external information rather than data for estimation. e remaining free
parameters unrelated to steady states are estimated using the Bayesian method.
1.4.1 Data
I use quarterly, seasonally adjusted U.S. data spanning the 1959:Q1–2017:Q1 periods for estima-
tion. ese data are drawn from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Fallick and Fleischman
(2004), and Barnichon (2010). e number of shocks is the same as the observed variables. For
the model without on-the-job search, I use data on the following six variables: real output (y),
real consumption (c), real investment (I ), real wage (w), unemployment rate (u), and vacancies
(v). Because job openings from FRED are only available aer 2000:Q4, I use the composite Help-
Wanted Index constructed by Barnichon (2010) for vacancies before then. Because the model with
on-the-job search has one additional shock, which is employed workers’ matching technology
shock ϵµ,nt , I use the ratio of the job nding rate of employed workers f nt to the job nding rate
of unemployed workers f ut as one of the observed variables. ese job nding rates are taken
from Fallick and Fleischman (2004)19. Although f nt /f ut begins from 1994:Q1, in the estimation, I
treat f nt /f ut before 1994Q1 as the unobserved latent variable so that I do not have to omit data
on other observed variables with longer durations to match the length of f nt /f ut .
18e model without on-the-job search is based on the model in Section 1.3. When χ is equal to 1, because new
jobs lled by employed workers cannot generate higher productivity, rms have no incentives to reallocate these
employed workers from current jobs to new jobs. us, rms only hire workers from unemployment to increase the
labor numbers. erefore, the free entry condition in Equation (1.20) also becomes the one in standard models: all
new vacancy postings are lled by unemployed workers. Moreover, χ = 1 also leads the wage premium to be equal
to zero. All seings in the model and value functions in Equations (1.11) and (1.19) are those seen in the standard
models without on-the-job searches. erefore, as χ is equal to one, my proposed model is the same as the standard
model without on-the-job search.
19e job nding rates they oer are seasonally unadjusted. I transform them to seasonally adjusted data using
Census X-13ARIMA-SEATS.
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For the robustness check, I estimate the NK DSGE model modied based on my proposed
model in Section 1.3. In the estimation of the NK model, except for the variables above, I include
the nominal interest rates and ination. During the zero lower bound (ZLB) period, under the
observed Federal Eective Rate, the Taylor rule is inadequate for describing the central bank’s
monetary policy in a log-linearized model. To avoid this issue, I replace the interest rate during
the ZLB period with the shadow rate constructed by Wu and Xia (2016) so that interest con-
tinues to decrease during this period. erefore, the Taylor rule can beer capture the central
bank’s monetary policy during the ZLB period. e connection between the shadow rate and
monetary policy during the ZLB period can be seen in Wu and Zhang (2017). When I estimate
the importance of unemployment insurance in explaining unemployment uctuations, I use real
unemployment insurance (b) as an additional observed variable. Trending data such as output,
consumption, investment, and wage are detrended by removing the linear trend from their logs,
and I demean the remaining variables in the logarithm. In the appendices, I provide my data
sources in detail and explain how these data series are constructed.
1.4.2 Calibration
Table 1.1 summarizes how the parameters that aect steady state are calibrated according to their
corresponding targets. As in most works, such as Michaillat (2012) and Christiano et al. (2016),
I set the steady-state unemployment rates in my model as sample averages. e discount factor
β is set at 0.99. e quarterly separation rate s is set according to the monthly separation rate
constructed by Shimer (2012a). e capital depreciation rate δ is chosen by following conven-
tion. According to Michaillat (2012), the output elasticity of labor α is set such that the model
labor share is two-thirds. e unit cost of a vacancy posting cv is set such that the total vacancy
costs-to-wages ratio is 1% of wages per the suggestion of Pissarides (2009). Moreover, the bar-
gaining power of workers is set so that the steady-state unemployment insurance-to-wage ratio
is 0.4, as recommended by Furlaneo and Groshenny (2016) and Christiano et al. (2016). For the
model with on-the-job search, employed workers’ job nding rate (or quit rate) f n is set as 0.06
according to Zandweghe (2010). e relative productivity χ of employed workers who switch
jobs is set according to the strategy of Tu¨zemen (2017), which in turn was based on the ndings
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Table 1.1: Calibration
Parameters/Steady State Value Target
Steady-State Unemployment Rate: u¯ 0.058 Sample Average (1959:Q1–2017:Q1)
Structure Parameter
Discount Factor: β 0.99 Convention
Risk Aversion: σc 2 Convention
Capital Depreciation Rate: δ 0.025 Convention
Gov’t Spending to
Gross Output Ratio: G/Y 0.2 Convention
Separation Rate: s 0.1 Sample Average: Shimer (2012a)
Labor Elasticity: α 0.677 Labor Share: 2/3, Michaillat (2012)
Unit Vacancy Cost: cv 0.121 cv/w¯ = 0.01 (Pissarides (2009))
Bargaining Power: η 0.804 b¯/w¯ = 0.4 (Christiano et al. (2016))
On-the-Job-Search-Related Parameters
it Rate: f¯ n 0.06 Zandweghe (2010)
Relative Productivity: χ 1.5 Tu¨zemen (2017), Davis et al. (2013)
Note: is table reports non-estimated parameters as quarterly frequencies based on the strategy reported
in Section 1.4.
in Davis et al. (2013). As in Christiano et al. (2016) (and indeed most literature), I set the ratio of
government spending to output as 0.2. Based on these chosen values, all model steady-state vari-
ables can be derived. For the NK models, I follow a similar strategy to pin down these parameters
but only choose a steady-state price markup of 10%.
1.4.3 Bayesian Estimation
e estimated parameters are consumption habit persistence ξc , matching elasticity ξ , investment
adjustment costκI , capital utilization costϕ2, unemployment insurance-related parameters, AR(1)
coecients, and standard deviation for shocks. For the NK model, price indexation ζp , Calvo
probability ϕp , and the Taylor Rule parameters are also estimated. Table 1.2 summarizes the prior
distributions of these parameters. First, if the parameter value lies between zero and one, I will
choose Beta distribution as prior density. Second, if the parameter value is larger than zero, then
Inverse Gamma distribution is used. ird, for parameters with no restriction on their ranges,
I use normal distribution. e prior mean and standard deviation are chosen so that possible
26
Table 1.2: Prior Distribution
Name Prior Shape (Mean, Std.)
Baseline
Consumption Habit Persistence: ξ c B (0.7, 0.1)
Matching Elasticity of Job Seekers: ξ B (0.5, 0.15)
Inv. Adjustment Cost κI IG (5.0, 1.5)
Capital Utilization Cost ϕ2 IG (0.5, 0.1)
AR(1) Coecients & Std.
ρ j B (0.5, 0.2)
σ j IG (0.01,∞)
Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment Relation: ϕu N (0.2, 0.1)
Wage Relation: ϕw N (0.25, 0.1)
New Keynesian
Phillips Curve
Price Indexation: ζ p B (0.5, 0.2)
Calvo Probability: ϕp B (0.6, 0.1)
Taylor Rule
Interest Smoothing: ϕR B (0.7, 0.1)
Feedback to Output: ϕy N (0.5, 0.1)
Feedback to Ination: ϕpi N (1.5, 0.1)
Note: is table reports prior distributions (together with mean and standard
deviation) for parameters in the baseline model and additional parameters in
a NK DSGE model.
parameters suggested in the literature are more likely to be drawn from prior distributions. In the
estimation, I connect the model to observed data series Xt through the measurement equations,
and use a log-linearized model as a transition equation. e state space model can be wrien as
Xt = Φ0Zt + Φ1e
m
t ,
Zt = Ψ0Zt−1 + Ψ1et .
(1.26)
e rst equation is a measurement equation, and the second one is the log-linearized model. In
Equation (1.26), I dene the vector of observed data asXt , the vector of model variables as Zt , the
vector of measurement error as emt , and the vector of structural shocks as et . Table 1.3 contains
the posterior mode and 90% credible set results. e parameters estimates for the model with
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on-the-job search and the one without it are both reported. I obtained the posterior distribution
of parameters using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. I ran 1,000,000 draws from two chains
and dropped the rst half of each chain.
e estimation results for the model without on-the-job search are in line with those from
the previous related literature (see e.g., Pace and Villa (2016)). Because this is the rst paper
estimating a DSGE model with on-the-job search, I compare my estimations results with those
in Sedla´c˘ek (2016), which uses a non-DSGE approach. Unlike my paper estimating a full DSGE
model, he only estimates a matching function similar to Equation (1.3), which includes job seekers
from employment and outside of the labor force, and also considers matching eciency shock.
Although Sedla´c˘ek (2016) does not estimate a DSGE model with on-the-job search, his work
considers employed job seekers and matching eciency so I use his estimation results as the
benchmarks. e main dierence between my estimation and his is in matching elasticity ξ . In
my estimation, the posterior mode of ξ is 0.55, regardless of whether or not employed job seekers
are included in my estimation. is nding is dierent from Sedla´c˘ek (2016). His work found that
aer non-unemployed job seekers were considered in the estimation, ξ increased from 0.5 to 0.76,
which is higher than most other studies suggest. is dierence comes from the two sources.
First, we use dierent variables for estimation. Particularly, Sedla´c˘ek (2016) directly uses hiring
for estimation, while I do not use it.20 Second, dierent estimation strategies are used. Sedla´c˘ek
(2016) uses the extended Kalman lter for estimation. However, I use log-linearized models. In
addition to ξ , in my estimation, parameters (ρµ , eµ) related to propagation in matching eciency
processes are also similar whether or not on-the-job search is incorporated. us, any biases
in matching eciency that I show are due to a dierence in models, rather than dierences in
parameters.
1.5 Analysis
In this section, I rst argue that models that include employed job seekers beer t the data,
particularly hiring dynamics. Second, I show that models that consider only unemployed workers
20Because I want to indicate the hiring biases in DSGE models that consider only unemployed workers as job
seekers, I have not used hiring as an observed variable in this paper.
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Table 1.3: Posterior Mode and 90% Credible Set
On-the-Job Search Standard
ξ c 0.94, [0.93, 0.95] 0.84, [0.82, 0.9]
ξ 0.55, [0.53, 0.58] 0.55, [0.52, 0.56]
κI 9.82, [9.74, 10.62] 9.2, [8.79, 9.91]
ϕ2 0.61, [0.61, 0.69] 0.3, [0.29, 0.35]
ρa 0.98, [0.97, 0.99] 0.98, [0.97, 0.99]
ρη 0.63, [0.62, 0.7] 0.85, [0.83, 0.89]
ρµ,n 0.97, [0.94, 0.99]
ρµ 0.97, [0.96, 0.99] 0.97, [0.95, 0.99]
ρpr 0.02, [0.0, 0.05] 0.12, [0.04, 0.16]
ρI 0.25, [0.16, 0.27] 0.35, [0.26, 0.37]
ρG 0.9, [0.87, 0.91] 0.92, [0.89, 0.95]
ea 0.01, [0.01, 0.01] 0.01, [0.01, 0.01]
eµ 0.05, [0.04, 0.05] 0.05, [0.05, 0.05]
eη 0.03, [0.02, 0.03] 0.03, [0.03, 0.03]
eµ,n 0.07, [0.07, 0.08]
epr 0.42, [0.36, 0.5] 0.16, [0.14, 0.22]
eI 0.19, [0.18, 0.21] 0.17, [0.15, 0.19]
eG 0.04, [0.04, 0.04] 0.04, [0.03, 0.04]
ϕu 0.14, [0.09, 0.15] 0.44, [0.45, 0.48]
ϕw 0.5, [0.45, 0.51] 0.28, [0.28, 0.33]
ρb 0.94, [0.91, 0.96] 0.96, [0.93, 0.97]
eb 0.1, [0.09, 0.1] 0.1, [0.09, 0.11]
Note: is table reports posterior mode
and a 90% credible set based on RBC mod-
els with unemployment insurance. Both
the model with on-the-job search (le col-
umn) and the standard model (right col-
umn) are reported here.
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Table 1.4: Data Moments and Model Moments
Data y c I u v
Volatility 1 0.889 2.111 5.622 4.8
Autocorrelation 0.971 0.964 0.968 0.977 0.950
Correlation 1 0.234 0.805 -0.663 0.435
1 0.046 -0.355 0.250
1 -0.483 0.581
1 -0.722
1
Proposed Model
with On-the-Job Search
Volatility 1 0.949 2.695 3.102 5.525
Autocorrelation 0.989 0.995 0.985 0.858 0.888
Correlation 1 0.78 0.883 -0.566 0.588
1 0.446 -0.223 0.213
1 -0.632 0.608
1 -0.672
1
Standard Model
without On-the-Job Search
Volatility 1 1.180 2.049 3.049 3.590
Autocorrelation 0.99 0.985 0.972 0.844 0.787
Correlation 1 0.912 0.861 -0.417 0.321
1 0.709 -0.353 0.257
1 -0.441 0.338
1 -0.366
1
Note: Data moments are based on quarterly, detrended, and season-
ally adjusted data series. e sample period is 1957:Q1–2017:Q1.
Model theoretical moments are generated based on a log-linearized
model based on the posterior mode and calibrated values. Volatility
is dened as the variable of standard deviation relative to the output.
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as job seekers (i.e., the models without on-the-job search) underestimate the decline of matching
eciency during the Great Recession. ird, due to this underestimation, these models without
on-the-job search also fail to correctly identify sources of unemployment uctuations. e model
parameters are set based on Table 1.1 and the posterior mode.
1.5.1 Model Evaluation
I rst examine model performance by comparing model-generated moments with their empirical
counterparts in U.S. data. I focus on the volatility and autocorrelation of outputy, consumption c ,
investment I , unemployment rateu, and vacanciesv and the correlations between these variables.
ese moments are standard for evaluating model performance and widely used in the literature
(e.g., Michaillat 2012). I consider two models here: one is my proposed revised model with on-
the-job search, and the another one is a standard model that only considers unemployed workers
as job seekers (i.e., my proposed model with χ = 1). Table 1.4 contains data moments and the
moments generated based on both models. Overall, both models t these important moments
well. Both of them can generate autocorrelations that are similar to the scenarios demonstrated
by the data. In particular, whether or not on-the-job search is introduced into the model, both can
generate a relatively higher volatility of labor unemployment rates and vacancies. As observed in
the data, the relationship between unemployment rates and vacancies is negative in both models.
However, when a model incorporates on-the-job search, it can generate higher volatility of these
labor market variables; in addition, the magnitude of correlation between the unemployment
rates and vacancies are then closer to the correlation shown in the data. us, introducing on-
the-job search improves the model performance, and this nding is consistent with other works
based on DSGE models with on-the-job search, such as Tu¨zemen (2017).
Hiring Dynamics: In-Sample Fit
In addition to data moments, I evaluate the models’ performance by hiring dynamics. When the
models do not consider on-the-job search, they fail to generate the hiring dynamics during the
Great Recession and its aermath. Figure 1.3 compares the estimates of model hires and data
hires. When the models (i.e., the standard models in the literature) consider only unemployed
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Figure 1.3: Model and Data Hires
Note: is gure reports observed hires (solid line), the estimates of hires based on my model with on-the-job search
(blue dashed line), and the one based on models without on-the-job search (green line with cross markers). Model
hires are generated based on the estimated posterior mode and calibrated parameters. e gray shaded areas indicate
NBER recession periods. Data source for observed hires: FRED.
workers as job seekers, they can predict only 40 percent of the total decline in hiring during the
Great Recession. In addition, these models also fail to explain the sluggishness of hiring growth
seen aer the Great Recession. In contrast, the proposed model with on-the-job search can gen-
erate a roughly similar decline in hiring during the Great Recession. Aer the Great Recession,
hiring in my proposed model returns to the pre-recession level aer ve years, consistent with
what can be observed.
To beer understand the goodness of t of my model, I follow Leduc and Liu (2017) and com-
pute the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) for hiring ht , vacancy lling rate qt , and hiring-to-
unemployment ratio ht/ut .21 As shown in Table 1.5 incorporating on-the-job search improves
the model’s t in these variables. Because the vacancy lling rate is dened as hiring divided by
total number of vacancies, and the conventional job nding rate is dened as hiring divided by
the total number of unemployed workers, the accuracy of the estimates of these two rates depend
21is is used as unemployed workers’ job nding rate in the standard models in which the total population of
job seekers only consists of the number of unemployed workers.
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Table 1.5: In-Sample Predictions: RMSEs
ht ht/ut qt
Standard Model 0.0894 0.101 0.099
On-the-Job Search 0.0701 0.060 0.074
Improvement 22% 40% 26%
Note: is table reports the numbers of RMSEs
calculated based on detrended data and predic-
tions from both models. Improvement is dened
as the percentage decrease in the RMSEs aer
the model considers the number of employed job
seekers.
on whether or not a model can correctly generate hiring. erefore, my model with on-the-job
search explains these two rates beer.
is discrepancy, between the standard models’ predictions and the actual hires, emerges be-
cause the number of unemployed workers is not a good proxy for the entire population of job
seekers. During the Great Recession, the unemployment rate rose from 6 percent to its peak
of around 10 percent. Because the numbers of job seekers and vacancies positively aect hires
through matching functions, when a model only considers unemployed workers as job seekers,
the increases in unemployment during the Great Recession push hires up, and therefore less
decline in hiring is generated. Aer the Great Recession, the number of unemployed workers
remained higher than it was before recession until 2014:Q3. Hence, when the population of job
seekers is comprised of only unemployed workers, the high level of unemployed workers and the
increases of vacancies together boost these models’ hires. e sluggish recovery of hires during
the post-recession period therefore cannot be predicted by these models that do not take into
account on-the-job search.
Aer on-the-job search is incorporated, the uctuations of job seekers are smaller than unem-
ployment uctuations; this is because the number of employed job seekers moves procyclically,
while the number of unemployed workers moves countercyclically. erefore, the hiring dy-
namics are mainly determined by vacancy uctuations. As noted previously, during the Great
Recession, vacancies decreased by 60 percent; my proposed revised model that incorporates on-
the-job search therefore can explain the sharp decline in hires. Aer the Great Recession, both
employed job seekers and vacancies increased sluggishly. erefore, aer on-the-job search is in-
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Table 1.6: Out-of-Sample Predictions: RMSEs
One Period Ahead ht ht/ut qt vt
Standard Model 0.200 0.225 0.101 0.229
On-the-Job Search 0.132 0.131 0.075 0.152
Improvement 34% 42% 26% 34 %
Two Periods Ahead
Standard Model 0.223 0.431 0.248 0.436
On-the-Job Search 0.201 0.339 0.168 0.349
Improvement 10% 21% 32% 20 %
Note: is table reports the numbers of RMSEs cal-
culated based on detrended data and predictions from
both models for the out-of-sample exercise. Improve-
ment is dened as the percentage decrease in the RM-
SEs aer the model considers the number of employed
job seekers.
corporated, my model can explain why hiring did not return to pre-recession levels until 2014:Q3.
Hiring Dynamics: Out-of-Sample Forecast
e previous section analyzes the goodness of the model’s t by in-sample estimates of hiring.
To beer evaluate a model’s prediction ability, I estimate these two models by the data from
1959:Q1–2006:Q4, and forecast model variables from 2007:Q1 to 2017:Q1.
e one period (i.e., quarter) ahead forecast in hiring is similar to the results presented in Figure
1.3 for both models before 2014:Q3. e proposed model with on-the-job search can well predict
the sharp decline during the Great Recession and the sluggish recovery of hiring aerwards,
while the standard models cannot. Aer 2014:Q3, observed hiring rose back to the pre-recession
level. However, in this out-of-sample forecast exercise, both models fail to predict the rising of
hiring aer 2014:Q3, as they cannot explain the increase in the number of job vacancies aer
2014:Q3.
e reason is the low level of the total number of job seekers. As seen in Figure 1.1, the
economic recovery leads the number of unemployed workers to be lower than the pre-recession
level aer 2014:Q3. In addition, the number of employed job seekers never rose back to the
pre-recession level. Because both models can well explain the dynamics in the number of job
seekers, they suggest a smaller pool of job seekers. erefore, both models predict that rms are
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less likely to meet job seekers and that rms’ incentives to post job vacancies will decrease, rather
than predicting the rise in the vacancies as observed aer 2014:Q3. Because hiring is positively
related to vacancies and job seekers, both models therefore fail to explain the increase in hiring
aer 2014:Q3.
Table 1.6 reports the numbers of RMSEs for one period and the two periods ahead forecast
for hiring ht , hiring-to-unemployment ratio ht/ut , vacancy lling rate qt , and vacancies vt . Al-
though the goodness of t of both models decreases in the out-of-sample prediction exercises, my
proposed model with on-the-job search still ts these variables beer than the standard models.
1.5.2 Bias in Matching Eciency
When the models include employed job seekers, they predict smaller uctuations in labor mar-
ket tightness, which increases the magnitude of decline in matching eciency, as discussed in
Section 1.2 through steady-state equations. Figure 1.4 shows the evidence supporting the fact
that my argument in Section 1.2 still holds in the dynamic models. In this graph, I compare the
estimates of matching eciency shocks based on the proposed model that includes on-the-job
searches and the one based on the models that assume only unemployed workers are job seekers.
When on-the-job searching by employed workers is incorporated into the model, the predicted
matching eciency declines 40 percent for the Great Recession and its aermath. By contrast,
in the models that consider only unemployed workers as job seekers, the matching eciency
declines by around 20 percent.
Although this paper is the rst work that shows such dierences in the estimates of matching
eciency by the use of DSDE models, Sedla´c˘ek (2016) oered similar conclusions by estimating
the matching function,22 rather than a DSGE model. In spite of similar conclusions in the esti-
mates of matching eciency, the underlying mechanisms are dierent. In his work, he directly
used hires as an observed variable. His argument is based on omied variable errors. Because
fewer employed workers search for jobs during a recession, unemployed workers are more likely
to nd jobs. Hence, without including employed job seekers in the estimation, the decline in
matching eciency is underestimated. He only focused on the biases in the estimates of match-
22In the appendices, I compare my estimates of matching eciency with Sela´c˘ek’s.
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Figure 1.4: Matching Eciency
Note: is gure reports the estimates of matching eciency shock, based on the posterior mode and calibrated
parameters. e blue dashed line represents matching eciency shock based on standard models without on-the-
job search, while the black line represents the one based on my model with on-the-job search. e gray-shaded areas
indicate NBER recession periods.
ing eciency.
However, my argument is based on the nature of the model with labor search-and-matching
frictions. e uctuations in unemployed workers’ job nding rate f ut in such models depends
on the changes in labor market tightness and that in matching eciency. An shown in Section
1.2, because the number of employed job seekers moves procyclically while unemployment is
countercyclical, the models that include job searches from employment predict lower uctuations
in job seekers and thus smaller changes in labor market tightness. My proposed model with on-
the-job search consequently shows that the fraction of the changes in f ut that should be aributed
to the uctuations in matching eciency would increase.
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1.5.3 Sources of Unemployment Rates
e previous subsection demonstrates that standard models, which consider only unemployed
workers as job seekers, underestimated the declines in matching eciency that occurred dur-
ing the Great Recession. Because the decrease in matching eciency means that mismatches
between rms and workers arise more frequently, matching eciency negatively aects unem-
ployment. erefore, the underestimation of the decline in matching eciency leads standard
models to calculate the contributions of matching eciency to unemployment uctuations at lev-
els that are lower than those experienced. Because the contributions of matching eciency are
underestimated, standard models overestimate the impact of other channels on unemployment
uctuations. I thus oer quantitative analyses and show that standard models fail to correctly
identify the sources of unemployment uctuations.
In the rst exercise, I shut down the uctuation of matching eciency during and aer the
Great Recession to compute corresponding counterfactual unemployment rates, which uctu-
ated because of the changes in other channels, except matching eciency. erefore, the dier-
ence between the observed and counterfactual unemployment rates measures the contribution of
mismatching eciency to unemployment uctuations. e second analysis is based on historical
decomposition, which explains what percentage of the variable (e.g., unemployment) uctua-
tions can be aributed to a shock. is exercise is used to quantify the overestimation of other
channels to unemployment changes during the Great Recession. I use unemployment insurance
as the example.
Figure 1.5 presents the observed and the counterfactual unemployment rates. During the Great
Recession, the unemployment rate increased from 5 percent to around 10.5 percent. In the stan-
dard models assuming that only unemployed workers are job seekers, aer the uctuation of
matching eciency was shut down, the unemployment rate rose to around 9 percent. us, the
standard models suggest approximately 27 percent of the increase in the unemployment rate dur-
ing the Great Recession is accounted for by matching eciency. is nding is consistent with
previous research that does not consider employed job seekers, such as the works based on non-
DSGE approaches (e.g., S¸ahin et al. 2014) or those based on DSGE models (e.g., Furlaneo and
Groshenny 2016). However, when on-the-job searching by employed job seekers is considered,
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Figure 1.5: Counterfactual Unemployment Rate
Note: is gure shows the observed unemployment rate (black solid line) and the counterfactual unemployment
rate aer shuing down the uctuation of matching eciency during the Great Recession and its aermath. e blue
dashed line indicates the counterfactual unemployment rate based on the model with on-the-job search, while the
green line with circle markers represents the counterfactual unemployment rate based on standard models without
on-the-job search. e dierence between the counterfactual unemployment rate and observed unemployment rate
is the contribution of matching eciency to the increase in the unemployment rate. Data source for the observed
unemployment rate: FRED.
the counterfactual unemployment rate based on the proposed model rises to approximately 7.5
percent. My proposed model shows that around 54 percent of the increase in the unemployment
rate during the Great Recession is aributed to matching eciency. erefore, when models do
not include employed job seekers, they are unable to identify 27 percent of the increase in the un-
employment rate, which actually should be aributed to changes in matching eciency during
the Great Recession.
Additional evidence is based on the historical shock decomposition of the unemployment rate.
Figure 1.6 reports the historical shock decomposition for matching eciency shock. Two features
are worth noting in this gure. First, similar to previous research that does not consider on-
the-job search, such as Furlaneo and Groshenny (2016), the importance of matching eciency
in explaining unemployment uctuations increases aer the Great Recession. is result holds
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Figure 1.6: Historical Decomposition: ϵµt
Note: is gure represents the contribution of matching eciency shock to unemployment uctuations based on
historical decomposition. e dark gray shaded area represents the result based on models without on-the-job search.
e light gray shaded area represents the excess contribution of matching eciency in my model with on-the-job
search.
whether or not on-the-job search is introduced into the models. Second, aer on-the-job search is
considered in the model, the contributions of matching eciency to unemployment uctuations
increase by around 20 percent, which is consistent with the previous counterfactual analysis.
ese exercises have important policy implications. In the DSGE model, the decline in match-
ing eciency represents the increases in the degree of skill or demographic mismatches between
rms and workers during recessions. As the contribution of matching eciency is lower in the
standard DSGE models, the importance of mismatches in explaining unemployment uctuation
is overlooked in the previous DSGE literature. ese exercises suggest that, to decrease the un-
employment rate, the government should consider not only scal and monetary policies but also
the provision of job search assistance.
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Figure 1.7: Historical Decomposition: ϵbt
Note: is gure presents the contribution of unemployment insurance shock to unemployment uctuations based
on historical decomposition. e dark gray shaded area represents the result based on models with on-the-job
search. e light gray shaded area represents the excess contribution of unemployment insurance shock in the
standard models without on-the-job search.
Other Channels: Unemployment Insurance
Due to biases in hiring, standard models that do not incorporate on-the-job search underesti-
mate the importance of matching eciency in explaining unemployment uctuations. erefore,
one may wonder whether the standard models overestimate the contributions of other channels.
Some researchers (e.g., Zhang 2017) have relied on the results of DSGE models to emphasized the
importance of unemployment insurance in explaining the increases in the unemployment rate
during the Great Recession. However, these studies all assume that only unemployed workers are
job seekers. I explore the example of unemployment insurance based on Zhang (2017) because
her work considered both unemployment insurance and matching eciency in a standard model
without on-the-job search. She assumes that unemployment insurance bt is set as
bt/b¯ = (wt/w¯)ϕw (ut−1/u¯)ϕuϵbt , (1.27)
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which states that the change in unemployment insurance at the end of a given period depends on
changes in wages in a current period and the unemployment rate at the beginning of that same
period. e exogenous unemployment insurance shock ϵbt is used to capture spontaneous policy
changes. e role of ϵbt here is similar to that of monetary policy shock in the Taylor rule.
Here, b¯, w¯ , and u¯ are steady-state unemployment insurance, wages, and unemployment rates,
respectively. I follow the assumptions used by most researchers, including Zhang (2017), and
assume the steady state of unemployment insurance as a fraction of wages. erefore, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the dynamics of unemployment insurance depend on changes in wages.
Moreover, as the unemployment rates increase, the government adjusts unemployment insurance
accordingly. For example, as shown in Zhang (2017), typically, unemployment insurance rates
increase by 10 percent during recessions. It is thus reasonable to assume that changes in unem-
ployment insurance during a period are related to the unemployment rate that the government
observes. Parameters ϕu and ϕw describe the relationship between unemployment insurance and
wages, and the unemployment rate.
Figure 1.7 reports the historical shock decomposition for unemployment insurance shock.
When my models do not consider on-the-job search, during the Great Recession and its aer-
math, unemployment insurance accounts for around 25 percent of unemployment uctuation. In
other words, unemployment insurance increased the unemployment rate by 1.5 percent during
the Great Recession. is result is consistent with the nding of Zhang (2017). However, when
I incorporate employed job seekers in the models, the contribution of unemployment insurance
shock decreases by 10 percent. us, the standard models, which assume only unemployed work-
ers are job seekers, overestimate the contribution of unemployment insurance to unemployment
uctuations.
1.6 Conclusion
Standard DSGE models with labor search-and-matching frictions usually assume that the popula-
tion of job seekers is only comprised of unemployed workers, although in reality, hiring from the
ranks of employed workers matches or exceeds hiring from the ranks of the unemployed. To un-
derstand and quantify biases caused by this unrealistic assumption, I develop DSGE models that
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incorporate on-the-job searches. is paper shows that the standard models’ unrealistic assump-
tions about the full pool of job seekers explain the failure of such models to predict the 25 percent
decline in hiring witnessed during the Great Recession and explain why hiring in the post-Great
Recession period failed to return to pre-recession levels as quickly as the standard models had
predicted. is paper further nds that standard models are unable to identify sources of un-
employment uctuations correctly because of this unrealistic assumption. Without considering
on-the-job searches, these standard models generate lower contributions of mismatches between
unemployed workers and rms (i.e., matching eciency) to unemployment uctuations, while
overestimating contributions from other channels, such as unemployment insurance. Based on
these ndings, future works based on DSGE models with labor search-and-matching frictions
should relax this conventional assumption and incorporate employed job seekers and should not
overlook the importance of matching eciency in explaining unemployment uctuations.
Although the model incorporates employed workers’ searches and exogenous matching e-
ciency shocks, this paper xes the labor force as constant and does not introduce endogenous
matching eciency. Elsby et al. (2015a) emphasized the importance of the transition between
unemployment and being totally outside of the labor force in explaining unemployment rate
uctuations. In addition, matching eciency can also be an endogenous variable. Davis et al.
(2013) showed the importance of recruiting intensity for understanding uctuations in hiring.
ese choices of rms may inuence matching eciency endogenously. is work also does not
consider heterogeneity in rms. For example, Decker et al. (2014) examined the importance of
rm heterogeneity in explaining employment uctuation. In addition, the impact of on-the-job
search on the transmission of monetary policy based on the Taylor rule is not addressed by my
present work. Future research should extend my framework to incorporate those who are out of
the labor force, rms’ search eorts, and the heterogeneity of rms.
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Chapter 2
A Bayesian-Estimated Labor Search-and-Matching
Model with Job Rationing
2.1 Introduction
Using the search-and-matching models that permit jobs to be rationed, studies such as Michaillat
(2012) have claimed that instead of matching frictions (or search frictions), the increases in unem-
ployment seen during recessions are mainly accounted for by job rationing. Although Michaillat
demonstrates convincingly that the unemployment due to job rationing dominates in the portion
of the parameter space he considers, it remains an open question that is his calibration strategy,
which allow jobs rationing to exist in a model, supported by data like unemployment, vacancy
and output?1 In addition, it remains unknown whether Michaillat’s model that permits job ra-
tioning can outperform a more standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) style search-and-
matching model (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides 1994) in capturing data such as unemployment,
vacancy and output. In this paper, I apply Baysian estimation methods to Michaillat’s model
and a baseline DMP model to examine these two questions. Although I nd that the Michiallat
model outperforms the DMP model, when I decompose unemployment according to its sources,
matching frictions and job rationing, my estimation results do not support the existence of job
rationing in the United States during the time period I consider (1964:Q1–2015:Q3).
Since job rationing cannot be directly observed in reality, researchers must rely on models in
which jobs can be rationed to measure the importance of job rationing increases in unemploy-
ment during recessions. Answering the above two questions can help us develop a beer model
to analyze job rationing. Moreover, knowing the existence and amount of job rationing also has
1Ramo´n Garcı´a and Sorolla (2017) also discuss rationing unemployment based on a calibrated model. eir work
consider both U.S. and Spain and their results are consistent with Michaillat (2012). Because Ramo´n Garcı´a and
Sorolla (2017) use Michaillat’s results as benchmark, I also use Michaillat’s model and results as benchmark in this
paper.
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important policy implications. Job rationing can be eliminated by using scal or monetary policy
to increase the aggregate demand in an economy, while the government can oer search assis-
tance to decrease matching frictions. e answers to the two questions posed by this paper are
also important for helping policymaker choose suitable tools to decrease unemployment.
e standard labor search-and-matching models consider only frictional unemployment. Since
rms in these models need to pay vacancy costs (in addition to wage) for job postings to hire
workers, such costs cause themarginal productivity of labor (MPL) and the marginal rate of sub-
stitution (MRS) between leisure and consumption to be unequal. erefore, equilibrium unem-
ployment exists in these models, and vacancy costs represent the matching frictions. As vacancy
costs vanish, MPL becomes equal to MRS between leisure and consumption, and so there will be
no unemployment in these standard models. Because unemployment in these standard models is
aributed to matching frictions, researchers are unable to analyze job rationing using these stan-
dard models. erefore, Michaillat (2012) proposed a model in which both matching frictions and
job rationing exist in equilibrium. He introduced two mechanisms, wage rigidity and decreasing
return to scale (DRS) technology of production, into the standard search-and-matching models
so that job rationing could be generated. In his model, even though matching frictions disappear,
because wage rigidity prevented MPL from being equal to MRS between leisure and consump-
tion, unemployment still exist in equilibrium. Such unemployment in the absence of matching
frictions is called rationing unemployment, which is caused by job rationing.
In quantitative exercises, Michaillat showed that job rationing is a major source of unemploy-
ment uctuations during periods of recession. In other words, rationing unemployment, the
amount of unemployment as a result of job rationing is countercyclical and is higher than that of
frictional unemployment during the periods of recession. Michaillat asserts that during a reces-
sion, vacancies can be lled easily because there are more unemployed workers seeking jobs than
usual. Because this implies that matching frictions decrease, he claimed most unemployment is
accounted for by job rationing in a recession.
Michaillat’s ndings and argument are based on models that permit job rationing and his cal-
ibration strategy. In his paper, however, Michaillat did not do any comparisons to determine
whether alternative models t the data beer. If the standard models without job rationing t
the data beer than his models, the existence of rationing unemployment is questionable. In
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addition, Michaillat calibrates his model parameters so that job rationing occurs in steady state
models. Since the dynamics of model variables uctuate around their steady states, his calibration
strategy favors the existence of rationing unemployment, and the argument that the major por-
tion of unemployment uctuations during the recessions are not aributed to matching frictions.
However, the calibrated parameters he use may not be supported by data.
e models used in this paper are based on Michaillat (2012). Since exogenous uctuations
can be introduced by supply-side, demand-side and labor search frictions in labor search-and-
matching models, in addition to technology shock serving as a supply side shock, I also intro-
duce matching eciency and demand shock into Michaillat’s model. As there are three shocks
in the model, I am able to use three data series–the unemployment rate, job vacancy postings
and output–for estimation. I introduce the demand shocks because Michaillat (2012) suggested
introducing this shock an extension of his work. Moreover, matching eciency shocks represent
the ability of the labor market to match unemployed workers and rms’ job postings. Match-
ing eciency shocks have also been widely introduced and examined by current literature (e.g.,
Cheremukhin and Restrepo-Echavarria 2014). erefore, I consider the matching eciency shock
in the model.
Bayesian methods of estimation are suitable and appropriate tools to answer these questions
for following two reasons. First, dierence between prior and posterior density can be used to
examine whether or not data support the existence of jobs rationing. In this research, I designed
the prior distributions of parameters such that the probability that jobs rationing exists is equal
to 1/2 in the model’s steady state. In other words, before any information of data is incorporated
in the estimation, I believe that the steady state probability that jobs rationing occurs in a model
is 1/2. Because model variables uctuate around its steady state, this design of prior distributions
can also help us observe the changes in the dynamics of the model’s implied job rationing, aer
data is incorporated for estimating parameters. Aer observed data are used for estimation,
the posterior distributions of these parameters are updated. ese posterior distributions allow
us to measure changes in the probability that job rationing occurs in the model aer data are
considered.
Second, the log marginal data density based on Bayesian methods represents the likelihood that
observed data can be generated from a given model. For example, Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa
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(2013) used it to evaluate the performance of New Keynesian models with nancial frictions. I
thus use the log marginal data density to compare tness of data between the models that permit
jobs rationing and those standard models that cannot.
I use unemployment, job vacancy postings and output from 1964:Q1–2015:Q3 as observed vari-
ables for estimation. Aer estimation, using log marginal data density as criterion, this paper
complements Michaillat (2012) and shows that models which permit job rationing t data bet-
ter than standard labor search-and-matching models. However, using posterior means (i.e., the
estimated parameters that include information from data) as parameter values, the model used
by Michaillat suggests that rationing unemployment does not exist, even in periods of recession.
is nding shows that the data I used did not support the existence of rationing unemployment.
In addition to the above ndings, I also determined that the amount of rationing unemployment
is negatively related to demand side shock. During the recessions, as aggregate demand declines,
incentives for rms to post jobs decrease, so that it is more likely for job rationing to occur.
Although introducing demand side shocks can help increase the likelihood for a model to have
rationing unemployment, my estimation results still do not support the existence of rationing
unemployment in a model that permits job rationing.
Although I did not nd the evidence of job rationing, the fact that the models, which include
features that could lead job rationing, performs beer than the standard models suggests that job
rationing may occur in other time periods or other countries. Moreover, additional features that
I did not consider in this model, such as price rigidities or credit constraints, may further restrict
labor and aggregate demand, and therefore lead to job rationing. I leave these considerations for
future work.
is paper is also related to Elsby and Michaels (2013) and Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014),
which use Nash Bargaining over marginal surplus and DRS technology. I estimate this type of
model and nd that a rigid wage improves model tness. Several recent studies have also used
Bayesian methods to estimate DSGE with labor search frictions. For example, Christiano et al.
(2016) discussed monetary policy in their model with wages determined by Alternative Oer
Bargaining, Cheremukhin and Restrepo-Echavarria (2014) quantied that source of labor wedge
in the model with labor search friction, and Lubik (2009) explored Shimer’s puzzle by estimating
a DSGE model with search frictions, where wages are determined by surplus spliing. My con-
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Table 2.1: Model Dierences
Flexible Wage Rigid Wage
CRS Technology DMP
DRS Technology M f lexDRS Michaillat
Note: is table reports the models discussed in this paper.
Flexible wage models represent the models that do not
permit job rationing, while the model that include wage
rigidity and DRS technology permits job rationing.
tribution is to oer decomposition of unemployment based on Bayesian estimation. Moreover,
the exible wage in this paper is determined by Nash Bargaining over the marginal surplus. is
paper also contributes literature about New Keynesian model with search frictions such as were
used in Gertler et al. (2008), Trigari (2009), Krause and Lubik (2010) and Zandweghe (2010). I
show that the uctuations of demand side shock are important for the dynamics of rationing
unemployment.
is paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model for estimation. Section 2.3 dis-
cusses the data used for estimation and the replication of Michaillat (2012). Section 2.4 explains
how linearized state space model can be used to discuss rationing and frictional unemployment.
Although Michaillat (2012) used a nonlinear model for quantifying rationing and frictional un-
employment from total unemployment, in this section, I further show that a linearized state
space model suggests similar dynamics in rationing and frictional unemployment as the nonlin-
ear model did. Section 2.5 examines model tness and decomposes historical U.S. unemployment
based on the posterior means. Section 2.6 is the conclusion.
2.2 Models
e model in this paper is mainly based on Michaillat (2012), but there are some dierences be-
tween the model in this paper and Michaillat’s. First, in addition to technology shock (at ), I intro-
duce two new shocks: matching eciency shock (µt ) and demand shocks (zt ). By incorporating
these shocks, I can use three observed time series–unemployment, job vacancy and output–for
estimation.
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e second dierence is in the model’s frequency. Because I use quarterly output as an ob-
served variable, the model frequency is quarterly,2 while Michaillat (2012) used a weekly the
model frequency. Moreover, one trivial dierence is that I reformulate Michaillat’s model to a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model so that demand shocks are able to aect
the dynamics of the model.
Table 2.1 lists the dierences among the models I compare in this paper. e dierences are in
wage seing and technology. Wages can be rigid or exible, and technology can have a constant
return to scale (CRS) or decreasing return to scale (DRS), meaning there are four possible com-
binations. In this paper, I am interested in three of the four possible model congurations. First
is the model which has DRS technology and a rigid wage. is model serves as my benchmark
since this was developed by Michaillat to decompose rationing unemployment. e second one
is the model where wage is determined by Nash Bargaining and technology is CRS. is is the
conventional Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model. And last is the model with a exible
wage and DRS technology, which is widely used in literature.3
2.2.1 Labor Market
In the model, labor is the only input for rms, which are indexed with i ∈ [0, 1]. Firm i posts job
vacancies vit to hire workers at time t . In the model, nit is the number of workers hired by rm i
at time t . Aggregated employment at time t is denoted by nt =
∫ 1
0 nitdi . e unemployment rate
at time t is represented by ut . In addition, the matching technology in the model is CRS and the
function form is
ht = µtu
ξ
t v
1−ξ
t ≤ min{ut ,vt },
where ht is the total number of hires (matches), µt is the time-variant matching eciency shock
and µ is the level of matching eciency in the steady state. Moreover, ξ is matching elasticity
andvt =
∫ 1
0 vitdi is the aggregated vacancy posted by the rms. e tightness of the labor market
2arterly frequency is widely used in the literature on DSGE model with search frictions. For example, Krause
and Lubik (2007), Lubik (2009), Krause and Lubik (2010), Zandweghe (2010), and Christiano et al. (2016) all use
quarterly frequency. Moreover, we can use output data for estimation in quarterly frequency model. us, I think
choosing quarterly frequency is reasonable.
3See Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) and Elsby and Michaels (2013).
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is dened as θt = vt/ut . e job nding rate is dened as f (θt ) = ht/ut = µtθ 1−ξt and vacancy
lling rate is dened as q(θt ) = ht/vt = µtθ−ξt .
In the beginning of the period t , a fraction s of employment will separate exogenously from
the current worker-rm matches. is paper follows Michaillat (2012), where workers who lose
their jobs today are able to search for a new job immediately.4 e dynamic of employment is
wrien as
nt = (1 − s)nt−1 + ht = (1 − s)nt−1 + f (θt )ut , (2.1)
which describes employment at the end of time t are comprised of the employed workers who do
not suer separation and the new matches ht . en, aer normalizing the size of the labor force
to unity, we get
ut = 1 − (1 − s)nt−1 = ut−1 + snt−1. (2.2)
is equation says that employed workers who suer separation during period t − 1, and those
who were already unemployed during that period, together make up the total population of the
unemployed workers in the period t .
Moreover, in the model, when wages are exible, wage wt is determined by bargaining. Since
technology may be DRS, I follow Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) and Elsby and Michaels (2013)
and use the bargaining procedure of Stole and Zwiebel (1996), which can be characterized as
bargaining over marginal productivity to solve exible wage. In the model with rigid wage, I
follow Blanchard and Gal (2010), seing the functional form as wt = waγt where w is the level of
wage, γ is degree of exibility and at is technology shock.
2.2.2 Household
A Household chooses consumption Ct and employment nt to maximize lifetime utility, repre-
sented by
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt − 1
1 − σ
]
, (2.3)
4Zandweghe (2010) discusses the inuence of timing in the transition of employment. He nds that when workers
are able to become productive immediately when they nd a job (the timing in this paper), the model cannot generate
unemployment-vacancy correlations close to the data, but the volatility of vacancies and unemployment are close
to the data. I follow Michaillat (2012), so I do not make any changes in timing sequence.
49
where Ct is aggregated consumption and nt =
∫ 1
0 nitdi is aggregate labor supply of household.
Households are subject to budget constraints, calculated as
Ct +Tt =Wt + but + Πt . (2.4)
In equation (2.4), Wt is income from employed household members and equals to
∫ 1
0 nitwitdi ,
wherewit is the wage rm i oered to workers at time t . Moreover, the unemployment insurance
payments are b, so the income from unemployed household members is but , and Tt is the lump-
sum tax.
e representative household maximizes lifetime utility as displayed in equation (2.3) and sub-
ject to equation (2.4). In a household’s problem, the rst order condition is
C−σt = λt , (2.5)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with equation (2.4). Workers’ search behaviors
are governed by equations (2.1) and (2.2). erefore, workers’ net asset value of being employed
can be wrien as:
V eit = wit − b + Et [βt ,t+1(1 − s)(1 − f (θt+1))V eit+1]. (2.6)
V eit the net marginal value of being employed, measured by units of consumption, and βt ,t+1 =
βλt+1/λt is the stochastic discount factor. Equation (2.6) describes the value for a household of
one additional worker moving from unemployment to employment as being equal to today’s net
benet from working, wit − b, and plus the continuation value Et [βt ,t+1(1 − s)(1 − f (θt+1))V eit+1].
2.2.3 Firms
Following Michaillat (2012), labor is the only input for rms to produce output. e production
function of rm i is
yit = at f (nit ), (2.7)
where at is the aggregate shock and f (nit ) has the properties f ′(nit ) > 0 and f ′′(nit ) < 0 when
technology is DRS. When technology is CRS, its properties are instead f ′(nit ) = 1 and f ′′(nit ) = 0.
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e demand rm i faces is
yit =
(pit
Pt
)−(1+εt )Yt ,
where Yt represents aggregate output, the price set by rm i is denoted by pit , the aggregate
market price is represented by Pt , and εt is the time-varying demand elasticity. By this demand
function of rm i , I can introduce demand shock in the model. From now on, I assume that
the rm behaves symmetrically, so, in the following discussion, I omit rm index i . Following
equation (2.1) and the denition of vacancy lling rate q(θt ), the law of motion of employment
can be expressed as
nt = (1 − s)nt−1 + q(θt )vt ,
where vt is the vacancies posted by a rm. e cost of posting vacancies is denoted by c(at ,vt ).
e vacancy cost function satises conventional assumptions: cv(at ,vt ) > 0 and cvv(at ,vt ) ≥ 0.
Following Michaillat (2012), I assume the function form of vacancy costs is
c(at ,vt ) = atcvvt ,
which is linear in vt and increases as at rises. Now we can write a rm’s lifetime prot as
Π0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
[
pt
(pt
Pt
)−(1+εt )Yt − ntwt − cvatvt ] , (2.8)
where ntwt is the wage cost rm i pays to workers, and cvatvt is total vacancy costs. A rm
maximizes its lifetime prots (2.8) by choosing vacancyvt , numbers of employment nt , and price
pt . Moreover, these choices are subject to the production function (2.7), and the law of motion of
employment nt = (1 − s)nt−1 + q(θt )vt . Solving a rm’s problem can give us the value function
when the rm hires an additional worker. e rst order conditions for rms are
∂nt : Jt = at f ′(nt )zt −
(
wt +
∂wt
∂nt
nt
)
+ Etβt ,t+1(1 − s)Jt+1,
∂vt : Jt =
atcv
q(θt ) .
(2.9)
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In equation (2.9), Jt = φt/λt , where φt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with employment
dynamics nt = (1−s)nt−1 +q(θt )vt . Since λt equalsC−σt , Jt therefore describes the marginal value
measured in units of consumption when rm i hires one additional worker. In addition, zt equals
εt/(1 + εt ) and is positively related to εt . I call zt demand-side shock. Roughly speaking, increases
in zt represent increases in demand.
e rst equation in (2.9) shows that the value of hiring additional one worker equals the
marginal production value at f ′(nt )zt , minus wage cost
(
wt +
∂wt
∂nt
nt
)
and plus continuation value
Etβt ,t+1(1− s)Jt+1. e wage cost just describes how the wage rm i pays to workers will change
as the number of employees changes. When a vacancy is lled by one additional worker, a rm
can earn at f ′(nt )zt , while the wage paid to that worker is wt + ∂wt∂nt nt . We have the second term,
∂wt
∂nt
nt , because rms can hire more than one worker at a time. erefore, when rms increase
hiring, the marginal productivity of labor may decrease given DRS technology and, therefore,
wages paid to workers will vary. When the wage is rigid, then ∂wt∂nt nt = 0 applies in the case of
both DRS and CRS technology. Moreover, because this worker-rm matched pair can continue
with probability 1 − s , the continuation value for the current match is thus Etβt ,t+1(1 − s)Jt+1.
e second equation in (2.9) is a rm’s free entry condition in the labor market. e equation
Jt =
cvat
q(θt ) tells us that the marginal cost from one additional vacancy posted is equal to Jt , the
marginal value from hiring. Using equation (2.9), I derive the job creation condition:
cvat
q(θt ) +
(
wt +
∂wt
∂nt
nt
)
= atzt f
′(nt )zt + Et
[
βt ,t+1(1 − s) cvat+1
q(θt+1)
]
, (2.10)
in which the le-hand side describes the marginal cost of posting an additional vacancy and
this vacancy being lled. e right-hand side is the marginal revenue from hiring an additional
worker. We have Et
[
βt ,t+1(1− s)cvat+1wt+1q(θt+1)
]
on the right-hand side because the rm-worker match
can continue with probability 1− s . is part describes how a rm can thus avoid the future cost
of posting a vacancy, so that it can be accounted for in rms’ marginal benet when the posted
vacancy is lled.
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2.2.4 Wage Determination
In this paper, exible wagewt is determined through Nash Bargaining over the marginal surplus,
based on Stole and Zwiebel (1996). Now, I assume the production function is at f (nt ) = atnαt .
When I say technology is CRS (or DRS), α = 1 (or 0 < α < 1). e bargaining problem is thus
max
wt
(V et )x (Jt )1−x , (2.11)
in which x is the bargaining power of workers, and V et is net marginal asset value a worker can
earn when she/he is hired. Jt is the marginal value a rm can gain when hiring additional one
worker. ese are from equations (2.6) and (2.9), respectively. Using equation (2.11), I can derive
exible wage as
wt =
xatztαn
α−1
t
1 − x(1 − α) + xEt (1 − s)
[
βt ,t+1θt+1at+1cv
]
+ (1 − x)b . (2.12)
As α = 1, exible wage wt will be the wage form derived by Nash Bargaining in DMP model.
2.2.5 Closing the Model
In equilibrium we have the resource constraint Yt = Ct + cvatvt . e output is used for con-
sumption and vacancy costs. e government’s budget constraint is always binding, so we have
Tt = utb in equilibrium. e three shocks in the model are technology shock at , match eciency
shock µt , and demand shock zt . I assume logarithms of these shocks follow the AR(1) process
with a coecient of ρk and innovation of ek,t , which follows N (0,σ 2k ) where k ∈ {µ,a, z}. us,
these shocks are
lnkt = (1 − ρk) ln k¯ + ρk lnkt−1 + ek,t ,
where k¯ is the steady state of these shocks.
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2.3 Data
e data discussed in this section are used for extending the work of Michaillat (2012) to 2015:Q3,
and used for estimation and choosing other non-estimated parameters in this paper. I use the
same data source as Michaillat (2012), plus the job nding rate of unemployed workers con-
structed by Shimer (2012b).
First, the data series of separation rates, hires, and job openings are taken from the Job Opening
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). ese seasonally adjusted monthly series are constructed by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). I use the separation rate and hires data to replicate Michail-
lat’s work, and extend his results to 2015:Q3. Moreover, because the sample period of JOLTS starts
only begins in December 2001, I use the Conference Board help-wanted advertisement index as
the proxy for job vacancies posted before the JOLTS data series began.5
Second, the nominal wage is the average hourly earnings in total private sectors, which is a
seasonally adjusted monthly series. is series is constructed by the BLS from Current Employ-
ment Statistics (CES).6 In order to compute real wages, I also utilized the seasonally adjusted
monthly series of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban households, constructed by the BLS.
When I constructed the real monthly wage, I followed Michaillat (2012).
ird, seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rates and unemployment levels are also
taken from the BLS. ey are constructed based on workers who are 16 years old and over. Fi-
nally, output and employment level were obtained from the seasonally adjusted quarterly index
in Nonfarm business sector from the BLS Major Sector Productivity and Costs (MSPC).7 In addi-
tion to the above data, I also used job nding rate data constructed by Robert Shimer in Shimer
(2012b).8 is data was used to choose the means of prior distribution of various parameters.
Table 2.2 presents the data statistics for unemployment, vacancies, market tightness, wages,
output and technology. e data’s frequency is quarterly, and transformed by taking their logs. I
transformed monthly unemployment, monthly vacancy and monthly real wage data to quarterly
5e help-wanted advertisement index is oered by Michaillat (2012). e link is
hps://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.4.1721
6Series ID: CES0500000008.
7In Michaillat (2012), these indexes are normalized by the values for 2005 (2005 = 100). In this paper, the series
is updated and normalized by the values for 2009 (2009 = 100). erefore, although this paper uses the same source
for output and employment level data, the numbers are slightly dierent than Michaillat’s
8is data was constructed by Robert Shimer. For additional details, please see Shimer (2012b).
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Table 2.2: Statistics Summary: 1964:Q1 – 2015: QIII
Data Moments u v θ w y a
Standard Deviation 0.185 0.190 0.363 0.020 0.030 0.020
Autocorrelation 0.950 0.946 0.947 0.956 0.935 0.897
Correlation 1 -0.882 -0.968 -0.159 -0.821 -0.492
1 0.971 0.124 0.472 0.448
1 0.145 0.800 0.481
1 0.438 0.589
1 0.867
1
Note: is table reports the moments of quarterly, seasonally adjusted and detrended
data. I detrend the data using the HP lter with a parameter 105 suggested by Michaillat
(2012).
data by averaging them. I then detrended these data series using the HP lter with parameters
105, which is suggested by Michaillat (2012). In addition, technology shock is constructed by
Solow residual with α = 0.666. ese data series revealed the stylized fact in Shimer (2005): the
volatility of variables in the labor market is higher than that of output and the unemployment-
vacancy correlation is negative. Usually, the DMP model fails to generate these two stylized facts.
e unemployment, vacancies and output described above are used for estimation.
2.4 Empirical Approach
is section rst discusses the methodology of estimation, the design of prior distributions, and
the decomposition approach. Although my decomposition approach, based on linear state space
model, diers from Michaillat’s, I show that results based on my approach are consistent with
Michaillat’s when estimation supports the existence of job rationing. To compare my approach
and Michaillat’s, following Michaillat (2012), I recalibrated parameters and replicated the decom-
position of unemployment in his paper using data series updated to 2015:Q3. e details of these
replications are contained in the appendices.
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2.4.1 Methodology
In this paper, I estimate a log-linearized model in state-space representation using Bayesian meth-
ods. I see the model as a data generating process. e linearized model can be wrien as
Ωt = ΦΩt−1 + et and
Λt = ΨΩt + νt ,
(2.13)
where Ωt are model variables and Λt are observed variables. In this paper, there are three ob-
served variables: unemployment, vacancy and real output. e linearized rational expectation
model is solved with the method proposed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980). Moreover, νt is mea-
surement error and et are exogenous shocks. ere is no measurement error in this paper.
Since the number of model variables is larger than that of the observed variables, I use the
Kalman Filter to write the likelihood function for estimation. A major dierence between my
paper and Michaillat (2012) is that my decomposition of unemployment is based on equation
(2.13). I will discuss this dierence aer discussion of prior distributions.
2.4.2 Prior Distributions
Table 2.3 presents the details of prior distributions I choose. e density of prior is chosen based
on the ranges of each parameter. If the value for the parameter lay between zero and one, I chose
the Beta density. If the value of the parameter was a positive real number, I used the Gamma
density. I set the discount factor β = 0.99. Following most New Keynesian studies such as
Christiano et al. (2016), I used demand elasticity ε = 10 so that steady-state markup of a rm
would be 10%. Risk aversion σ is set at 2. e way I chose α was dierent from how Michaillat
(2012) calibrated it. Michaillat assumed that the relationship of unit vacancy cost cv to steady-
state wage w was a xed fraction c . en, using equation (2.10), we will have
cw¯a¯
q¯
+ w¯a¯γ = αa¯z¯n¯α−1 + β(1 − s)cw¯a¯
q¯
,
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Table 2.3: Prior Distribution
Denition Parameters Distribution Mean Std. Dev.
Discount Factor β Fixed 0.99
Labor Elasticity α Fixed 11/15
Demand Elasticity ε Fixed 10
Risk Aversion σ Fixed 2
Separation Rate s B 0.03 0.01
Match Elasticity ξ B 0.5 0.1
Match Eciency µ G 0.9 0.2
Level of Vacancy Cost cv G 0.215 0.05
Rigid Wage Case Only
Wage Flexibility γ B 0.7 0.1
Flexible Wage Case Only
Unemployment Insurance b Fixed 0
Worker’s Bargaining Power x B 0.5 0.2
Shocks
AR(1) Coecient ρk B 0.9 0.01
Std. Dev. σk I.G. 0.01 1
Note: is table reports the prior distributions and xed parameters used for estimation.
where the variable with the upper bar is their steady state variable. Due to labor share n¯α−1/w¯ =
0.66, Michaillat was able to derive value of α and steady-state wage w¯ . However, I did not choose
this approach because α is a function of other parameters in the model. us, the draws of
parameters from Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling may cause α > 1. To avoid this
problem, I used the following approach to choose α instead. Recall in equation (2.10), when there
is no search friction (i.e. cv = 0), labor share will be z¯α , where z¯ = ε/(1+ ε) = 10/11 is the steady
state value of zt . Since I want to have a steady-state labor share with a value of 2/3, I therefore
set α = 11/15. In my approach, α remains constant, rather that depends on other parameters.
Aer we have chosen the value of α , steady-state wage w¯ can be computed according to
cv
q¯
+ w¯ = α · (10/11) · n¯α−1 + β(1 − s)cv
q¯
,
which is the steady-state version of equation (2.10). Since I used a dierent approach to calibrate
α , I will show that my approach does not disfavor the existence of job rationing (i.e., rationing
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Figure 2.1: Inuence of µ on aR
Note: In this gure, the value of µ goes on X-axis, and the critical value of steady-state aR goes on Y-axis. e black
solid line represents the the impact of changes in µ on aR in my approach, while dashed green line represents that of
Michaillat’s. is gure shows that my approach generate higher aR (i.e., higher likelihood of having job rationing)
than Michaillat’s.
unemployment) aer I explain the approach of unemployment decomposition.
According to Shimer (2012b), the long run average job nding rate is around 0.4845, and trend
in the unemployment rate during the period 1964:Q1–2015:Q3 is 0.6.9 I thus set the prior mean
of separation equal to 0.03. I believe workers’ contributions to the creation of matches is equal
to rms’. us, the mean of matching elasticity is set at 0.5. I set the mean of unit vacancy
cost cv at 0.215 and γ at 0.7, according to calibration strategy in Michaillat (2012). Moreover,
aer I determined the prior distributions of the above parameters, I was able to pin down the
steady-state for matching eciency µ as 0.8587.
e way I computed rationing unemployment is the same as in Michaillat (2012). When there
was no search friction, unit vacancy cost cv was equal to zero. us, according to the equation
9Trend is computed using the HP lter with parameter of 105.
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(2.10), I can derive the employment rate in absence of search frictions when wages are rigid as
nRt =
(αzt
w
)1/(1−α)
a
(1−γ )/(1−α)
t . (2.14)
e labor force is normalized to one. GivennRt < 1, then there is unemployment resulting from job
rationing rather than search frictions. erefore, rationing unemployment can be computed
as
uRt = max{0, 1 − nRt }, (2.15)
and frictional unemployment can be
uFt = ut − uRt (2.16)
where ut is model unemployment rate. Furthermore, according to equation (2.14), the condition
that nRt < 1 is
at < a
R
t =
( w
αzt
)1/(1−γ )
. (2.17)
When technology at is below aRt , then we will have rationing unemployment in the model at time
t . In this paper, aRt depends on demand shock, so it will change over time, while in Michaillat
(2012), it stays constant. When demand decreases, incentives of rms to hire workers decrease
and possibility that job rationing occurred rise, meaning demand shock zt and aRt are negatively
related. us, equation (2.17) implies that uctuations in demand inuence the degree of job
rationing.
As I mentioned, in Michaillat’s approach, α is a function of estimated parameters: s, µ, ξ and
cv .10 However, in my approach, I xed α as a constant. Due to the dierence, one concern is that
my approach may disfavor rationing unemployment so that I can not compare my results with
Michaillat’s.
As we can see in Figure 2.1, the inuence of steady-state matching eciency µ on aR in my
approach is consistent with Michaillat’s, even though I x the value of α . Moreover, my approach
will generate a higher aR than Michaillat’s approach.11 e higher the value of aR , the more likely
10Since α is derived using cw¯a¯q¯ + w¯a¯
γ = αa¯z¯n¯α−1 + β(1 − s) cw¯a¯q¯ and 0.66 = n¯α /w¯ , it is a function of s , cv and
steady-state q. Since q depends on µ and ξ , we know α will be a function of s, µ, ξ and cv and so is w¯ . Moreover, aR
depends on w¯ and γ . I know these ve parameters will be key parameters inuencing aR .
11I keep s = .03, ξ = 0.5, γ = 0.7 and c = 0.32 in Figure 2.1. Recall parameter c here is from Michaillat, who uses
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of aR : Changes in s
Note: In this gure, the value of s goes on X-axis. is gure shows the prior distribution of aR , given the random
draws from the prior distributions of s . Other parameters, except for s , are kept at their prior means.
that rationing unemployment can exist in a model. erefore, my approach does not disfavor the
existence of rationing unemployment in a model.12
According to equation (2.17), when steady-state aR is larger than the steady-state of technology
shock (i.e., unity), then we have rationing unemployment in the steady state. Based on the prior
mean I chose, steady-state wage was 2/3, which resulted in aR = 1 in steady state because of z¯α =
2/3. Figure 2.2 shows the sampling distribution of steady-state aR , based on 1000 random draws
from prior distribution of separation rate s , showing that my prior will cause the probability of
aR > 1 to be approximately half.13 In the appendices, I show the sampling distribution of aR
based on draws from the prior distributions of ξ , µ, cv and γ still means that the probability of
aR > 1 will be around 1/2. us, the prior distributions I chose indicated that my model is naive
about the existence of rationing unemployment. Model variables uctuate around their steady
cv = cw¯ to calibrate α and w¯ .
12I le the inuence of s, cv ,γ and ξ on aR in the appendices where I show my approach are still consistent with
Michaillat’s approach. Moreover, my approach even generates higher aR when values of parameters s, cv ,γ and ξ
change.
13Other parameters are kept at their prior mean.
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states.14 erefore, when the steady-state of aRt is larger than one, the steady-state of technology
shock at ), aRt in the model will likely be larger than at even in dynamic environments. Because
my prior distributions suggest that the probability of a steady-state aR larger than one is half, I
can conclude that this model does not favor or disfavor the existence of rationing unemployment.
In the exible wage model, two additional parameters–unemployment insuranceb and worker’s
bargaining power x–needed to be estimated. Following Michaillat (2012), I kept b at zero. I set
the prior density of x to Beta with a mean of 0.5.15
2.4.3 Decomposition
My decomposition is based on the state space model in equation (2.13). I use the observed vari-
able Λt to pin down Kalman smoothed variables Ωt . Michaillat (2012), however, followed Fair
and Taylor (1983) to solve nonlinear models, and generate simulated unemployment. en, he
fed technology shock from Solow residual back into the models, and constructed the model sim-
ulated unemployment for doing decomposition of unemployment. us, Michaillat’s analysis of
decomposition in Michaillat (2012) is dierent from the approach in this paper. I do, however,
use a methodology for the decomposition in this paper when the parameters allow the model
to generate rationing unemployment that is similar to Michaillat’s. e purpose of following
exercise is to show that if the estimation parameters can support the existence of rationing un-
employment, my model can produce results that are likewise similar to Michaillat’s, in spite of
dierences in model frequencies, numbers of shocks, and decomposition approach. e discus-
sion in this section is divided into two parts. I rst discuss a model with only technology shocks,
as in Michaillat’s model, and output is only observed variable to have Kalman smoothed model
variables. Aer discussion of this one-shock model, I show the decomposition of a model with
three shocks (i.e., the model in this paper) by using unemployment, vacancies, and output as the
observed variables. Although the decomposition in this three-shocks model is dierent from the
one-shock model, Michaillat’s argument concerning rationing unemployment still holds.
14For example, we have detrended series unemployment uˆt . We can compute unemployment in the model by uˆtu¯
where u¯ is steady state unemployment.
15Lubik (2009) uses uniform density because he is interested in the information data contained in x . Since x = 0.5
is widely used in the literature (e.g., Fujita and Ramey (2012) used x = 0.5 for a robustness check), I thus use Beta to
put a higher weight on this value.
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Figure 2.3: Smoothed Unemployment and Simulated Unemployment
Note: is gure compare simulated unemployment rate usimulated based on Michaillat’s approach (the red dot-
ted line), smoothed unemployment rate uSmoothed constructed by this paper (the green dashed line), and observed
unemployment rate udata (black solid line).
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Figure 2.4: Technology Shocks: State Space Approach
Note: Gray bars indicate NBER recession periods. Green dashed line represents the technology shock constructed
according to the Solow residual (Michaillat’s approach), and black solid line represents the technology shock based
on state space model and Kalman Smoother (this paper).
Technology Shock Only
First, I followed Michaillat (2012) and replicated simulated unemployment and employment de-
composition based on his methodology.16 In this replication exercise, I extended the data period
to 2015:Q3. Second, I use only output as an observed variable in my model, so I can compare
the smoothed unemployment generated by equation (2.13) with the true unemployment.17 Using
equation (2.13), I can nd smoothed unemployment and smoothed technology shock (at ). e
result of decomposition is based these on these two smoothed variables. en, using these two
smoothed variables and equation (2.14), I can recover nRt . In this one-shock case, zt will be xed
at 10/11. Since the frequency in my model was dierent from Michaillat’s model, when I did
the above exercise, I chose parameters values such that the steady state of nRt in my model equals
16I put the details of replication in the appendices.
17Michaillat (2012) used two observed data series, output and employment, to construct technology shock. Since
this model only has one shock, I can only use one variable. I thus use output here.
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Figure 2.5: Decomposition: Non-linear Model
Note: is gure used Michaillat’s approach to decompose the unemployment rate from 1964:Q1–2015:Q3 into two
category: the dark gray shaded area represents the rationing unemployment, and the light gray shaded area repre-
sents frictional unemployment.
to the one in Michaillat’s.18 erefore, I used a separation rate of 0.03, matching elasticity of
0.5, matching eciency of 1.0, a vacancy cost of 0.084 and wage exibility of 0.7 in my model
for this exercise.19 e remaining parameters were set at the prior means shown in Table 2.3.
Figure 2.3 shows a comparison among simulated unemployment, smoothed unemployment, and
actual unemployment. Simulated unemployment is replicated according to Michaillat’s nonlin-
ear model approach. Smoothed unemployment was derived from equation (2.13). In Figure 2.3,
smoothed unemployment is based on only observed output. Simulated unemployment from non-
linear model ts the true unemployment well before 1992. However, aer 1992, the volatility of
simulated unemployment cannot be as extreme as the volatility of observed data. e smoothed
18Since steady-state employment or unemployment is like a long-run average, they will not be inuenced by
frequency. Since I hoped that steady-state rationing unemployment 1−nR would be the same in both models, I thus
used nR as the benchmark for choosing parameters.
19Since I want to keep the steady-state unemployment rate at 6% and the job nding rate around 0.48 (according
to Shimer (2012b)), I thus set s = 0.03. Moreover, Michaillat (2012) suggests µ in monthly frequency is around .9 so
µ will be 1 in quarterly frequency according to the transformation x + (1 − x)x + (1 − x)x2 used by Blanchard and
Gal (2010). I used matching elasticity 0.5 and γ = 0.7 since they are used in Michaillat (2012). e level of vacancy
cost cv = 0.084 lies between the two values used in Zandweghe (2010). So, we can see these values in literature.
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Figure 2.6: Decomposition: State Space Model
Note: Rectangle bars indicate NBER recession periods. is gure used linear state space model with only technology
shock proposed by this paper to decompose the unemployment rate from 1964:Q1–2015:Q3 into two category: the
dark gray shaded area represents the rationing unemployment, and the light gray shaded area represents frictional
unemployment.
unemployment based on the state-space model ts actual unemployment well. However, during
the period from 1972 to 1982, the volatility of smoothed unemployment is much higher than ac-
tual unemployment was. In this paper, the smoothed technology shock was generated according
to equation (2.13). In my decomposition, unlike Michaillat, who used the Solow residual as tech-
nology shock, I used a smoothed technology shock series based on my model in equation (2.13).
Figure 2.4 compares this smoothed technology series with Solow residual. We can see that the
smoothed technology series is similar to the Solow residual.
Aer I have model’s unemployment and technology shock, I can use equations (2.14), (2.15) and
(2.16) to compute rationing and frictional unemployment. Figure 2.5 shows decomposition based
on Michaillat’s approach, which used simulated unemployment and the Solow residual. During
the period of recessions, the fraction of rationing unemployment in total unemployment sharply
increases. e results in my replication were consistent with Michaillt’s conclusion. Figure 2.6
shows decomposition based on smoothed unemployment ut and smoothed technology shock at
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found using a state space model. Our approach again showed sharp increases in rationing un-
employment during the period of recessions. However, there are some dierences between my
results and Michaillat’s. First, in Michaillat’s decomposition, rationing unemployment exits and
stayed at a high level from 1983 to 1992, and the periods aer the Great Recession, while in my ap-
proach (see Figure 2.6), rationing unemployment was reduced in the these periods. is dierence
between Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 results from the dierence between simulated unemployment
and smoothed unemployment. In Figure 2.3, between 1982 and 1992, simulated unemployment
was nearly constant, and aer the Great Recession, it was lower than true unemployment and
stays around 6%. However, smoothed unemployment was closer to the observed unemployment
rate. It decreases between 1982 and 1992 and the period aer the Great Recession. is is why
Michaillat’s results in Figure 2.5 diered from the results of the one-shock linear model, reported
in Figure 2.6. us, according to the discussion above, when the parameters caused steady state
nR in my model to be equal to the one in Michaillat’s model, we conrm that my approach can
generate the results similar to Michaillat’s. In other words, when estimated parameters support
the existence of job rationing, the approach I use can still show us that rationing unemployment
occurred in the decomposition exercise.
ree Shocks
In this section, I present the results of unemployment decomposition based on my model with
three shocks. I used the same parameter values as in the one-shock model so that steady-state
rationing employment nR was unchanged, and was the same as in Michaillat (2012). In this three-
shocks model, I used unemployment, vacancies and output as the observed variables. Because
I did not include measurement error in these variables, smoothed unemployment was equal to
observed unemployment. Moreover, smoothed technology based on models with three shocks
was similar to that reported in Figure 2.4. erefore, I will not revisit the discussion of smoothed
unemployment and technology here.
In the three-shocks model, aRt varied as time changes, rather that staying at a constant level.
Figure 2.7 presents the technology shock at and the critical value aRt in the three-shocks model
with the parameters that allow job rationing to exist. e horizontal solid line is aR in the one-
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Figure 2.7: Comparison: aRt and at
Note: Gray bars indicate NBER recession periods. is gure compares technology shock (the dark solid line), the
critical value aR based on Michaillat’s approach (the black horizontal doed line), and the the critical value aRt based
on my model (the green dashed line). e critical value aR is my model changes as time changes because of demand
shocks.
shock model. It is a constant because there were no demand shocks. e green solid line in Figure
2.7 represents aRt based on the models with three shocks. As demand declines, rms prefer not to
post vacancies and job rationing is more likely to occur. erefore, aRt based on the model with
three shocks uctuated. According to equation (2.17), since aRt > at , rationing unemployment
can occur in a model. As shown in Figure 2.7, the dierence between technology shock at and
critical value aRt in the model with three shocks rises during recession. erefore, Michaillat’s
conclusion that rationing unemployment increased during periods of recession still holds.
Another interesting part of Figure 2.7 is the dynamics of aRt . From equation (2.17), we know
demand shock zt is negatively related to aRt , as decline in demand causes rms to decrease the
number of vacancy postings. Based on parameter values (s, ξ , µ, cv and γ ) I chose in this exercise,
during the 1980s and 1992 recessions, aRt decreased while in 1970s, 2002 and 2008 recessions, aRt
increased. is means that the 1980s and 1992 recessions were due to supply factors rather than
declines in demand, because the increase in zt caused aRt to rise. us, when the recession was
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Figure 2.8: Decomposition: ree Shocks
Note: Rectangle bars indicate NBER recession periods. is gure used linear state space model with three shocks
proposed by this paper to decompose the unemployment rate from 1964:Q1–2015:Q3 into two category: the dark
gray shaded area represents the rationing unemployment, and the light gray shaded area represents frictional un-
employment.
caused by the supply side, we were less likely to have rationing unemployment in this model.
During the 1980s, 1992 and 2008 recession, rationing unemployment was more likely to occur
because aRt increased during these periods. In sum, although this exercise still showed that the
size of rationing unemployment increased during the recessions (because of aRt > at ), the source
of each recession actually inuenced the likelihood of having job rationing occurring in a model.
Figure 2.8 shows the rationing and frictional unemployment in the three-shocks model. We
can still see the feature that during the recession, rationing unemployment sharply increased.
e dierence between Figures 2.6 and 2.8 is due to zt . As zt decreased, aRt increased, rationing
unemployment increased and vice versa. For example, in Figure 2.7, because aRt in the three-
shocks model was larger (or smaller) than aR in the one-shock model in 2002 (or 1982), there was
more (or less) rationing unemployment in Figure 2.8 during the same period.
Before I continue, I want to emphasize that the results above were only based on specic pa-
rameter values, which were set so that rationing unemployment would occur as in Michaillat
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Table 2.4: Log Marginal Density & Bayes Ratio
Model Rigid (µ xed) Rigid (cv xed) Flexible Flexible (CRS)
Log Marginal Density 1276.9 1276.3 1160.2 1160.6
Bayes Factor 1 e0.6 e116.7 e116.3
Note: is table reports the marginal data density and Bayes ratio. e larger the values of these two
measures, the more likely that data can be generated by a model.
(2012). rough the exercises detailed in this section, we know that decomposition of unemploy-
ment in my approach can share the same properties as in Michaillat (2012), even though I included
more shocks in my model and the frequency of the model is quarterly rather than weekly.
Demand shock is an important element in a New Keynesian model. Because I do not consider
price stickness or the Phillips curve, the analysis of demand shock zt could be incomplete. In spite
of this problem, I believe the implications of the relationship between rationing unemployment
and causes of recession are important. In the next section, I estimate the models that include job
rationing and use estimated parameters, which incorporate data information, to examine whether
or not the existence of rationing unemployment is supported by data.
2.5 Estimation
In this section, I rst compare the models in Table 2.1 based on marginal data density. When
I estimated these models, I used the same prior distributions reported in Table 2.3. Aer I got
posterior means, which were updated according to data, I set them as the model’s parameters to
further examine that whether or not the data supported the existence of rationing unemployment.
I used unemployment, vacancies, and output as observed variables for estimation, because these
three variables can determine all model variables. According to equation (2.2), employment can
be pinned down by unemployment. Using matching function, hires h depend on employment
and vacancy, and labor market tightness θ is an unemployment-vacancy ratio so it can be derived
observed variables too. Other variables, like the job nding rate f and vacancy lling rate q, are
just functions of θ . Moreover, through equation (2.7), I can derive technology shock, since we
have output and employment now. However, due to rigid wage wt = w¯aγt , the model’s wage
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Table 2.5: Posterior Mean
cv Fixed prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
ξ 0.500 0.6855 [0.6367, 0.7383] B 0.1000
µ 0.859 0.8503 [0.7108, 0.9845] G 0.2000
s 0.030 0.0747 [0.0628, 0.0855] B 0.0100
γ 0.700 0.5016 [0.3248, 0.6758] B 0.1000
cv 0.215 0.215
aR 1 0.8462
nR 1 1.3663
w¯ 2/3 0.6134
µ Fixed prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
ξ 0.500 0.6883 [0.6399, 0.7394] B 0.1000
µ 0.859 0.8587
s 0.030 0.0741 [0.0621, 0.0851] B 0.0100
γ 0.700 0.5157 [0.3573, 0.6738] B 0.1000
cv 0.215 0.2212 [0.1523, 0.2887] G 0.0500
aR 1 0.8450
nR 1 1.3578
w¯ 2/3 0.6144
Note: is table reports the estimation results, which include posterior means, 90% credible
sets and posterior standard deviations.
will be determined by technology shock, which depends on the observed variables. us, I chose
not to use wage as observed variable.20 In rigid wage model, since aer log-linearization, cv and
µ only exist in the job creating condition (equation (2.10)), there exists a collinearity problem.
erefore, for the rigid wage model, I estimated model twice: I xed cv and µ, respectively, and
did an estimation for each.
2.5.1 Model Comparison
According to Michaillat (2012), the model with rigid wage and DRS technology can generate job
rationing. is section discussed whether standard models or models that permit job rationing t
the data beer. Table 2.4 lists log marginal densities (Laplace approximation) and Bayes factors
20Of course, I can use measurement error of wage to introduce observed wage data series for estimation. I do not
use measurement error since I found the standard deviations of the measurement error and the observed wage were
close to each other. In other words, information of observed wage did not inuence estimated parameters.
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for models with rigid and exible wages. e technology of production in the rigid wage model
is DRS. e higher the log marginal data density was, the more likely the observed variables
could be regenerated by this model. e model with a rigid wage had a higher log marginal data
density than the model with a exible wage. e model with a exible wage has log marginal
data density of 1160.2 and 1160.6, which showed a Bayes ratio of e116.7 and e116.3 in favor of the
model with rigid wage (with xed µ). is nding is consistent with the literature. For example,
Shimer (2005) indicated that a DMP model cannot create high volatility in labor market variables
such as unemployment and vacancy. Numerous studies found that introducing a rigid wage
can help resolve this puzzle, for example, Hall (2005) and Krause and Lubik (2007). In sum, this
exercise shows that the model that permits job rationing ts the data beer than the standard
labor search-and-matching models, along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
2.5.2 Fitness of Model with Posterior Mean
In this section, I examine whether or not the posterior mean of the parameters supports the idea
that rationing unemployment can occur in a model. Because I consider more shocks and model
frequency is quarterly, I also compare simulated moments between my model and the model in
Michaillat (2012). Table 2.5 lists the posterior mean and steady-state critical value aR , rationing
employment nR , and wage w¯ , computed based on the posterior mean.
Based on the posterior mean, models with a rigid wage now cannot generate rationing unem-
ployment in the steady state because aR < 1. Michaillat (2012) mentions that the range of the
ratio of unit vacancy to wage in a steady state lies between 0.098 and 0.42. My estimation shows
cv/w¯ is around 0.34, which falls into this range.
Using the estimation of the posterior mean, we can determine the observed unemployment,
vacancies and output that will update the prior distributions I designed. First, the contribution to
matches of worker ξ was higher than my belief based on most literature. Second, the posterior
mean of separation s and unit vacancy cost cv were higher than their prior means, while the
posterior mean of matching eciency µ was lower than its posterior mean. Higher s values
mean that workers exogenously leave jobs more frequently, so rms have to post more vacancies
and pay more vacancy costs to rell jobs. Moreover, cv leads to higher vacancy costs for rms
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per vacancy. Lower µ causes the job nding rate f and vacancy lling rate q to be lower. us,
it is more dicult for rms and workers to meet each other, so rms have to post a greater
number of vacancies to increase the possibility to meet workers. In other words, posterior search
friction was higher than my prior belief constructed based on literature. Recall that I started
from prior distributions with means that result in steady-state aR being 1, while steady-state
aR based on posterior means is smaller than one. is means the data showed that rationing
unemployment did not exist in the steady state. In a dynamic environment, aRt varied over time
because of uctuations in demand shock zt . erefore, the existence of rationing unemployment
in a dynamic environment needs to be further examined. I will go back to this question aer I
compare the data tness between my three-shocks model and Michaillat’s model.
Following Michaillat (2012), I report the simulated moments based on my three-shocks model
and compare these moments with Michaillt’s model. e parameters in my model were based
on posterior means, while Michaillat’s were based on calibration value I replicated.21 Table 2.6
compares the simulated moments based on poster means (model with xed µ) and Michaillat’s
result.22 Data moments are reported in Table 2.2. We can see Michaillat’s parameters, and that his
model generated correlation among u, vacancy v , and tightness θ , similar to the data moments.
Moreover, the correlation betweenu and outputy was also close to the data. However, due to the
simple seing of rigid wage, in Michaillat’s model, correlations between wage, technology, and
other variables were much higher than their data counterparts. us, Michaillat’s model does
not t data well along this dimension. In addition to correlation, Michaillat’s simulated standard
deviation and autocorrelation were also lower than my data moments.
e simulation moments of my model, based on posterior means, t standard deviations and
autocorrelations well. ese moments are closer to the data moments than Michaillat’s. More-
over, due to additional shocks, my model alleviated the high correlation between model variables
and technology shocks. e correlation between technology shocks and other variables were re-
duced now and closer to the data correlation. For example, the correlation between vacancies and
technology, and between tightness and technology, are around 0.45. Additionally, the correlation
21Calibrated values are discussed in the appendices.
22I simulate my model 1000 times for 207 periods (length of 1964:Q1–2015:Q3). For the simulated moments of
Michaillat’s model, I replicated Michaillat’s model and extended it to 2015:Q3. e details of these procedures are
contained in the appendices.
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Table 2.6: Data & Simulated Moment
Posterior Mean u v θ w y a
Standard Deviation 0.139 0.186 0.272 0.013 0.027 0.025
(0.026) (0.031) (0.052) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Autocorrelation 0.886 0.792 0.922 0.910 0.907 0.910
(0.042) (0.070) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Correlation 1. -0.370 -0.763 -0.249 -0.435 -0.249
1. 0.876 0.496 0.576 0.496
1. 0.467 0.619 0.467
1 0.971 1.
1. 0.971
1.
Michaillat u v θ w y a
Standard Deviation 0.090 0.115 0.197 0.010 0.018 0.014
(0.013) (0.014) (0.027) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Autocorrelation 0.898 0.739 0.847 0.804 0.831 0.804
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Correlation 1 -0.864 -0.955 -0.974 -0.984 -0.974
1 0.974 0.885 0.871 0.885
1 0.956 0.952 0.956
1 0.998 1
1 0.998
1
Note: is table reports the simulated moments based on Michaillat’s model and my models
with three shocks. All simulated data are quarterly and detrended. I detrend the data by HP
lter with a parameter 105.
between vacancies and output is closer to data. However, my model could not generate correla-
tions amongu,v and θ as Michaillat’s did, and Michaillat’s model t these moments well. In sum,
my model simulation based on the posterior mean is beer than Michaillat’s in the dimensions
of standard deviation and autocorrelation. Moreover, my model alleviates the problem caused
by the simple seing of rigid wage. In Michaillat’s approach, due to the rigid wage seing, all
variables are highly correlated with technology. However, Michaillat’s model ts the relationship
among u, v and θ beer than mine. Although my model based on prior means does not match
the data perfectly, I have demonstrated that it is a good model, and one that can be applied to the
analysis of rationing unemployment.
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Figure 2.9: Posterior Distribution aR
Note: is gure reports the posterior distributions of critical value aR based on 30000 MCMC draws. According
to this gure, rationing unemployment did not exist in the model’s steady state because maximum value of aR is
smaller than one.
2.5.3 Decomposition Based on Posterior Mean
In this section, I discuss unemployment decomposition based on the estimated parameters (pos-
terior mean) in a dynamic environment. Until now, I have only showed that data did not sup-
port that models have rationing unemployment in the steady state based on posterior means.
erefore, I report the full posterior distribution of critical value aR here, and discuss rationing
unemployment in a dynamic environment. Figure 2.9 reports the posterior distribution of criti-
cal value aR based on 30,000 MCMC draws, and it shows that the maximum of aR is still smaller
than one. Because I designed the prior distributions so that the probability of aR > 1 would be
1/2, the information from observed unemployment, vacancies, and output shows that the steady-
state value of aR will not be larger than one. Based on the posterior aR , the possibility of having
rationing unemployment in the model in the steady state is zero.
Since the critical value aRt depends on demand shock zt , it is important to further examine the
dynamics of aRt . Figure 2.10 presents aRt and smoothed technology shock at . I set the posterior
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Figure 2.10: Posterior at and aRt
Note: Gray bars indicate NBER recession periods. e black thick solid horizontal line (aRM2012) represents the critical
value of aR based on Michaillat’s approach, while the blue dashed line represents the critical value aRt based on the
dynamic model proposed in this paper. e black doed horizontal line represents the steady-state of aR based on
posterior means (i.e., the critical value of aR in a static model). As aR is higher than technology shock (the black line
with cross markers, at ), there exists rationing unemployment. is gures shows that based on estimated posterior
means, both dynamic and static models indicate that rationing unemployment did not exist.
means as the parameter values to compute smoothed demand shock zt and smoothed technology
shock at based on my linear state space model. Aer at and zt were computed, aRt was derived
according to equation (2.17). I also ploed aR in Michaillat’s approach (denoted by a¯RM2012) and
steady state value of aRt in my paper (denoted by aR) in Figure 2.10.23 e smoothed technology
shock was still close to the Solow residuals. I ploed them in Figure 2.11 together with zt .
Figure 2.10 shows that in Michaillat’s approach, aRM2012 was larger than at in most periods, and
in particular, during recessions. Moreover, the amount of rationing unemployment increased
sharply during the period of recessions because the gap between at and aRM2012 increased. ere-
fore, Michaillat’s argument that rationing unemployment always exists and is more likely to
occur during the period of recessions still hold aer I extend his work to 2015:Q3. However, the
23In Michaillat (2012), aR is around 1.024. Since I replicate his paper by extending data to 2015:QIII, aR I replicate
here is 1.027. I set 1.027 as the value of aRM2012 in Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.11: Solow Residual and Smoothed Technology Shocks
Note: Gray bars indicate NBER recession periods. e black solid line represents the technology shock based on
Kalman Smoother used by this paper, the green dashed line represents the technology shock based on the Solow
residual, used by Michaillat (2012). ey are similar to each other. e blue doed line represents the demand shock
in the model proposed by this paper.
decomposition based on my posterior means told a dierent story. It showed that rationing un-
employment cannot exist, even in a dynamic environment. Although the aRt in my model rose
during the period of recessions, and this means the likelihood of having rationing unemploy-
ment also rose, aRt never passed the value of technology shock at . erefore, there is no rationing
unemployment according to the model and posterior means. In addition, the separation rate s ,
matching eciency µ, and vacancy cost cv are related to search frictions. In Table 2.5, we can
see that the posterior means of s and cv were higher than the prior means, while the posterior
mean of µ was smaller than the prior mean. Search friction will be higher in models based on
the posterior means than the one based on the prior means. e reason that we are less likely to
have rationing unemployment is the increases in search frictions.
Figure 2.12 presents further evidence for the results above. Since nRt is larger than one, accord-
ing to equation (2.15), we cannot have rationing unemployment in the model. Another interesting
story in Figure 2.10 is the dynamics of aRt . I discussed the dynamics of aRt in section 2.4, where I
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Figure 2.12: Rationing Employment: nRt
Note: Gray bars indicate NBER recession periods. e black dashed line represents the rationing employment, nRt ,
based on posterior means. Rationing unemployment only exists when nRt < 1. is gure reports another evidence
that observed data (unemployment, vacancies and output) did not support the existence of rationing unemployment.
used parameters that can generate rationing unemployment. In section 2.4, Figure 2.7 shows that
the gap between aRt and at is larger than zero in most periods, and gap especially widened during
the period of recessions. Figure 2.7 also shows that aRt does not always increase during the reces-
sion. For example, in the 1980s and 1992 recessions, aRt decreased, because the recession was not
caused by declines in demand. However, aer I used posterior means, Figure 2.10 shows that aRt
increased during the recession. is means that, based on my posterior means, the recession was
caused by decreases in demand (since zt decreased). I believe the dierence between Figure 2.7
and 2.10 shows the importance of having complete a New Keynesian model, which emphasizes
demand side factors, for discussing rationing unemployment and frictional unemployment.
Based on posterior means, I found that rationing unemployment did not exist in the models
which permit job rationing. In sum, in the steady state of my model, the probability of this model
to have job rationing is zero, because the maximum value of aR is less than one. In addition,
even though I discuss the existence of job rationing in a dynamic environment, the same result
holds. In particular, although having demand shock can help increase the likelihood of having
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rationing unemployment in models that permit job rationing, my decomposition exercise shows
that rationing unemployment did not exist in my model that included a demand shock.
2.6 Conclusion
is paper uses Bayesian estimation to evaluate the tness of the models that permit job rationing
and examine the ability of the models to generate rationing unemployment. Based on the model
constructed by Michaillat (2012), I added two more shocks: matching eciency and demand
shock.
I used posterior means and distribution of parameters to decompose rationing unemployment
from historical unemployment. I found that models that permit rationing unemployment t the
data (unemployment, vacancies and output) beer than alternative models with exible wages.
However, based on the estimated parameters (posterior means), I found that there was no ra-
tioning unemployment. Since I designed that prior probability of existence of rationing unem-
ployment to be 0.5, results based on posterior means showed that the data I used for estimation
do not support the existence of rationing unemployment in this model.
ese ndings further indicated that the existence of rationing unemployment is related to
demand shock. is model lacks important features like price rigidity or credit constraints which
may also cause rationing unemployment from the demand side. As demand shock is related to the
existence of rationing unemployment, I believe having a complete New Keynesian model with
more demand-side factors to analyze rationing unemployment is necessary. Moreover, because
of model limitations and the simple form of rigid wages, I can only use unemployment, vacancies
and output as observed variables. Introducing more rigidities or changing the form of rigid wages
could allow us to use more observed variables in future estimations.
I want to emphasize that this paper does not claim that there is no rationing unemployment
in the real world. is paper only indicates that the current models used for analyzing job ra-
tioning do not consider important channels such as demand-side factors, or are limited to simple
wage seings, so these models cannot be good devices for researchers to use in measuring the
importance of job rationing and matching frictions in explaining unemployment uctuations.
is paper uses Bayesian estimation to indicate the problems in current models, and shows that
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introducing more demand-side factors is important for analyzing rationing unemployment.
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Chapter 3
Hiring and Cyclical Unemployment Rates for
Disadvantaged Workers
3.1 Introduction
During the Great Recession, the unemployment rate increased dramatically, from a pre-recession
low of 4.4% in May of 2007 to a high of 10% in October of 2009.1 However, this increase in the
unemployment rate was not uniformly distributed across demographic groups. Young workers,
non-white workers, and those without college degrees experienced increases in their unemploy-
ment rate of 7 to 8 percentage points, while prime age, white, and those with college degrees saw
increases of 4 to 5 percentage points. In this paper, we investigate the sources of this heterogene-
ity in the impact of recessions across demographic groups.
We focus on the transition rates between the three labor market states: employment, unem-
ployment, and out of the labor force. Increases in the unemployment rate can be driven by in-
creases in the ow out of employment (EU), decreases in the ow into employment (UE), or
changes in the ows in and out of the labor force (IU and UI, respectively). By decomposing
the increase in the unemployment rate into component ows, are able to disentangle the pri-
mary sources of the increase in unemployment rates across demographic groups. Understanding
whether heterogeneity in unemployment rates across demographic groups is due to dierences
in job nding rates, job separation rates, or labor force participation rates has direct implications
for well-designed labor market policy.
We rst document the following facts about heterogeneity in the unemployment across de-
mographic groups. First, young workers, those without college degrees, and non-white workers
have substantially higher unemployment rates than other demographic groups throughout the
business cycle. Second, examining recessions dating back to the 1980s, we see that these three
1Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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groups have substantially larger increases in unemployment rates during recessions compared
with their counterpart demographic group. ird, by using matched labor force data, we nd
that these three disadvantaged demographic groups have important dierences in ows between
labor market states. In particular, while the raw ows indicate exits from employment are likely
an important feature across demographic groups, there are dierences in the role of the hiring
margin.
We then turn to a more formal decomposition. Building o work by Shimer (2012a), we ap-
proximate each demographic group’s unemployment rate using the ows between the three labor
market states. We then extend Fujita and Ramey (2009)’s two state decomposition methodology
to quantify the contributions of ows between between these three labor market states on each
demographic group’s unemployment rate.
We nd that declines in job nding rates can explain between 2/3 and 3/4 of the uctuations
in the unemployment for all workers except nonwhite workers, for whom the job nding rate
only explains 55% of the uctuations. Conversely, while the separation rate can only explain
between 1/4 and 1/3 of the uctuations in the unemployment rate across demographic groups,
for minority workers, it can explain 45%.
When we examine the sources of the persistent gap in unemployment rates between disad-
vantaged and their counterpart demographic groups, we see that the separation rate is by far the
largest component, explaining over 80% of the gap. While the job nding rate can explain a small
portion of the gap for nonwhite workers and those without college degrees, it plays no role for
young workers, which have higher job nding rates that experienced workers.
us, we conclude that job nding and separation rates play complementary roles in under-
standing dierences in unemployment rates across demographic groups. Separation rates are
more important for understanding the persistent gap in unemployment rates between disadvan-
taged groups (young, nonwhite, and without college degrees) and other demographic groups.
However, job nding rates are substantially more important for understanding cyclical uctua-
tions for all demographic groups. Nonetheless, we see important dierences for nonwhite job
seekers, by which job nding rates play a relatively smaller role. is is likely due to the fact that
nonwhite job seekers have substantially lower job nding rates at all points of the cycle, thus
declines in hiring have a relatively more modest impact in their unemployment rates.
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is paper contributes to a growing literature on the ow decomposition approach to under-
standing cyclical properties of the unemployment rate. Early contributors argued that increases
in the unemployment rate during recessions was primarily driven by exits from employment
to unemployment,2 however more recent papers such as Elsby et al. (2009), Fujita and Ramey
(2009), Shimer (2012a), and Elsby et al. (2015a) have found that reductions in transitions from
unemployment to employment play the largest role.
Consistent with this more recent literature, we nd that job nding rates are the largest con-
tributor to unemployment uctuations across demographic groups. Nonetheless, we nd impor-
tant dierences across demographic groups, namely that the hiring margin explains a somewhat
larger share for young workers and those without college degrees compared to all workers (3/4 vs
2/3), while the hiring margin explains substantially less of the uctuations for nonwhite workers
(55%).
Our paper also relates to a literature seeking to explain the sources of poor labor market out-
comes for various demographic groups. Similar to Choi et al. (2015), we nd that variation in the
unemployment rate over the lifecycle can primarily be aributed to separation rates. However,
we are also able to show that this is not unique to young workers, and instead is common across
demographic groups with persistently high unemployment rates.
e ndings in this paper also complements a set of studies that test that whether workers with
a specic demographic characteristics are rst red during recessions or last hired as the economy
recover. For example, Couch and Fairlie (2010) and Couch et al. (2016) test this hypothesis by
studying minority workers, while Xu and Couch (2017) discuss young workers. All of these works
show that in the comparison with advantage workers, these disadvantage workers’ separation
rate is more sensitive to business cycle uctuations while their job nding rates do not have
this feature. ey therefore claim that disadvantage workers are rst red during the recessions
while are not last hired during the periods of recovery. However, these studies did not oer
the connection between these features and disadvantage workers’ unemployment dynamics.3 In
2See Elsby et al. (2009) for a survey of the literature.
3ese studies only show that the long-run (steady-state) disadvantage workers’ unemployment gap can be elim-
inated when disadvantage workers have the same transition rates as that of advantage workers. ey do not discuss
unemployment gap in dierent recession periods and they also do not quantify the contribution of each transition
rate to unemployment gap.
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particular, although last hired hypothesis did not hold for disadvantage workers, the job nding
rate for these disadvantage workers still declines signicantly compared to that of advantage
workers during recessionary periods. We show that, even though the rst red hypothesis exists
in the data, the contribution of this component to the increases in the unemployment rate actually
is smaller than the decline in the job nding rates for both young and minority workers.
e remaining parts of this paper is organized as follows. e details of data source and these
estimation exercises are explained in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 explains the decomposition approach
for unemployment uctuations and oer the estimated contributions for various transition ows.
In Section 3.4, we use a similar analysis approach for unemployment gap and discuss the results.
Section 3.5 discusses misclassication issues in the data and claims such error will not change
our main argument. 3.6 concludes the paper and discussed policy implication.
3.2 Data and Methodology
We use monthly U.S. data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) spanning January 1976
through November 2017, retrieved from the IPUMS repository,4 which yields a total of over 36
million individual monthly observations. In order to measure ows between labor force status
(employed (E), unemployed (U), and out-of-the-labor-force (I)), we match individuals between
consecutive months.5
Since we are interested in comparing labor market ows and outcomes between demographic
groups, we divide our sample into three overlapping pairs of comparison groups. First, we dene
young workers as those with less than ten years of potential experience (age less experience
less six), which we compare with experienced workers, e.g. those with more than 10 years of
potential experience. Second, we compare non-white workers with white workers. ird, we
compare those without any college education with those with some college. Table C.4 shows the
4Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, and J. Robert Warren. Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series, Current Population Survey: Version 5.0. [dataset]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2017.
hps://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V5.0.
5Specically, we match individuals by using gender and the IPUMS-CPS dened variable (CPSIDP) that is con-
structed for uniquely identifying individuals. By CPSIDP, we can avoid the issues that CPS identication number
may not represent the same individual and simplify the matching process although CPSIDP is consistent only aer
1978.
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Figure 3.1: Unemployment Rate
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
relative frequencies of each of these six demographic categories.
3.2.1 Estimating Transition Unemployment Rates
e rst step in our analysis is to estimate the raw transition rates between the three labor force
states and the unemployment rate for each of our six demographic groups. Let 1ij
h,t ,c
be an in-
dicator that captures whether individual h with demographic characteristics c transitioned from
i ∈ {E,U , I } at time t − 1 to j ∈ {E,U , I } at time t . Here, we use t to denote a specic month in a
year. erefore, the transition ow from labor force status i to j for workers with demographic
characteristic c is zijt ,c =
∑H
h=1 1
ij
h,t ,c
×wh,t ,c , wherewh,t ,c is the CPS sample weight for the individual
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h with demographic characteristics c at time t .6 erefore, we can construct unemployment rate
for worker with demographic characteristic c by
uct =
∑H
h=1
∑
i∈{E,U ,I } ziUt ,c∑
i∈{E,U ,I } ziUt ,c +
∑
i∈{E,U ,I } ziEt ,c
, (3.1)
and the transition probability (or rate) between dierent three labor force status for workers with
demographic characteristics c by using
λijt ,c =
zijt ,c∑
i∈{E,U ,I } z
ij
t ,c
. (3.2)
Figure 3.1 compares the unemployment rate between workers with a specic characteristic (e.g.,
minority) and that of the counterpart workers (e.g., white), constructed based on Equation (3.1).
ere are two important features to note. First, minority workers, young workers and those
without college degrees have substantially higher unemployment rates than non-minority, expe-
rienced and workers with college degrees. Second, these disadvantage workers experience sharp
increases in the unemployment rate during recession.7 Table 3.1 compares the increase in the
unemployment of disadvantaged workers and that of the corresponding advantaged workers (in
parentheses) during recessions. e increase in the unemployment rate for disadvantage workers
is almost twice large as that of advantaged workers during the four recessionary periods during
our sample period.8
e fact that we see such persistent dierences in unemployment rates for these disadvantaged
demographic groups and such systematic cyclical responses to recessions across four decades
supports our contention that these groups are indeed specically disadvantaged in the labor mar-
ket. In contrast, we do not include female workers in our classication of disadvantaged workers,
because their unemployment rates and cyclical unemployment is quite similar to male workers.9.
In order to understand why these disadvantaged groups have persistently elevated and cycli-
6Due to the rotation feature of CPS data, we have two CPS sample weight: one is the weight in the beginning
of a month and another is that in the end of a month. Following Shimer (2012a), we use the average of these two
weight as the CPS sample weight wht,c
7ese ndings also have been documented by, for example, Hoynes et al. (2012).
8We combine the two recessions in 1980s together.
9Nonetheless, in the Appendix we include our key analyses separated by gender as a source of comparison
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Table 3.1: Unemployment Rate: Minimum to the Maximum
1980s Recessions 1990s Recessions 2000s Recessions Great Recessions
Minority 9.07%, (4.22%) 4.41%, (1.78%) 4.14%, (1.88%) 8.20%, (4.94%)
Young 7.04%, (4.39%) 3.76%, (2.22%) 3.50%, (1.99%) 7.51%, (4.54%)
No College 7.07%, (2.49%) 3.55%, (2.23%) 3.43%, (1.53%) 8.61%, (4.24%)
Female 4.44%, (5.43%) 2.32%, (2.55%) 2.18%, (1.83%) 5.04%, (5.53%)
Note: is table reports the changes in the unemployment rate from the minimum to the maximum around
the periods of recession for these four types of workers. e number in parentheses is the change in the
unemployment rate for corresponding counterpart less-disadvantage workers during the same period.
cally volatile unemployment rates, we turn to transition rates between the three main labor mar-
ket status: employment, unemployment, and out-of-the-labor force. Unemployed workers are
dened as those who are not employed but are actively seeking employment. e unemploy-
ment rate is dened as the share of workers in the labor force (that is, employed or unemployed)
who are unemployed. is ratio can vary across demographic groups for a variety of reasons:
some groups may nd employment more quickly, thus exit unemployment at a faster rate. Al-
ternatively, some demographic groups may be more likely to become discouraged from seeking
employment, and thus exit unemployment for out-of-the-labor force (which will decrease the un-
employment rate). Similarly, groups may dier in their rates of entry into unemployment, either
from employment or from non-employment.
As a rst pass at understanding the dierences in these transition rates across demographic
groups, we estimate the following linear regression model:
yt = a + ac1c +
∑
r
ar1r +
∑
r
acr1r ,c +
∑
s
as1s +
∑
m
am1m + et . (3.3)
where 1c is demographic characteristic dummy, 1r is recession dummy, 1r ,c is group-specic re-
cession dummy, 1s and 1m are state and month xed eect. yt can be unemployment rate or
transition rate, which is constructed based on Equations (3.1) and (3.2) respectively. Estimates
are weighted using the CPS sampling weights. Since we are interested in labor market outcomes,
instead of using the ocial NBER recession dates we measure recessions from the pre-recession
series minimum unemployment rate to the maximum unemployment in the specic recessionary
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Table 3.2: Estimated Transitions: Minority Workers
u λEU λEI λUE λU I λIE λIU
Const. 0.065*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.271*** 0.200*** 0.027*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002)
11980s 0.017*** 0.005*** 0.002** -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.001 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
11990s 0.004*** 0.002** -0.004*** -0.009 -0.048*** -0.003 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
12000s -0.006*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
1Great 0.006*** 0.001 -0.004*** -0.042*** -0.008 -0.007*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
Minority 0.054*** 0.010*** 0.009*** -0.061*** 0.101*** 0.007*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Group
Specic
11980s 0.030*** 0.005*** 0.001 -0.020** 0.019** 0.001 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.002)
11990s 0.008*** 0.002 0.002* -0.008 0.010 -0.003 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002)
12000s -0.009*** -0.002* 0.002 0.024** -0.003 0.006* -0.004**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002)
1Great -0.012*** -0.003*** -0.000 0.020** -0.010 0.000 -0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.002)
R2 0.33 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.09
N 49216 49207 49207 47136 47136 49060 49060
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
episode.10
Table 3.2 reports the regression results for minority workers. In the rst column, we know the
unemployment rate gap (5.4 percentage points) between minority and white workers is signi-
cantly larger than zero. Moreover, the increase in the unemployment of minority workers is also
signicantly larger than that of white workers. In the comparison with white workers, separation
rates (EU transition) of these minority workers are 1 percentage point higher and job nding rates
(UE transition) are 6 percentage points lower. Moreover, for the minority workers, the transition
rates between out-of-labor-force (I ) and labor force (E orU ) are all signicantly higher than that
10In the appendices, we report the specic dates as well as and the estimation for female workers.
87
Table 3.3: Estimated Transitions: Young Workers
u λEU λEI λUE λU I λIE λIU
Const. 0.067*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.217*** 0.208*** -0.000 0.011***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.001)
11980s 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.001** -0.015*** -0.028*** -0.004 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
11990s 0.001** 0.001*** -0.003*** 0.001 -0.044*** -0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
12000s -0.007*** -0.001** -0.004*** 0.013** -0.012*** -0.004 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
1Great 0.010*** 0.001*** -0.004*** -0.046*** -0.019*** -0.008*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Young 0.042*** 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.039*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.053***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Group
Specic
11980s 0.016*** 0.005*** -0.000 -0.015** -0.034*** 0.001 0.011***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
11990s -0.000 0.002*** 0.002* 0.007 -0.007 0.008** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
12000s -0.004*** -0.001* 0.005*** 0.001 0.028*** 0.005 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
1Great 0.002** -0.002*** 0.003*** -0.008 0.017*** -0.018*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
R2 0.49 0.24 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.20 0.47
N 49282 49282 49282 49137 49137 49246 49246
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
of white workers. is shows that minority moves between E orU and I is more frequently that
white workers. erefore, the labor force participation margin or non-participation likely plays
a more important role in explaining minority workers’ unemployment uctuation.
In addition, we can compare the cyclical responses for minority workers for the four individ-
ual recessionary periods in our sample. Here we see that the group-specic recession dummy
shows that minority workers suer most during the 1980s recession. e group-specic reces-
sion dummy for unemployment rate and separation rate is signicantly smaller than zero during
the Great Recession. is means that in the comparison with 1980s recession, the dierence be-
tween the increases in the separation and unemployment rates of minority workers and that of
88
Table 3.4: Estimated Transitions: Workers without College Degree
u λEU λEI λUE λU I λIE λIU
Const. 0.050*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.303*** 0.225*** 0.047*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001)
11980s 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
11990s 0.000 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.002 -0.044*** 0.001 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000)
12000s -0.003*** -0.000 -0.002** -0.014** -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000)
1Great 0.009*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.082*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
No College 0.042*** 0.010*** 0.016*** -0.069*** 0.044*** -0.024*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Group
Specic
11980s 0.006*** 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.021** -0.035*** -0.004 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
11990s -0.001 0.001*** -0.004*** -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
12000s -0.005*** -0.001 -0.002 0.019** 0.021*** 0.008*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001)
1Great 0.009*** 0.001*** -0.002 0.037*** 0.004 0.008*** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
R2 0.52 0.31 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.12
N 49291 49289 49289 49096 49096 49280 49280
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
white workers become smaller during the Great Recession. Moreover, group-specic recession
dummy for job nding rate is signicantly positive during the Great Recession. is also shows
that the dierence between the decline in the minority workers’ job nding rate and that of white
workers is smaller too during the Great Recession. In sum, these estimated results just show that
minority workers suer more during the 1980s recession, compared to the Great Recession. How-
ever, during the Great Recession, these minority workers still experience large magnitude in the
increases in the unemployment rate and separation rates, and the large decline in the job nding
rates.
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 report the regression results for young workers and those without
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college degrees respectively. For unemployment rate, the results are similar to minority workers’.
For these two types of workers, the signs of demographic characteristic dummy in each columns
are almost similar to that of minority workers. However, for young workers, their job nding
rates are 4% higher than experienced workers while for those without college degrees, they have
signicantly lower IE transition rates than that of workers with college degrees. In addition,
the group-specic recession dummy with regard to unemployment rate for these two types of
workers are signicantly larger than zero for both 1980s and the Great Recession. is revealed
that unlike minority workers, these two groups of workers experience similar unemployment
increases during these two periods of recessions. It is also noteworthy that, similar to that of
minority workers, the regression results show that the dierence between the decline in the
job nding rate of workers without college degrees and that of workers with college degrees is
smaller during the Great Recession, in the comparison with the 1980s recessions.
In sum, the estimation exercises rst show that these disadvantage workers have signicantly
larger unemployment rate than that of advantage workers and the increase in the unemploy-
ment during the periods of recessions for these workers are also signicantly higher. However,
minority workers particularly suer more during the 1980s recession. In addition, all disadvan-
tage workers have higher separation rates and lower job nding rates (except young workers)
than that of their counterpart advantage workers. Moreover, these disadvantage workers move
between I and labor force (U or E) more frequently than advantage workers. ese estimation
exercises help us understand the uctuations in unemployment and transition ows for these
disadvantage workers, but they cannot help us measure the importance of these transition rates
in explaining unemployment gap and the sharp increase in the unemployment during recessions.
We quantify the importance of these transition ows in the next section.
3.2.2 Linking Transition Rates and Unemployment Rates
In this section, we follow the steady-state approximation in Shimer (2012a) to derive the unem-
ployment rate as function of transition rates between labor market states. We begin by expressing
the accounting identity that must hold in the steady state: inows to each labor market state must
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equal outows. erefore, we have
(λEU + λEI )E = λUEU + λIEI ,
(λUE + λU I )U = λEUE + λIU I ,
(λIE + λIU )E = λU IU + λEIE.
(3.4)
Based on Equation (3.4) and assume the sum of E, U and I as a constant, we can derive inows
to unemployment and inow to employment respectively
Ut = C · (λEIt λIU + λIEt λEU + λIUt λEU ), (3.5)
Et = C · (λIUt λUE + λU It λIE + λIEt λUE). (3.6)
Here, C is a constant such that Ut + Et + It can be normalized as a x number. Given the unem-
ployment and employment inow, the steady-state approximation for unemployment rate can be
wrien as follows:
usst =
λEIt λ
IU
t + λ
IE
t λ
EU
t + λ
IU
t λ
EU
t
(λEIt λIUt + λIEt λEUt + λIUt λEUt ) + (λU It λIEt + λIEt λUEt + λIUt λUEt )
. (3.7)
In Equation (3.7), for example, λIEt λEUt describes that in a beginning of a month, a worker from out-
the-the-labor-force choose to participate labor force and nd a job, but then becomes unemployed
in the end of a month. However, due to the monthly frequency of CPS, only the labor force status
in the beginning of a month and that in the end of a month will be recorded. erefore, the
I − E −U transition will be recorded as I −U because I − E and E −U transition occurred during
a month. Based on the raw monthly transition rates according to CPS, we will mistakenly have
I−U transition, while do not count the actual I−E and E−U ows. Because Equation (3.7) implied
the feature that workers have multiple transitions between E, I , and U in a month, in order to
bring the model expressed in Equation (3.7) to monthly transition data, we again follow Shimer
(2012a) and correct this time aggregation error by assuming that the frequency of workers’ ows
transitions in a month is continuous.11
11We show how to implement the time aggregation error correction in the appendices. e way we present is
based on Gomes (2015).
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Figure 3.2: Observed v.s. Approximated Unemployment Rate
Note: e gray-shaded area indicates NBER Recession periods. e solid lines represent the observed unemployment
rate while dashed line and doed line represent approximated unemployment rate for disadvantage and advantage
workers respectively. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
Figure 3.2 shows this constructed unemployment rate tracks closely with the measured unem-
ployment rate for each demographic subgroup, while Table 3.5 shows the correlation coecients
and R2 between approximated and observed unemployment rates are all close to 1. is indi-
cates that this method for expressing the unemployment rate in terms of transition rates works
well for all demographic subgroups, and can be used to estimate how much each transition rate
contributes to the unemployment rate, which we turn to in the Section 3.3 and 3.4.
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Table 3.5: Approximated and Observed Unemployment
Workers’ Type Corr. R2 R2 (With Constant)
Minority 0.966 0.995 0.933
Young 0.969 0.997 0.940
No College Degree 0.977 0.997 0.954
White 0.980 0.997 0.960
Experienced 0.977 0.996 0.954
With College Degree 0.961 0.994 0.924
All 0.979 0.997 0.959
Note: is table reports the correlation between observed unemploy-
ment rate (ut ) and approximated unemployment rate (uapproxt ) based
on Shimer (2012a). In addition to correlation, we also oer the R2
based on the modelut = buapproxt +et andut = a+bu
approx
t +et . All
measures show that approximation formula in Shimer (2012a) can
well represent observed unemployment rate.
3.3 Sources of Unemployment Fluctuations
3.3.1 Decomposition: the Unemployment Fluctuations
In order to understand why unemployment rates increase so dramatically for disadvantaged
workers during recessions, we need to isolate the cyclical component of the unemployment rate
and then decompose this into the component transition rates. In particular, we will log linearize
the expression for the unemployment rate derived in Equation (3.7) around the mean unemploy-
ment rate over the time period, u¯c , where c indexes the demographic group.12
Let Λt represent the vector of the six transition rates between employment, unemployment,
and not-in-the-labor-force: λEUt , λEIt , λUEt , λU It , λIEt , and λIUt . en when we log linearize around
u¯c we obtain the following expression:
lnusst ≈ ln u¯ss +
∑
x∈X
∂ lnusst
∂λxt

Λt=Λ¯t
× (λxt − λ¯xt )
≈ ln u¯ss +
∑
x∈X
∂ lnusst
∂λxt

Λt=Λ¯t
× λ¯x · (ln λxt − ln λ¯x ),
(3.8)
12We do not use HP-lter for the main analysis here because of Hamilton (ming). In the appendices, we show that
using HP-lter trend does not change our main conclusion.
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where u¯ss and λ¯x are the mean of steady-state approximated unemployment rate usst each transi-
tion rates λxt , and we have x ∈ X = {EU ,EI ,UE,U I , IE, IU }. In the appendices, we show Equation
(3.8) allows us to approximate workers’ total unemployment uctuations F tott = lnuct − ln u¯c in
terms of six factors, each of which depend on a separate transition event
F tott = F
EU
t + F
EIU
t + F
UE
t + F
U IE
t + F
IE
t + F
IU
t + ϵt . (3.9)
ere are some advantages to decompose uˆt in this way. First, we can intuitively quantify the
inuence of hiring margin (U → E or U → I → E) and separation margin (E → U or E → I →
U ) in unemployment uctuations or unemployment gap. Second, F IE and F IU do not have the
component that contributes to E → I → U and U → I → E ows. Because F IE and F IU now
only contains the factors related to the transition from I to E andU , we can clearly determine the
“pure” impact of labor force participation margin on unemployment uctuations or disadvantage
workers’ unemployment gap.
3.3.2 Measure for Importance: β
Based on Fujita and Ramey (2009), we use this decomposition approach to analyze the source of
unemployment uctuations for each demographic group. Based on Equation (3.9), the variance
of total unemployment uctuation cov(F tott , F tott ) can be wrien as
cov(F tott , F tott ) = var (F tott ) =
∑
k∈K
cov(F tott , Fkt ) + cov(F tott , ϵt ), (3.10)
which can be further be rewrien as
1 =
∑
k∈K
cov(F tott , Fkt )
var (F tott )
+
cov(F tott , ϵt )
var (F tott )
=
∑
k∈K
βk + βϵ . (3.11)
Here, K is the set for ows EU ,UE,EIU ,U IE, IE and IE as we specied in Equation (3.9). Based
on Equation (3.11), we actually normalize the total contributions as unity, and each β coecient
represent the percentage of total unemployment uctuation that is aributed to ows k or error
term. In particular, we can estimate the model Fkt = a + βkF tott + et to have βk and its condence
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Figure 3.3: Observed Unemployment Fluctuation v.s. Approximation
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Black solid line represents observed unemployment
uctuations and green dashed line represents approximated rst-order log-linearized unemployment uctuations.
Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
interval, which allows us easily compare the β coecients between dierent groups and across
dierent time periods.
Figure 3.3 show the log-linearized approximation can capture more than 99% uctuations in
observed unemployment rate, even though we do not consider the terms with higher orders in
Equation (3.8). Aer conrming the accuracy of the log-linearized approximation, we discuss our
ndings in the next section.
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Figure 3.4: Sources of Unemployment Fluctuation
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Black solid line represents observed unemployment
uctuations. e green dashed line represents the factor which depends on job nding rate and the red doed line
represents the factor that depends on separation rate. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
3.3.3 Results
We begin by examining the cyclical uctuations in separations (e.g. FEU + FEIU ) and hiring (e.g.
FUE +FU IE) for each of our three key disadvantaged demographic groups: non-white, young, and
those without a college degree. In Figure 3.4, we see that hiring closely tracks the unemploy-
ment rate over the business cycle for all three groups, while separations exhibit substantially less
cyclicality.13 us, by this gure, it appears that uctuations in the unemployment rate for dis-
advantaged groups, including the large increase during the Great Recession, is primarily driven
13Since F IU and F I E constitute relatively minor contributions to the unemployment rate, we suppress them on
this graph.
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Table 3.6: β Coecient: Unemployment Fluctuations, Overall
Minority Young No College All
E → U 0.286 0.179 0.178 0.214
[0.26, 0.313] [0.148, 0.21] [0.155, 0.2] [0.189, 0.24]
E → I → U 0.172 0.083 0.071 0.117
[0.15, 0.195] [0.053, 0.114] [0.053, 0.088] [0.101, 0.134]
U → E 0.33 0.485 0.509 0.459
[0.301, 0.359] [0.447, 0.523] [0.484, 0.535] [0.43, 0.489]
U → I → E 0.221 0.255 0.25 0.215
[0.202, 0.24] [0.236, 0.274] [0.235, 0.265] [0.203, 0.227]
I → E 0.005 0.016 0.009 0.008
[0.005, 0.006] [0.013, 0.018] [0.008, 0.01] [0.007, 0.009]
I → U -0.01 -0.011 -0.007 -0.009
[-0.011, -0.009] [-0.014, -0.008] [-0.008, -0.006] [-0.01, -0.008]
ϵ -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.004
[-0.009, -0.002] [-0.01, -0.003] [-0.012, -0.007] [-0.006, -0.002]
White Experienced With College All
E → U 0.218 0.216 0.176 0.214
[0.192, 0.244] [0.195, 0.237] [0.153, 0.198] [0.189, 0.24]
E → I → U 0.123 0.122 0.148 0.117
[0.107, 0.139] [0.107, 0.138] [0.125, 0.17] [0.101, 0.134]
U → E 0.476 0.457 0.53 0.459
[0.446, 0.506] [0.435, 0.479] [0.503, 0.557] [0.43, 0.489]
U → I → E 0.19 0.21 0.155 0.215
[0.178, 0.202] [0.196, 0.225] [0.141, 0.169] [0.203, 0.227]
I → E 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.008
[0.007, 0.009] [0.004, 0.006] [0.01, 0.016] [0.007, 0.009]
I → U -0.01 -0.006 -0.011 -0.009
[-0.011, -0.009] [-0.007, -0.006] [-0.013, -0.009] [-0.01, -0.008]
ϵ -0.005 -0.004 -0.01 -0.004
[-0.006, -0.003] [-0.007, -0.002] [-0.012, -0.007] [-0.006, -0.002]
Note: 95% Condence Interval in brackets.
by rm hiring behavior.
Next, we want to compare the magnitude of these uctuations between dierent groups. To do
so, we estimate the β coecients derived in Equation (3.11). e results are reported in Table 3.6.
ese β ’s represent the share of the uctuations in the unemployment rate for the demographic
group that is captured by uctuations in the transition of interest. In particular, due to the small
magnitude of βϵ , we know the the rst-order log-linearized approximation well capture the most
uctuations in the unemployment rate.
Some important information can be found this table by comparing the condence intervals.
e estimated β of all dierent types of workers share common features. First, the contribution of
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Table 3.7: β Coecient: Unemployment Fluctuations, Recessions
Minority 1980s 1990s 2000s Great Recession
E → U 0.237 0.077 0.166 0.176
[0.131, 0.344] [-0.057, 0.211] [0.02, 0.312] [0.119, 0.234]
E → I → U 0.014 0.221 0.091 0.105
[-0.062, 0.09] [0.093, 0.348] [-0.027, 0.209] [0.042, 0.168]
U → E 0.383 0.483 0.406 0.464
[0.299, 0.468] [0.301, 0.665] [0.259, 0.553] [0.401, 0.526]
U → I → E 0.368 0.233 0.33 0.265
[0.288, 0.448] [0.126, 0.34] [0.23, 0.43] [0.218, 0.313]
I → E 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003
[0.003, 0.007] [0.001, 0.01] [0.003, 0.007] [0.002, 0.004]
I → U -0.003 -0.011 -0.003 -0.005
[-0.005, -0.001] [-0.017, -0.004] [-0.005, -0.001] [-0.006, -0.003]
ϵ -0.004 -0.009 0.005 -0.009
[-0.017, 0.009] [-0.025, 0.007] [-0.005, 0.015] [-0.017, -0.001]
Young 1980s 1990s 2000s Great Recession
E → U 0.198 0.122 0.119 0.128
[0.113, 0.283] [-0.012, 0.256] [-0.009, 0.247] [0.065, 0.19]
E → I → U 0.022 0.104 0.174 0.091
[-0.072, 0.117] [-0.036, 0.243] [0.023, 0.325] [0.023, 0.158]
U → E 0.55 0.498 0.466 0.538
[0.458, 0.643] [0.325, 0.671] [0.292, 0.64] [0.465, 0.611]
U → I → E 0.221 0.264 0.229 0.248
[0.156, 0.286] [0.177, 0.351] [0.143, 0.315] [0.202, 0.295]
I → E 0.014 0.025 0.017 0.014
[0.008, 0.02] [0.016, 0.035] [0.009, 0.026] [0.011, 0.018]
I → U -0.007 -0.015 -0.008 -0.014
[-0.012, -0.003] [-0.025, -0.006] [-0.017, 0.001] [-0.018, -0.01]
ϵ 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.006
[-0.007, 0.01] [-0.01, 0.015] [-0.01, 0.015] [-0.012, 0.001]
No College 1980s 1990s 2000s Great Recession
E → U 0.288 0.13 0.114 0.208
[0.224, 0.352] [0.023, 0.237] [0.003, 0.226] [0.154, 0.263]
E → I → U 0.005 0.041 0.106 0.092
[-0.042, 0.053] [-0.042, 0.123] [0.023, 0.188] [0.049, 0.134]
U → E 0.462 0.549 0.553 0.478
[0.402, 0.521] [0.432, 0.666] [0.44, 0.666] [0.422, 0.533]
U → I → E 0.243 0.271 0.225 0.23
[0.203, 0.283] [0.209, 0.333] [0.155, 0.296] [0.193, 0.267]
I → E 0.01 0.013 0.006 0.004
[0.007, 0.013] [0.009, 0.017] [0.002, 0.009] [0.003, 0.006]
I → U -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
[-0.007, -0.002] [-0.012, -0.004] [-0.009, -0.003] [-0.008, -0.005]
ϵ -0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.005
[-0.009, 0.001] [-0.002, 0.01] [-0.004, 0.008] [-0.011, 0.001]
Note: 95% Condence Interval in brackets.
98
hiring margins (FUE +FU IE or FUE only) is signicantly larger than that of separation (FEU +FEIU
or FEU only) to workers’ unemployment uctuations. Second, the role of direct inows from U
to E (FUE) is more important than that of indirect inows fromU to I to E (FU IE). e same story
applied to the two separation margins components FEU and FEIU . ird, the direct inows from I
to E or from I toU play trivial roles in unemployment uctuations. erefore, in the comparison
with separation or hiring margins, the pure impact of labor force participation (directly from
I to U or E) in explaining unemployment uctuations is really minor. Our analysis shows that
out-of-the-labor-force I is just a transient status when workers move between employment and
unemployment in a given month. Our results about I actually complement the ndings in Elsby
et al. (2015a) which emphasize the role of transition between I and U in unemployment rate
uctuations. We show that IU or U I transition ows are important only when I is a transient
status between E and U .
In addition to these common features, Table 3.6 also shows that the role of separation margins
and hiring margins varied between dierent types of workers. First, although minority workers’
unemployment uctuations are mainly driven by hiring margins, the contribution of separation
margins to their unemployment uctuations is signicantly larger than that of white workers
and other disadvantage workers. In addition, the role of hiring margins for minority workers
is less important in explaining unemployment uctuations compares to that of white and other
disadvantage workers. We believe discrimination would be a potential source for this feature
(see e.g., Couch and Fairlie 2010). Second, in the comparison with experienced and minority
workers, unemployment uctuations young workers are mainly driven by FU IE . e same story
also applied to workers without college degrees. However, some components may only well
explain the unemployment decreases during normal time or during a specic period of recession.
Because we are more interested in the sources to the increase in the unemployment, we further
compute the β coecients for each groups during dierent periods of recessions and Table 3.7
reports these estimated β coecients. During all recession periods, the main reason that these
workers suer sharp increases in the unemployment rate because of hiring margin FUE and FU IE .
In particular, as in Table 3.6, the contribution of hiring margin is signicantly higher than that
of separation margin for all disadvantage workers. Moreover, for minority workers, the con-
tribution of FEIU is not signicantly larger than zero during the 1980s recessions while FEU for
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them during the Great Recession is signicantly smaller than that in Table 3.6. e decline in the
importance of FEIU and FEU during the periods of recession show that separation margins only
contribute to minority workers’ unemployment uctuations in normal time.
us, despite the fact that the magnitude of unemployment uctuations are larger for disad-
vantaged groups, we see that the primary source is hiring for all demographic groups. However,
for minority workers, the contribution of separation margin to unemployment uctuations is
higher than that of white and other disadvantage workers while the importance of hiring margin
of minority is smaller than that of white and other disadvantage workers. For young workers
and those with college degree, the contribution hiring margin of to unemployment uctuations
is similar to their counterpart advantage workers. During the periods of recessions, we show that
the increases in the unemployment rate are mainly aributed to hiring margins for all disadvan-
tage workers. In particular, we nd that separation margin for minority workers only maers
during normal time. During the periods of recession, the importance of separation margin in
explaining the minority workers’ increases in the unemployment rate signicantly decline.
3.4 Explaining Level Dierences between Groups
3.4.1 Decomposition: the Unemployment Gap
Now that we have determined the sources of uctuations in the unemployment rate for dierent
demographic groups, we turn to explaining dierences in the level of the unemployment rate
between groups. Recall from Figure 3.1 that non-white, young, and workers without college
degrees have substantially higher unemployment rates at all phases of the business cycle. In
order to determine which transition rates can explain these gaps, we return to the unemployment
rate decomposition that we derived in Section 3.3. As in Equation (3.8), the (log) unemployment
gap between disadvantage workers with demographic characteristic c and the counter advantage
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Figure 3.5: Observed Unemployment Gap v.s. Approximation
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Black solid line represents observed unemployment
gap and green dashed line represents approximated rst-order log-linearized unemployment gap. Data source: FRED
& IPUMS-CPS.
workers with demographic characteristic c˜ can be wrien as following
lnuss,ct − lnuss,c˜t ≈
∑
x∈X
∂ lnusst
∂λxt

Λct=Λ
c˜
t
× (λx ,ct − λx ,c˜t )
≈
∑
x∈X
∂ lnusst
∂λxt

Λct=Λ
c˜
t
× λx ,c˜t · (ln λx ,ct − ln λx ,c˜t ),
(3.12)
which is similar to Equation (3.8) and shows that, as unemployment uctuations, disadvantage
workers’ unemployment gap can be decomposed to components that depend on transition rate.
For the same reason mentioned in Section 3.3, we decompose observed unemployment gap
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F
дap
t = lnuct − lnuc˜t to the factors that depend on transition event EU ,EIU ,UE,U IE, IE and IU .
e decomposition of unemployment gap Fдapt , similar to Equation (3.9), can be decomposed as
F
дap
t = F
EU
t + F
EIU
t + F
UE
t + F
U IE
t + F
IE
t + F
IU
t + ϵt .
3.4.2 Measure for Importance: Ratio r
e β coecients in Equation (3.11) can well capture the contribution of each factor to “variation”
of our target F tott . When we compute the variance of F tott and its covariance between other factor
Fkt , we remove the mean of F tott and Fkt . For unemployment uctuations, removing mean is not
a issue because mean of F tott or Fkt has been zero. However, the mean (level) of disadvantage
workers’ unemployment gap, Fдapt , is not zero. Using Equation (3.11) actually eliminates the level
of unemployment gap. Because our goal is to identify source of the level of unemployment gap,
we do not use Equation (3.11) to compute the contribution of factor Fk to unemployment gap.
When we discuss unemployment, we compute the ratio of each factor to total unemployment
gap:
1 =
FEUt
F
дap
t
+
FEIUt
F
дap
t
+
FUEt
F
дap
t
+
FU IEt
F
дap
t
+
F IEt
F
дap
t
+
F IUt
F
дap
t
+
ϵt
F
дap
t
=
∑
k∈K
rkt + r
ϵ
t (3.13)
Here, K again is the set for ows EU ,UE,EIU ,U IE, IE. Aer we have these ratio, we further
construct the condence interval for the mean of these ratio variable rkt .14 By the estimated
condence interval, we can compare the importance of a factor depending on transition ow k
between dierent types of disadvantage workers and across dierent recession periods.
We evaluate how well the rst-order log-linearizion approximation based on Equation (3.12)
performs in capturing the observed gap in the unemployment rate for pairs of demographic
groups (e.g. non-white and white, young and experienced, and without vs. with college de-
gree). In Figure 3.5, we see that our approximation method can capture 99% of unemployment
gap based, indicating this is a reliable method for decomposing the gap in unemployment rates.
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Figure 3.6: Sources of Unemployment Gap
Note: is gure reports percentage of F EU (top shaded area), FU IE + F EIU (middle shaded area) and FU E (boom
shaded area) in total unemployment gap for each type of disadvantage workers. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
3.4.3 Results
As in Section 3.3, we begin by examining the unemployment gap in separations (i.e., FEU + FEIU )
and hiring (i.e., FUE + FU IE) for these disadvantaged workers. Figure 3.6 shows that main factor
that result in disadvantage workers’ unemployment gap are separations. We combine F IU , F IE
and error term ϵ as “other” in the gure, and their ratio to total unemployment gap is almost zero.
Interestingly, in the comparison with workers’ unemployment uctuations, hiring only account
for 20 percent in total unemployment gap for minority workers and those without college degree.
In particular, for young workers, the contribution of hiring margin to their unemployment gap
14We just simply regress rkt on a constant to have the condence interval.
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Table 3.8: Compositions of Unemployment Gap, Overall
Minority Young No College
E → U 0.323 0.706 0.569
[0.313, 0.333] [0.69, 0.721] [0.562, 0.577]
E → I → U 0.536 1.441 0.243
[0.523, 0.548] [1.412, 1.47] [0.234, 0.253]
U → E 0.395 -0.165 0.099
[0.383, 0.407] [-0.178, -0.152] [0.089, 0.109]
U → I → E -0.169 -0.874 0.083
[-0.18, -0.158] [-0.904, -0.843] [0.076, 0.09]
I → E -0.008 -0.051 0.034
[-0.009, -0.007] [-0.056, -0.046] [0.032, 0.036]
I → U -0.033 -0.05 -0.002
[-0.035, -0.032] [-0.054, -0.045] [-0.002, -0.001]
ϵ -0.044 -0.008 -0.027
[-0.047, -0.041] [-0.01, -0.005] [-0.028, -0.025]
Note: 95% Condence Interval in brackets.
is zero.
en, we compare the magnitude of contribution of these factors to unemployment gap be-
tween dierent groups. Table 3.8 reports the estimated fraction of the factor which depend on a
specic ows in total unemployment gap and the corresponding condence interval. First, we
can see that for all disadvantage workers, the main factor of unemployment gap is FEU . In par-
ticular, the component FUE only accounts for 10 percent in total unemployment gap for workers
without college degrees, and its contribution is even smaller than zero for young workers. is
nding for young workers is not surprising. It is consistent with the estimated parameter in Ta-
ble 3.3, which shows that young workers have higher job nding rate compared to experienced
workers. However, for minority workers, 40 percent of total unemployment gap can be aributed
to the contribution from FUE . Particularly, minority workers’ ratio of FUE to total unemployment
gap is signicantly higher than that of FEU in total. Second, the impact of FEIU and FU IE on un-
employment gap is dierent. For minority and young workers, the unemployment gap is mainly
caused by FEIU , a component that belongs to separation margin. However, FU IE , a component in
hiring margin, did not contribute to unemployment gap for all disadvantage workers. ird, as
the estimated results we report in Section 3.3, the pure labor force participation component F IE
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Table 3.9: Compositions of Unemployment Gap, Recessions
Minority 1980s 1990s 2000s Great Recession
E → U 0.34 0.355 0.281 0.27
[0.318, 0.362] [0.322, 0.389] [0.234, 0.328] [0.225, 0.314]
E → I → U 0.443 0.501 0.562 0.606
[0.422, 0.464] [0.472, 0.53] [0.517, 0.607] [0.537, 0.676]
U → E 0.426 0.387 0.455 0.468
[0.399, 0.452] [0.345, 0.428] [0.407, 0.502] [0.417, 0.52]
U → I → E -0.111 -0.159 -0.218 -0.266
[-0.135, -0.087] [-0.188, -0.13] [-0.266, -0.171] [-0.328, -0.204]
I → E 0 -0.003 -0.013 -0.012
[-0.002, 0.003] [-0.006, -0.0] [-0.018, -0.008] [-0.019, -0.005]
I → U -0.034 -0.033 -0.028 -0.023
[-0.039, -0.029] [-0.038, -0.028] [-0.035, -0.02] [-0.032, -0.014]
ϵ -0.065 -0.048 -0.039 -0.043
[-0.071, -0.058] [-0.057, -0.039] [-0.052, -0.026] [-0.059, -0.026]
Young 1980s 1990s 2000s Great Recession
E → U 0.667 0.82 0.697 0.657
[0.637, 0.697] [0.771, 0.87] [0.656, 0.739] [0.614, 0.7]
E → I → U 1.159 1.474 1.411 1.423
[1.114, 1.205] [1.384, 1.564] [1.329, 1.494] [1.331, 1.514]
U → E -0.069 -0.259 -0.148 -0.111
[-0.104, -0.035] [-0.312, -0.207] [-0.189, -0.106] [-0.153, -0.069]
U → I → E -0.655 -0.914 -0.872 -0.929
[-0.697, -0.613] [-0.985, -0.843] [-0.945, -0.8] [-1.032, -0.826]
I → E -0.04 -0.06 -0.049 -0.019
[-0.052, -0.027] [-0.083, -0.036] [-0.067, -0.032] [-0.031, -0.007]
I → U -0.038 -0.055 -0.041 -0.022
[-0.05, -0.025] [-0.076, -0.034] [-0.055, -0.026] [-0.037, -0.006]
ϵ -0.025 -0.007 0.002 0
[-0.03, -0.019] [-0.016, 0.002] [-0.009, 0.013] [-0.011, 0.011]
No College 1980s 1990s 2000s Great Recession
E → U 0.534 0.602 0.602 0.596
[0.509, 0.559] [0.58, 0.625] [0.572, 0.632] [0.573, 0.619]
E → I → U 0.121 0.153 0.314 0.295
[0.1, 0.142] [0.13, 0.175] [0.292, 0.336] [0.27, 0.32]
U → E 0.168 0.107 0.063 0.054
[0.131, 0.206] [0.073, 0.14] [0.026, 0.101] [0.026, 0.081]
U → I → E 0.158 0.114 0.026 0.071
[0.138, 0.178] [0.099, 0.129] [0.006, 0.045] [0.051, 0.091]
I → E 0.045 0.049 0.023 0.017
[0.038, 0.051] [0.042, 0.055] [0.019, 0.028] [0.012, 0.021]
I → U 0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.003
[0.0, 0.005] [0.0, 0.005] [-0.006, -0.004] [-0.005, -0.002]
ϵ -0.029 -0.027 -0.023 -0.029
[-0.034, -0.025] [-0.03, -0.024] [-0.027, -0.019] [-0.032, -0.025]
Note: 95% Condence Interval in brackets.
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and F IU did not account for any fraction of unemployment gap. Transition ows related to not-
in-the-labor-force I are important only when I is a transient status when workers transit from
E to U . In overall, hiring margins contributes to the unemployment gap for minority workers,
while separation margins are the most crucial factors in explaining the unemployment gap for
all disadvantage workers.
Because the source of unemployment gap may dier in recession, as in Section 3.3, we estimate
fraction rk and their condence interval for the four periods of recession. Table 3.9 reports the
results. During the 1980s and Great Recession, for minority workers, the component related to
hiring margin in total unemployment gap is one and a half times as large as that of separation
margin while for other disadvantage workers, separation margins are still the most important
source to the unemployment gap during these two recessions. In particular, for workers without
college degrees, the importance of hiring margins during the Great Recession only account 10% of
total unemployment gap and are much smaller than that in 1980s. Moreover, the separation mar-
gins during the Great Recession is signicantly higher than that in the 1980s recession for those
without college degrees. As in Table 3.8, for young workers, hiring margin did not contribute to
unemployment gap. erefore, we nd that the source to unemployment gap is acyclical.
In sum, separation margins FEU and FEIU are the main factors that cause disadvantage workers’
unemployment gap during both recession and normal time, although for these minority workers
the role of hiring margins are relatviely more important, in particular during the Great Reces-
sions.
3.5 Misclassication Error
One potential issue in our work is misclassication error, which states that workers’ labor force
status is not correctly specied in data. With this errors in data, we may overestimate magnitude
of λIU and λU I . erefore, the magnitude of contribution of ows E → I → U andU → I → E to
unemployment uctuations or unemployment gap would be overestimated too. In our analysis,
omiing these ows related to ins and outs of I does not change our argument. For unemploy-
ment uctuations, hiring margin, the ows U → E, is still signicantly more important than
separation margin, E → U . Moreover, for unemployment gap, separation margin, E → U , con-
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tributes much more than hiring margin, the ows U → E. In spite of this error, our results are
still valid.
Previous studies have oered options for us to correct misclassication error. Although Abowd
and Zellner (1985) and Poterba and Summers (1986) use CPS reinterview survey to construct
the correction matrix to eliminate such error, this correction method is limited aggregated data.
Moreover, this correction matrix has not been updated because data of CPS reinterview survey
are no longer available. eir approach therefore does not t our paper. Other options suggested
by Feng and Hu (2013) and Elsby et al. (2015a) can be applied to this paper. Because existence of
this error does not change our main argument, we le this for future works which focus on the
role of ows related to labor force participation margin.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the source of elevated unemployment rates for three demographic sub-
groups: young workers, nonwhite workers, and workers without college degrees. We decompose
the unemployment rate into ows between employment, unemployment, and out-of-the-labor-
force. We nd that the majority of the uctuations in the unemployment rate can be aributed to
reductions in hiring rates during recessions, which can explain between 2/3 and 3/4 of the cycli-
cal uctuations in unemployment rates for all demographic groups except non-white workers. In
contrast, we nd that the persistent gap in the unemployment rate between these disadvantaged
demographic groups and other demographic groups can primarily be aributed to ows out of
employment, although the job nding rate can explain about 20% of the gap for nonwhite and
young workers.
ese results have important policy implications for addressing heterogeneity in the incidence
of unemployment across demographic groups. Although we see the cyclical properties unem-
ployment can be aributed to a reduction in hiring during recessions that aects all job seekers,
this leads to a larger fraction unemployed for these disadvantaged groups. is is because these
disadvantaged groups begin from an elevated unemployment rate during expansionary periods,
so a common shock results in a larger increase in the stock. Moreover, since these groups also
have a faster inow to unemployment, a reduction in the outow leads to a bigger increase in
107
the unemployment rate. us, policies that lead to reductions in the exit rate from employment
at all points in the business cycle should improve disparities in the unemployment rates across
demographic groups during expansions as well as recessions.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Robustness Check: Disutility Shock
In the baseline model, employed workers search for jobs in each period because their human
capital decays immediately aer they switch to a new job and being to receive higher wages.
However, the assumption about human capital destruction in this model is strong. In reality,
these employed workers usually do not leave their current jobs at such high frequencies. is
appendix briey explores the eects of relaxing this assumption. Given this new seing, unlike
in the baseline model, not all employed workers have incentives to search for jobs in each period.
ese workers only search only when they face disutility shock in the workplace.
Workers may not like, for example, their current job’s oce culture, promotion system or
their colleagues, factors which can encourage them to leave their current jobs. ese factors
are the sources of disutility shock. Because of this disutility shock, the matches between rms
and workers can continue only when, rst, these workers do not suer from disutility shock, or
second, when workers cannot nd a new job despite suering this disutility shock.
A.1.1 Workers
Recall in my model, the rst stage in a period is job destruction. When workers are not separated
from their current jobs and do not suer any disutility shock, workers’ human capital does not
decay because they continue to stay in the working environment they prefer. In addition, even
when workers do suer disutility shock, their human capital does not decay if they successfully
leave the working environment they dislike and switch to a new job. For these employed workers,
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the law of motion can be wrien as
nnt+1 = (1 − s) · (ϵµ,nt · ftnt + (1 − ϵµ,nt )nt ), (A.1)
which is the counterpart equation for Equation (1.5). In the main context, ϵµ,nt is used to denote
employed workers’ matching technology shock. Here, ϵµ,nt is interpreted as employed workers’
disutility shock. e job nding rate for employed workers is ft . ese workers can receive a
higher wage, wnt , due to their higher human capital.
In contrast, as workers suer disutility shock, their human capital decays and cannot accu-
mulate even though they stay in their current jobs. erefore, these employed workers have the
same human capital as those unemployed workers who successfully nd new jobs. e employ-
ment transition equation for these workers with levels of lower human capital can be wrien
as
not+1 = (1 − s) · ((1 − ft )ϵµ,nt · nt + f ut ut ), (A.2)
which is the counterpart equation for Equation (1.6). Given the two new equations that describe
employment ows, we can write the asset value of employed workers with higher human capital
as
V nt = w
n
t + Etβt+1
[
(1 − s)((1 − ft )ϵµ,nt V ot+1 + ( f nt + (1 − ϵµ,nt ))V nt+1) + sVut+1] , (A.3)
which describes how these workers with higher human capital can receive higher wage wnt . As
in the baseline model, their jobs are destructed with probability s . If their matches continue but
disutility shock occurs, these workers’ human capital will decay and receive a lower asset value
V ot+1 in the next period; otherwise, these workers can continue to receive a higher asset value
V nt+1. In a similar way, we can write down the asset value function for workers with lower human
capital as
V ot = w
o
t + Etβt+1
[
(1 − s)((1 − ft )ϵµ,nt V ot+1 + ( f nt + (1 − ϵµ,nt ))V nt+1) + sVut+1] . (A.4)
eir continuation value is similar to those with higher human capital. If they do not suer
any disutility shock, they can accumulate human capital and receive a higher asset value; other-
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wise, their human capital cannot accumulate and decays to the same level as that of unemployed
workers.
A.1.2 Firms
For rms, there exist two possibilities for how that the matches with workers can continue aer
the separation stage. e rst is when these employed workers do not suer disutility shock;
the other is when these workers cannot nd a new jobs and experience disutility shock. Because
workers’ human capital will not decay when disutility shock does not occur, the asset value of
the worker-rm match in the rst case is higher than that in the second. erefore, the asset
value of the match between rms and workers with lower human capital can be wrien as
Jot = αyt/(χnnt + n0t ) −wot + Et
[
βt+1(1 − s)
(
ϵ
µ,n
t (1 − ft )Jot+1 + (1 − ϵµ,nt )Jnt+1
) ]
, (A.5)
while the value between rms and workers with higher human capital is
Jnt = χαyt/(χnnt + n0t ) −wnt + Et
[
βt+1(1 − s)
(
ϵ
µ,n
t (1 − ft )Jot+1 + (1 − ϵµ,nt )Jnt+1
) ]
. (A.6)
As in the main context, χ describes the higher marginal productivity for these experienced work-
ers with higher human capital. ose unlisted equations in this model with disutility shock re-
main unchanged, as do those in the baseline model.
A.1.3 Analysis
In the model with disutility shock, although employed workers may not search in each period, the
bias in hiring and estimated shock is robust. Figure A.1 shows that the main results in the paper
continue to hold true in this new seing. First, without on-the-job searching, standard models
fail to explain the hiring dynamics seen both during the Great Recession and aer it. Second,
standard models underestimate the decline of matching eciency during the Great Recession
and its aermath. ird, standard models underestimate the contribution of matching eciency
to unemployment uctuations by 20%.
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Figure A.1: Robustness Checks: Model with Distutility Shock
Note: is gure shows that the main results in this paper still hold true in the model when disutility shock is
included. e gray-shaded areas indicate NBER Recession periods. Data source: FRED.
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A.2 Robustness Check: New Keynesian Model
In this appendix, I explain how to modify the baseline model to the New Keynesian one. In the
New Keynesian model, I introduce intermediate goods rms to create price rigidity. Intermediate
goods rms’ problems are similar to nal goods rms in the baseline RBC model. Capital goods
producers remain the same in the New Keynesian model. In the following discussion, I only list
the changed FOCs and constraints in the New Keynesian model.
A.2.1 Household
In the representative household’s problem, the budget constraint will be
Ct +
Bt
Pt
+Tt = w
n
t · nnt +wot · not + btut + Πt +
ϵ
pr
t−1Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
,
where Rt is the nominal interest rate and Pt is the price of nal good. Moreover, ϵpr is the risk
premium shock. ere is no preference shock in a household’s problem. e FOCs are
∂Ct : λt = UC(Ct )
∂Bt : λt = βϵprt RtEt+1λt+1
Pt
Pt+1
.
Equation (1.11) remains the same here.
A.2.2 Intermediate Firm
Intermediate rms require inputs of capital from capital goods producers and labor from house-
holds. ey sell intermediate goods to nal goods rms at real price zt . e intermediate goods
market is perfectly competitive. An intermediate goods rm problem is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
[
ztyt −wnt nnt −wot not − cvvt
]
.
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us, we can solve for FOCs as follows:
∂nnt : Jnt = χztαyt/(χnnt + n0t ) −wnt + (1 − s)(1 − f nt )Et
[
βt+1J
o
t+1
]
,
∂not : Jot = ztαyt/(χnnt + n0t ) −wot + (1 − s)(1 − f nt )Et
[
βt+1J
o
t+1
]
,
∂Kt : rkt = ztyt/Kt .
e only dierence here is zt , which is the price of intermediate goods. e free entry condition
in Equation (1.20) remains unchanged.
A.2.3 Final Goods Firm
e nal goods market comprises monopolistic competition. Final goods rms choose the optimal
prices but face Cavlo-style price rigidity. In each period, only ζp fraction of nal goods rms can
reoptimize and reset the prices. e demand for each nal goods rm is
Yt+s(i) = (
P∗t Π
ξp
t+s−1,t−1
Pt+s
)−ϵt+sYt .
Here, ination Πt+s−1,t−1 is dened as Pt+s−1/Pt−1, and ξp is the parameter that governs price
indexation. e choice P∗t is the optimal price that the nal goods rms reoptimize at period t .
In other words, ξp describes the degree to which rms are looking backwards when they reset
prices. In addition, ϵt is cost-pushing shock. A nal goods rm’s problem is
maxEt
∞∑
s=0
β
λt+s
λt
ζ sp
[P∗t Πξpt+s−1,t−1
Pt
− zt
]
Yt+s(i). (A.7)
us, the price choice will be
P∗t =
Et
∑∞
s=0 ζ
s
pβ
λt+s
λt
ϵtzt+sP
1+ϵt
t+s Π
−ξpϵt+s
t+s−1,t−1
Et
∑∞
s=0 ζ
s
pβ
λt+s
λt
(ϵt − 1)zt+sPϵtt+sΠ−ξp (1−ϵt+s )t+s−1,t−1
,
and the aggregate price will be
Pt =
[
ζp(Pt−1Πt−1)1−ϵt + (1 − ζp)(P∗t )1−ϵt
]1/(1−ϵt ).
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A.2.4 Monetary Policy
e central bank will adjust interest Rt according to the Taylor rule
ln(Rt/R) = (1 − ϕR)(ϕpi ln(pit/pi ) + ϕy ln(yt/y)) + ϕR ln(Rt−1/R) + ϵˆRt . (A.8)
In the New Keynesian model, one additional supply shock (ϵt : cost-pushing shock) and one ad-
ditional demand shock (ϵRt : monetary policy shock) exist.
A.2.5 Parameters
For the New Keynesian model, the calibration strategy is the same as what I use for the baseline
model. I only need to calibrate the steady state of z in a New Keynesian model. I follow convention
and set the steady state of the cost-pushing shock at ϵ¯ = 11. us, the steady state of z is
(ϵ¯ − 1)/ϵ¯ = 10/11.
A.2.6 Analysis
e bias in hiring and estimated shock is robust in the New Keynesian model. Figure A.2 in this
section demonstrates that the main results in the paper continue to hold in the New Keynesian
environment.
First, without considering on-the-job searching by employed workers, standard models fail to
explain hiring dynamics during the Great Recession and its aermath. Second, standard models
underestimate the decline of matching eciency during the Great Recession and its aermath.
ird, standard models underestimate the contribution of matching eciency to unemployment
uctuations by 20%, while overestimating the contribution of unemployment insurance by ap-
proximately 10%.
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Figure A.2: Robustness Checks: New Keynesian
Note: is gure shows that the main results in this paper still hold in the New Keynesian model. e gray-shaded
area indicates NBER Recession periods. Data source: FRED.
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A.3 Random Search
e assumption of random search means that rms or workers will not direct their searches. In
other words, rms will not post vacancies only for workers who belong to a specic category,
and workers will also apply for all possible job postings. erefore, the hiring from employment
hnt can be wrien as
hnt =
ht
jst
ϵ
n,µ
t · nt ,
where job seekers are denoted by jst = ϵµt ut + ϵ
n,µ
t nt and ht represents the total number of new
hires. Because of the assumption of random search, unemployed and employed workers are
pooled together as job seekers. ey also compete with each other for jobs. us, the hiring
ow from employment divided by the total number of employed job seekers ϵn,µt nt is the prob-
ability that a job seeker nds a job (i.e., ht/jst ). In the same way, we can write the hiring from
unemployment as
hut =
ht
jst
ϵ
µ
t · ut .
e hiring ow data hnt and hut are constructed by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) according to CPS
data. Because we can observe unemploymentut and employmentnt , job nding rates, f ut = hut /ut ,
and f nt = hnt /nt , for both types of job seekers can be computed by observed data.
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A.4 Outside of the Labor Force
is appendix section shows that the business cycle properties of job seekers do not change even
when workers from outside of the labor force are considered. Based on Equation (1.3), when
workers from out of the labor force are considered, the matching function can be modied as
ht = ϵ
µ
t (ut + Φnt nt + Φotot )ξv1−ξt ,
where ot means workers from outside of the labor force and Φot can be seen as the combination of
search participation and matching technology for workers from outside of the labor force. us,
Φot · ot can be seen as job seekers from outside of the labor force. Similar to the discussion in
Section 1.2, Φot equals the ratio of the job nding rate of workers from outside of the labor force
to the job nding rate of unemployed workers. e data of these job nding rates are available
from Fallick and Fleischman (2004). Referring to the accounting exercise explained in Section 1.2,
we can compute ϵµt and derive job seekers from employment and outside of the labor force.
In Figure A.3, the black solid line shows the dynamics of employed job seekers, while the green
dashed line with cross markers represents job seekers from outside of the labor force. erefore,
aer we consider workers from outside of the labor force, the number of employed job seekers
still moves procyclically. Moreover, since the number of job seekers from outside of the labor
force moves acyclically, rather than countercyclically, incorporating job seekers from outside of
the labor force will not help eliminate uctuations in unemployment, as did those employed job
seekers. us, although we omit job seekers from outside of the labor force, the main results will
not change.
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Figure A.3: Job Seekers: Outside of the Labor Force
Note: e black line represents the job seekers from employment, while the green dashed line with cross markers
represents the job seekers from outside of the labor force. Incorporating those from outside of the labor force or not
does not alter the business cycle property of job seekers from employment. e grade shaded areas indicate NBER
recession periods.
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A.5 My Results and Sedla´c˘ek’s
is is the rst paper that shows that on-the-job search raises the contribution of matching e-
ciency to unemployment uctuations by the use of the DSGE models. Although Sedla´c˘ek (2016)
used a non-DSGE approach and estimated a matching function similar to Equation (1.3), his re-
sults are similar to my work. Besides the dierence in our estimation approaches, another dier-
ence in estimation is that I do not use the number of hires as an observation variable, while he
did.
Because the number of hires is the most important variable related to matching eciency,
in this section, I compare my estimates of matching eciency with those based on his work. I
repeat his estimation but exclude job seekers from outside of the labor force. e purpose of
this appendix is to show that even though I do not use hiring in the estimation, my paper still
suggests similar changes in the estimates of matching eciency aer the number of job seekers
from employment is incorporated into the total population of job seekers.
Figure A.4 compares the matching eciency based on my estimation and those based on
Sedla´c˘ek’s estimation approach. is gure shows that the dierence in estimation approaches
did not change the main message: including job seekers from employment can amplify the de-
cline in matching eciency during the Great Recession. When we consider only unemployed
workers as job seekers, my estimated matching eciency is similar to Sela´c˘ek’s, even though I
do not consider hires in estimation. However, when employed job seekers are incorporated, the
volatility of estimated matching eciency in my paper is greater than in Sela´c˘ek’s.
is dierence is due to the estimation strategy. My estimation and Sela´c˘ek’s both transform
the noninear models to linear models. I follow most DSGE researchers (e.g., Smets and Wouters
2007) and log-linearize my model, while Sela´c˘ek transforms the model based on the extended
Kalman lter. In the models where the population of job seekers is comprised of only unem-
ployed workers, the log-linearized model and extended Kalman Filter suggest the same form of
linear matching function. However, given the fact that job search from employment is incor-
porated, the log-linearized matching function depends on steady states of unemployment and
employment in the model. erefore, in this case, the linear matching function based on the
extended Kalman Filter is dierent from the log-linearized matching function. In spite of this, in-
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corporating job seekers from employment still increases the decline in matching eciency during
the Great Recession.
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Figure A.4: Matching Eciency: is Paper vs. Sedla´c˘ek’s
Note: e gure compares the estimates of matching eciency in my paper and those based on Sedla´c˘ek (2016).
e graph on the le reports the estimated matching eciency when only unemployed workers are job seekers,
while the one on the right reports the estimated matching eciency when employed job seekers are included in the
estimation. In both graphs, the black solid line represents the result based on my estimation, and the blue dashed
line represents the result based on the estimation approach in Sedla´c˘ek (2016).
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A.6 Data Source
Table A.1: Data: Name & Source
Name Data Description Source
COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour FRED
FEDFUNDS Eective Federal Funds Rate FRED
JTSJOR Job Openings: Total Nonfarm FRED
UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate FRED
W825RC1 Personal current transfer receipts: FRED
government social benets to persons:
unemployment insurance
CLF16OV Civilian Labor Force FRED
PNFI Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment FRED
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deator FRED
PCECC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures FRED
GDPC1 Real Gross Domestic Product FRED
JTS1000HIL Hires: Total Private FRED
HWI Help Wanted Index Barnichon (2010)
Rs Shadow Rate Wu and Xia (2016)
f n Job Finding Rate for Employed Workers Fallick and Fleischman (2004)
f u Job Finding Rate for Unemployed Workers Fallick and Fleischman (2004)
hn Hires for Employment Fallick and Fleischman (2004)
hu Hires for Unemployment Fallick and Fleischman (2004)
Note: is table shows data names and corresponding sources.
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Table A.2: Denition of Observed Variables for Estimation
Variable Description Note
y ln(GDPC1/CLF16OV)
c ln(PCECC96/CLF16OV)
w ln(COMPRNFB)
I ln(PNFI/(CLF16OV · GDPDEF))
u ln(UNRATE)
v ln(HWI/CLF16OV) Before 2000:Q4
ln(JTSJOR/CLF16OV) Aer 2000:Q4
Φn ln(f n/f u ) 1994-Q1–Present
b ln(W825RC1/(CLF16OV · GDPDEF))
R FEDFUNDS/400
Rs/400 e ZLB Periods
pi ln(GDPDEFt/GDPDEFt−1)
Note: is table explains how the observed variables for estimation
are constructed.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Replication
In this section, I discuss how I replicated the work of Michaillat (2012), and extended his results
to 2015:Q3. First, by using data on separation, hires, job openings, and unemployment level,
I calibrated the separation rate s and matching eciency µ. ese data are monthly and non-
detrended. e average separation rate from 2000:M12 to 2015:M10 is around 0.03488. erefore,
at a weekly frequency, it would be 0.00872, which is the steady-state value of s . Following Michail-
lat (2012), I used ξ = 0.5. I chose µ which minimized
∑(fi−µθ 1−ξi )2, where i is the index of month,
fi is the job nding rate, and θi is labor market tightness. I constructed fi using unemployment
level divided by hires, and constructed θi using job openings divided by unemployment level. e
data period was from 2000:M12 to 2015:M10. us, I derived µ = 0.84484. In a weekly frequency,
we therefore know µ = 0.21121. Moreover, the trend from the HP lter of unemployment rate
was around 0.06 during the period 1964:Q1–2015:Q3. Following Michaillat (2012), the HP lter
parameter was 105. erefore, I chose steady-state unemployment 0.06, meaning steady-state
employment was 0.9482, steady-state tightness θ¯ was 0.4246 and the steady-state vacancy lling
rate q¯ was 0.3238. In Michaillat (2012), cv = c · w¯ , where w¯ is the steady-state wage and c = 0.32.
I kept value of c unchanged. Moreover, for rigid wage wt = w¯aγt , I set γ = 0.7, the same as in
Michaillat (2012). According to equation(2.10), and since there is no demand shock in Michaillat’s
model, I have
cw¯a¯
q¯
+ w¯a¯γ = a¯n¯α−1 + β(1 − s)cw¯a¯
q¯
.
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By denition, we know the labor share in the steady state is wn/y = w¯aγn/anα . In the steady-
state, a¯ = 1 and c = 0.32, so I rewrote the above equation to
α = ls((1 − (β(1 − s)))0.32/q + 1)
where ls = 0.66 is the labor share. Using this formula, I can computed α = 0.666, and the
steady-state wage as 0.672. e AR(1) coecient and standard deviation of innovation were also
recomputed. e coecient is now 0.99 in a weekly frequency, and the standard deviation of
innovation is now 0.00254. Table B.1 lists the parameter values I discussed above. Simulation
unemployment in Figure 2.3 and unemployment decomposition in Figure 2.5 were computed
using the methodology proposed by Fair and Taylor (1983) based on parameter value in Table B.1.
Moreover, the simulated moments in Table 2.6 were computed based on the parameter values in
Table B.1. e data period was from 1964:Q1 to 2015:Q3. e length of data is 207. Since the
frequency in Michaillat’s model was weekly, aer I burned out the rst 1200 simulation results, I
totally simulated the model 100 times for 207× 12 weekly. en, the weekly data I simulated was
transformed to quarterly data by averaging. en I took the log of these variables and detrended
them using the HP-lter with the parameters 105. My simulated moments in Table 2.6 are based
on these detrended data in logarithm.
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Table B.1: Calibration Values
Parameters Michaillat (2012) Replication
Discount Factor β 0.999 0.999
Matching Elasticity ξ 0.5 0.5
Wage Flexibility γ 0.7 0.7
Vacancy Cost: Fraction c 0.32 0.32
Labor Share ls 0.66 0.66
Separation Rate s 0.0095 0.0087
Matching Eciency µ 0.233 0.211
Steady-Steady Unemployment u¯ 0.058 0.06
Steady-Steady employment n¯ 0.951 0.9482
Labor input elasticity α 0.666 0.666
Steady-Steady Wage w¯ 0.671 0.672
Critical Vale aR 1.024 1.027
AR(1) Coecient of Shocks ρa 0.992 0.99
Standard Deviation of Shocks σa 0.0027 0.0025
Note: is table reports calibrated parameter values aer I extended the data to 2015:Q3.
B.2 Inuence of Parameters on aR
In main context above, I mentioned that my approach of calibratingα was consistent with Michail-
lat’s, and does not disfavor the existence of aR . Figure 2.1 shows the inuence of µ on aR . Since
aR is related to other parameters–separation rate s , matching elasticity ξ , wage rigidity degree
γ , and c (the ratio of the unit cost of each vacancy posting to the steady-state wage). Figure B.1
shows that my approach remained consistent with Michaitllat’s for these four parameters. e
impact of these parameters on aR are identical in both approaches. Moreover, given the same
parameter values, my approach even produced an even higher aR . In these gures, except for the
parameters which were allowed to change, the others were kept at the prior means.
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Figure B.1: Inuence of Parameters on aR
Note: is gure reports the relationship among aR and s , ξ , γ , and c respectively. e black solid line represents the
results based on my approach, while the green dashed line represents the results based on Michaillat (2012).
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Figure B.2: Prior Distribution of aR
Note: is gure reports the prior distributions of aR based on random draws from the prior distributions of µ, ξ , γ ,
and c respectively. is gure shows that the median of prior aR is one, and the prior probability of having rationing
unemployment is 1/2.
B.3 Prior Distribution of aR
In Figure 2.2, I showed the prior distribution of aR drawn from prior distribution of s , with other
parameters kept at their prior means. Figure B.2 reported the remaining gures for related pa-
rameters. In each graph, all parameters were kept at their prior means, except for the parameter I
allow to change. When I used the random values drawn from the distributions of ξ , s , cv , γ and µ,
the median that of these prior distributions of aR were very close to one, meaning that the design
of my prior distributions made the probability that aR > 1 equal to 1/2.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Deriving Decomposition of the Unemployment Rate
By Taylor eorem, we can rewrite the log dierence in unemployment rate uˆt = lnut − lnu∗t =
lnu(Λt ) − u(Λ∗t ) as log-dierence in transition rates λˆxt = ln λxt − ln λ∗xt . Here, x denotes the
transition ows and x ∈ X = {EU ,EI ,UE,U I , IE, IU }. To understand workers’ unemployment
uctuations, lnut − ln u¯t , we just to use trend component in workers’ transition rate as λ∗ijt . When
we discuss disadvantage workers’ unemployment gap lnuct − lnuc˜t , we just need to replace λ∗ijt
with counterpart advantage workers’ transition rate λc˜,ijt . e decomposition of the log dierence
in unemployment rate lnut − lnu∗t = lnu(Λt ) − u(Λ∗t ) can be explicitly wrien as below
lnut − lnu∗t =
∑
x∈X
∂ lnu(Λt )
∂λxt

Λt=Λ
∗
t
× λ∗xt · (ln λxt − ln λ∗xt ) + ϵt
= aUt (λ∗IEt + λ∗IUt )λ∗EUt · (ln λEUt − ln λ∗EUt )
+ aUt λ
∗IU
t λ
∗EI
t · (ln λEIt − ln λ∗EIt )
+ aEt (λ∗IEt + λ∗IUt )λ∗UE · (ln λUEt − ln λ∗UEt )
+ aEt λ
∗IE
t λ
∗U I
t · (ln λU It − ln λ∗U It )
+
[
aUt λ
∗EU
t + a
E
t (λ∗UEt + λ∗U It )
]
λ∗IEt · (ln λIEt − ln λ∗IEt )
+
[
aUt (λ∗EUt + λ∗EIt ) + aEt λ∗UEt
]
λ∗IUt · (ln λIUt − ln λ∗IUt ) + ϵt
=FEUt + F
EI
t + F
UE
t + F
U I
t + F˜
IE
t + F˜
IU
t + ϵt ,
(C.1)
where the coecient aUt is equal to (1 − u∗t )/U ∗t and aE is equal to −u∗t /U ∗t . Moreover, U ∗ =
λ∗EUλ∗IU + λ∗IEλ∗EU + λ∗EIλ∗IU represents the total inows to unemployment given transition
rates vectorΛ∗t . Equation (C.1) describes that the total log dierence in unemployment lnut−lnu∗t
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consist of six factors (F or F˜ ) that depend on the log dierence in transition rate ln λt − ln λ∗xt .
For example, FUE account for the part of lnut − lnu∗t that is driven by job nding rate (i.e.,
ln λUEt − ln λ∗UEt ). During the recessions, FUEt will increase because of the decline in job nding
rate ln λUEt − ln λ¯UEt and the negative component aEt . In the exercise about unemployment gap,
FUEt would be positive because of the lower job nding rate of disadvantage workers and aEt < 0.
e error term ϵt account for the residual between lnut − lnu∗t and the sum of these six factors.
In a given month, an unemployed worker may directly become employed (U → E) or may
give up job searches and participate labor force again and nd a job (U → I → E). In the same
way, an employed worker may become unemployed but continue job search (E → U ) or may
give up job searches but participate labor force again (E → I → U ). We therefore do not naively
decompose the unemployment rate according to each transition rates based on Equation (C.1).
Recall Equation (3.5) and (3.6), transition rate λU I only inuence λU It λIEt . However, the transition
rate λIEt inuence unemployment rate through the inows to unemployment together with λEU ,
and the inows to employment together with λU I and λUE . erefore, we extract the component
related to transition ows λU It from factor F˜ IEt as f U IEt . We combine this extracted part f U IEt with
FU It , the component that depends on ln λU It − ln λ∗U It . We call f U IEt + FU It as FU IEt and dene
F˜ IEt − f U IEt as F IEt , which does not contain any component related to owsU → I → E. Similarly,
because λIUt inuence unemployment rate through the inows to unemployment together with
λEI and λEU , and the inows to employment together with λUE . erefore, we combine f EIUt ,
the component related to transition ows λEIt in factor F˜ IUt together with FEIt as FEIUt . Again, we
dene F IUt = F˜ IUt − f EIUt , which does not depend on the ows E → I → U . Aer we combine
the parts that inuence U → I → E and E → I → U together respectively as FU IEt and FEIUt , we
rewrite Equation (C.1) as
Ft = F
EU
t + F
EIU
t + F
UE
t + F
U IE
t + F
IE
t + F
IU
t + ϵt . (C.2)
Here, for simplicity, we use Ft to represent the “total” log dierence in unemployment target,
lnut − lnu∗t . In the main context, we use F tot for total unemployment uctuation and Fдap for
total unemployment gap. is equation is totally same as Equation (C.1) but we just rearrange
the component related to U → I → E and E → I → U ows. e factor Fk still describes the
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component that inuence Ft through transition ow k . Here, we have six transition ows. e
two depends on separation margins: E → U and E → I → U , and the two depends on hiring
margins and U → E and U → I → E. e last two, I → E and I → U , are related to labor force
participation. Because F IE and F IU now only contains the factors related to the transition from
I to E and U , we can clearly determine the “pure” impact of labor force participation margin on
unemployment uctuations or disadvantage workers’ unemployment gap. e part that cannot
be accounted for by these components is residual ϵt , which is the same as that in Equation (C.1).
Each component in Equation (C.2) can be explicitly wrien as below:
FEUt = a
U
t (λ˜IEt λ˜IUt )λ˜EUt λˆEU ,ct ,
FUEt = a
E
t (λ˜IEt + λ˜IUt )λˆUE,ct ,
FEIUt = a
U
t λ˜
IU
t λ˜
EI
t λˆ
EI ,c
t + a
U
t λ˜
EI
t λ˜
IU
t λˆ
IU ,c
t ,
FU IEt = a
E
t λ˜
IE
t λ˜
U I
t λˆ
U I ,c
t + a
E
t λ˜
U I
t λ˜
IE
t λˆ
IE,c
t ,
F IEt =
(
aUt λ˜
EU
t + a
E
t λ˜
UE
t
)
λ˜IEt λˆ
IE
t , and
F IUt =
(
aUt λ˜
EU
t + a
E
t λ˜
UE
t
)
λ˜IUt λˆ
IU
t .
(C.3)
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C.2 Time Aggregation Error
We correct time aggregation error according to Shimer (2012a). By CPS, we can have the monthly
transition matrix Pmt for month t . Due to the multiple transition in a month, we have
Pmt = (Pt )n,
where Pt is the transition matrix for each sub-period (e.g., week) in a month. Here, we use n to
represent the number of the sub-period in a month. e goal is to derive Pt based on observed
Pmt . For simplicity, I skip subscript t in the following derivation.
By eigendecomposition, we can write Pm as QMQ−1. erefore, we can have
P = QM1/nQ−1.
For example, if n is equal to 4, we can derive the weekly transition matrix P based on monthly
transition matrix Pm. If time is continuous, then n →∞. As shown in Gomes (2015), we can have
continuous time transition matrix
P = lim
x→0
QMxQ−1 − I
x
where x equals to 1/n. In the main context, to avoid time aggregation, we use continuous time
transition matrix, rather than observed monthly transition matrix, for all analysis.
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C.3 Robustness Check: HP-Filter
In this section, we report the estimation results based on HP-lter trend, rather than mean, as the
trend component. Based on Table C.1, the main results hold: workers’ unemployment uctuation
is mainly aributed to hiring margin rather than separation margin. In addition, even though
we use HP-lter trend. small magnitude of βϵ shows again the accuracy of our decomposition
approach.
When we use HP-lter trend, we nd that the contribution of separation margin to unemploy-
ment uctuations of minority and young workers decline. erefore, contribution of separation
margin to minority workers’ unemployment uctuation is not signicantly larger than that of
other workers now. In our main result, we show separation margin to minority workers may
contribute to their unemployment changes during normal time.
Moreover, based on HP-lter trend, the contribution of hiring margin to young workers’ un-
employment uctuations is signicantly larger than that of experienced workers. Because using
HP-lter trend will increase the contribution of hiring margin, based on mean as trend compo-
nent, we have lower bound for the contribution of hiring margin to minority and young workers’
unemployment uctuations. Fujita and Ramey (2009) also addressed that contribution of hiring
(separation) margin to unemployment uctuation is higher (lower) when we use HP-lter trend.
In sum, out conclusion that hiring inuence disadvantage workers’ unemployment uctuations
do not change even when we use HP-lter trend.
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Table C.1: β Coecient: HP-Filter
Minority Young No College All
E → U 0.148 0.138 0.188 0.181
[0.121, 0.175] [0.114, 0.163] [0.165, 0.211] [0.162, 0.201]
E → I → U 0.078 0.045 0.067 0.101
[0.05, 0.106] [0.017, 0.073] [0.045, 0.089] [0.082, 0.12]
U → E 0.471 0.54 0.487 0.491
[0.445, 0.496] [0.512, 0.568] [0.465, 0.51] [0.473, 0.509]
U → I → E 0.309 0.275 0.264 0.233
[0.285, 0.332] [0.256, 0.295] [0.246, 0.282] [0.219, 0.247]
I → E 0.007 0.018 0.008 0.008
[0.006, 0.007] [0.016, 0.02] [0.007, 0.009] [0.007, 0.009]
I → U -0.006 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009
[-0.007, -0.005] [-0.013, -0.008] [-0.009, -0.007] [-0.011, -0.008]
ϵ -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
[-0.008, -0.002] [-0.009, -0.003] [-0.009, -0.004] [-0.006, -0.003]
White Experienced With College All
E → U 0.194 0.22 0.192 0.181
[0.174, 0.215] [0.197, 0.243] [0.169, 0.216] [0.162, 0.201]
E → I → U 0.109 0.118 0.152 0.101
[0.089, 0.128] [0.099, 0.138] [0.129, 0.174] [0.082, 0.12]
U → E 0.497 0.444 0.491 0.491
[0.477, 0.518] [0.425, 0.464] [0.467, 0.515] [0.473, 0.509]
U → I → E 0.206 0.224 0.174 0.233
[0.193, 0.22] [0.208, 0.239] [0.157, 0.19] [0.219, 0.247]
I → E 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.008
[0.007, 0.01] [0.004, 0.005] [0.005, 0.01] [0.007, 0.009]
I → U -0.011 -0.006 -0.012 -0.009
[-0.012, -0.009] [-0.007, -0.006] [-0.013, -0.01] [-0.011, -0.008]
ϵ -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
[-0.006, -0.003] [-0.006, -0.002] [-0.006, -0.002] [-0.006, -0.003]
Note: 95% Condence Interval in brackets.
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C.4 β Coecients for Unemployment Gap
In the main context, we use Equation (3.13) to derive ratio of each factor to total unemployment
gap so we are able to determine the contribution of each factor to unemployment gap. e β
coecients in Equation (3.11) can only reveal the importance of these factors to variation of
unemployment gap, rather than the level of the gap. erefore, we do not use β coecient for
analysis of unemployment gap in the main context. is appendix reports the results for the β
coecients when we apply Equation (3.11) to unemployment gap.
As we can see in Table C.2, the variation of unemployment gap is still mainly caused by the
uctuations in the separation factors FEU and FEIU for minority and young workers. For workers
without college degree, 60 percent of unemployment gap variation is accounted for by the hiring
margin, which only contribute around 20 percent to unemployment gap. Table C.3 reports the β
coecients for the dierent recession periods. As in Table C.2, variation in unemployment gap
is determined by separation margin. Particularly, the importance of hiring margin for workers
without college degree decline during the recessions (especially the Great Recession). erefore,
hiring margin only explains the uctuations in the normal time for workers without college
degrees, rather than for recession.
Although Figure 3.6 shows that hiring margin contribute trivially to unemployment gap, the β
coecients for hiring margin factors are even positive for young workers. Moreover, β coecient
for hiring margin is even much larger than that of separation margin for those without college
degrees. Because β means the contribution of the uctuations of a factor to variation, rather than
level, of unemployment gap, β coecients are inconsistent with the features in Figure 3.6. is
is the reason that we do not use β in the main context for unemployment gap.
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Table C.2: β Coecient: Unemployment Gap, Overall
Minority Young No College
E → U 0.388 0.369 0.373
[0.355, 0.422] [0.325, 0.413] [0.338, 0.407]
E → I → U 0.229 0.478 0.045
[0.2, 0.258] [0.43, 0.526] [-0.005, 0.094]
U → E 0.367 0.162 0.39
[0.327, 0.407] [0.116, 0.207] [0.343, 0.437]
U → I → E 0.105 0.055 0.177
[0.08, 0.13] [0.025, 0.085] [0.141, 0.213]
I → E 0.012 -0.029 0.056
[0.009, 0.016] [-0.049, -0.009] [0.045, 0.067]
I → U -0.029 -0.019 -0.002
[-0.035, -0.023] [-0.038, 0.0] [-0.006, 0.001]
ϵ -0.072 -0.016 -0.038
[-0.083, -0.062] [-0.027, -0.006] [-0.044, -0.032]
Note: 95% Condence Interval in brackets.
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Table C.3: β Coecient: Unemployment Gap, Recessions
Minority 1980s 1990s 2000s Great Recession
E → U 0.296 0.194 0.449 0.112
[0.144, 0.448] [0.035, 0.353] [0.232, 0.666] [-0.056, 0.28]
E → I → U 0.303 0.235 0.134 0.316
[0.175, 0.431] [0.118, 0.351] [-0.032, 0.3] [0.173, 0.459]
U → E 0.295 0.536 0.217 0.298
[0.131, 0.458] [0.328, 0.744] [-0.009, 0.443] [0.141, 0.455]
U → I → E 0.183 0.106 0.226 0.222
[0.057, 0.309] [0.004, 0.209] [0.092, 0.361] [0.099, 0.346]
I → E 0.013 0.004 0.018 0.011
[-0.004, 0.03] [-0.01, 0.018] [-0.005, 0.041] [-0.006, 0.028]
I → U -0.028 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009
[-0.06, 0.005] [-0.032, 0.016] [-0.043, 0.031] [-0.033, 0.015]
ϵ -0.062 -0.067 -0.039 0.05
[-0.105, -0.019] [-0.12, -0.015] [-0.105, 0.027] [-0.013, 0.113]
Young 1980s 1990s 2000s Great Recession
E → U 0.295 0.173 0.29 0.386
[0.172, 0.418] [0.055, 0.291] [0.125, 0.455] [0.271, 0.501]
E → I → U 0.643 0.304 0.482 0.604
[0.455, 0.831] [0.135, 0.472] [0.309, 0.656] [0.49, 0.718]
U → E 0.282 0.182 0.191 0.051
[0.117, 0.446] [-0.001, 0.366] [0.006, 0.376] [-0.084, 0.187]
U → I → E 0.009 0.137 0.088 0.046
[-0.092, 0.111] [0.016, 0.258] [-0.021, 0.196] [-0.052, 0.145]
I → E -0.116 0.08 -0.037 -0.051
[-0.188, -0.044] [-0.015, 0.174] [-0.119, 0.045] [-0.088, -0.015]
I → U -0.091 0.073 -0.024 -0.045
[-0.162, -0.019] [-0.012, 0.158] [-0.091, 0.044] [-0.092, 0.003]
ϵ -0.023 0.052 0.009 0.008
[-0.053, 0.007] [0.008, 0.096] [-0.046, 0.065] [-0.03, 0.047]
No College 1980s 1990s 2000s Great Recession
E → U 0.394 0.372 0.225 0.497
[0.286, 0.501] [0.255, 0.489] [0.105, 0.346] [0.337, 0.656]
E → I → U 0.147 0.183 0.131 0.239
[0.036, 0.258] [0.047, 0.319] [0.027, 0.235] [0.058, 0.421]
U → E 0.383 0.358 0.45 0.182
[0.219, 0.546] [0.17, 0.546] [0.281, 0.62] [-0.011, 0.374]
U → I → E 0.062 0.085 0.187 0.092
[-0.031, 0.156] [-0.016, 0.185] [0.098, 0.277] [-0.058, 0.241]
I → E 0.055 0.037 0.031 0.018
[0.017, 0.093] [-0.005, 0.079] [0.006, 0.055] [-0.013, 0.05]
I → U -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.005
[-0.014, 0.007] [-0.019, 0.006] [-0.017, -0.001] [-0.015, 0.006]
ϵ -0.038 -0.028 -0.016 -0.023
[-0.065, -0.011] [-0.047, -0.009] [-0.038, 0.007] [-0.048, 0.002]
Note: 95% Condence Interval in brackets.
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Table C.4: Data Summary
NoWeighted Weighted
Minority 14.65% 16.66%
Young 25.19% 26.02%
No College 54.69% 53.23%
Female 52.74% 52.11%
White 85.34% 83.33%
Experienced 74.80% 73.97%
With College 45.30% 46.76%
Male 47.25% 47.88%
Note: is table reports the percentage of each type
of workers in our data. Weighted numbers are
computed according to CPS weight.
Table C.5: Dates: Minimum to the Maximum
1980s Recessions 1990s Recessions 2000s Recessions Great Recessions
Minority 9.07%, (4.22%) 4.41%, (1.78%) 4.14%, (1.88%) 8.20%, (4.94%)
Young 7.04%, (4.39%) 3.76%, (2.22%) 3.50%, (1.99%) 7.51%, (4.54%)
No College 7.07%, (2.49%) 3.55%, (2.23%) 3.43%, (1.53%) 8.61%, (4.24%)
Female 4.44%, (5.43%) 2.32%, (2.55%) 2.18%, (1.83%) 5.04%, (5.53%)
Minority 1979/07– 1982/10 1989/08– 1992/09 2000/10–2003/08 2007/02–2010/07
Young 1979/07–1983/04 1990/01–1992/12 2000/12–2003/06 2007/01–2010/01
No College 1979/05–1982/11 1989/07–1992/06 2000/06–2003/06 2007/02–2010/07
Female 1979/05–1982/12 1989/03–1992/06 2000/02–2003/06 2007/03–2010/02
Note: is table reports the dates with minimum of unemployment rate and the dates with
the maximum of unemployment rate around the periods of recession for these four types of
workers.
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Table C.6: Estimated Transitions: Female Workers
u λEU λEI λU E λU I λI E λIU
Const. 0.074*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.256*** 0.202*** 0.038*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
11980s 0.013*** 0.005*** -0.002** -0.020*** -0.055*** 0.003** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
11990s 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.053*** -0.005*** -0.001*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
12000s -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.004 0.005 -0.005*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000)
1Great 0.014*** 0.001*** -0.002** -0.052*** -0.001 -0.013*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
Female -0.001*** -0.003*** 0.016*** -0.029*** 0.096*** -0.014*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Group
Specic
11980s 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.011*** -0.008 0.040*** -0.004** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
11990s -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.004 0.022*** 0.004* 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
12000s -0.004*** -0.000 -0.005*** 0.012 -0.018*** 0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
1Great -0.011*** -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.024*** 0.005** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
R2 0.24 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.20
N 49295 49295 49295 49156 49156 49276 49276
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Figure C.1: Observed Unemployment Fluctuation v.s. Approximation: Advantage Workers
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Black solid line represents observed unemployment
uctuations and green dashed line represents approximated rst-order log-linearized unemployment uctuations.
Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
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Figure C.2: Employment to Unemployment: λEU
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
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Figure C.3: Employment to Out-of-the-labor-force: λEI
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
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Figure C.4: Unemployment to Employment: λUE
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
143
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2018
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40 Minority
White
(a) Minority v.s. Non-Minority
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2018
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
Young
Experienced
(b) Young v.s. Experienced
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2018
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
No College Degree
Wtih College Degree
(c) Without v.s. With College Degree
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2018
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35 Female
Male
(d) Female v.s Male
Figure C.5: Unemployment to Out-of-the-labor-force: λU I
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
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Figure C.6: Out-of-the-labor-force to Employment: λIE
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
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Figure C.7: Out-of-the-labor-force to Unemployment: λIU
Note: e gray-rectangle area indicates NBER Recession periods. Data source: FRED & IPUMS-CPS.
146
References
Abowd, J. M. and Zellner, A. (1985). Estimating gross labor-force ows. Journal of Business &
Economic Statistics, 3(3):254–283.
Acemoglu, D. and Hawkins, W. B. (2014). Search with multi-worker rms. eoretical Economics,
9:583–628.
Barlevy, G. (2011). Evaluating the role of labor market mismatch in rising unemployment. Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 35(3).
Barnichon, R. (2010). Building a composite help-wanted index. Economics Leers, 109(3):175–178.
Barnichon, R. and Figura, A. (2015). Labor market heterogeneity and the aggregate matching
function. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(4):222–49.
Blanchard, O. and Diamond, P. (1989). e beveridge curve. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
20(1):1–76.
Blanchard, O. and Gal, J. (2010). Labor markets and monetary policy: A new keynesian model
with unemployment. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(2):1–30.
Blanchard, O. J. and Kahn, C. M. (1980). e solution of linear dierence models under rational
expectations. Econometrica, 48(5):1305 – 1311.
Brzoza-Brzezina, M. and Kolasa, M. (2013). Bayesian evaluation of dsge models with nancial
frictions. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 45(8):1451–1476.
Cantore, C., Levine, P., and Melina, G. (2014). A scal stimulus and jobless recovery. e Scandi-
navian Journal of Economics, 116(3):669–701.
Cheremukhin, A. A. and Restrepo-Echavarria, P. (2014). e labor wedge as a matching friction.
European Economic Review, 68:71 – 92.
Choi, S., Janiak, A., and Villena-Roldn, B. (2015). Unemployment, participation and worker ows
over the life-cycle. e Economic Journal, 125(589):1705–1733.
Christiano, J. L., Eichenbaum, M., and Evans, L. C. (2005). Nominal rigidities and the dynamic
eects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of Political Economy, 113(1):1–45.
147
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M. S., and Trabandt, M. (2016). Unemployment and business cycles.
Econometrica, 84(4):1523–1569.
Couch, K. A. and Fairlie, R. (2010). Last hired, rst red? black-white unemployment and the
business cycle. Demography, 47(1):227–247.
Couch, K. A., Fairlie, R., and Xu, H. (2016). Racial dierences in labor market transitions and the
great recession. Working Paper.
S¸ahin, A., Song, J., Topa, G., and Violante, G. L. (2014). Mismatch unemployment. American
Economic Review, 104(11):3529–64.
Davis, S. J., Faberman, R. J., and Haltiwanger, J. C. (2013). e establishment-level behavior of
vacancies and hiring. e arterly Journal of Economics.
Decker, R., Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R., and Miranda, J. (2014). e role of entrepreneurship in us
job creation and economic dynamism. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(3):3–24.
Dickens, W. T. (2009). Understanding Ination and the Implications for Monetary Policy: A Phillips
Curve Retrospective, chapter A New Method for Estimating Time Variation in the NAIRU. e
MIT Press.
Elsby, M. and Michaels, R. (2013). Marginal jobs, heterogeneous rms, and unemployment ows.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(1):1–48.
Elsby, M. W., Hobijnb, B., and S¸ahinc, A. (2015a). On the importance of the participation margin
for labor market uctuations. Journal of Monetary Economics, 72:64–82.
Elsby, M. W. L., Michaels, R., and Ratner, D. (2015b). e beveridge curve: A survey. Journal of
Economic Literature, 53(3):571–630.
Elsby, M. W. L., Michaels, R., and Solon, G. (2009). e ins and outs of cyclical unemployment.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1):84–110.
E´va Nagypa´l (2007). Labor-market uctuations and on-the-job search. Working Paper.
Faberman, R. J., Mueller, A. I., S¸ahin, A., and Topa, G. (2017). Job search behavior among the
employed and non-employed. NBER Working Paper, (23731).
Fair, R. C. and Taylor, J. B. (1983). Solution and maximum likelihood estimation of dynamic
nonlinear rational expectations models. Econometrica, 51(4):1169–1185.
Fallick, B. and Fleischman, C. A. (2004). Employer-to-employer ows in the u.s. labor market:
e complete picture of gross worker ows. FEDS Working Paper.
Feng, S. and Hu, Y. (2013). Misclassication errors and the underestimation of the us unemploy-
ment rate. American Economic Review, 103(2):1054–70.
Fujita, S. and Ramey, G. (2007). Job matching and propagation. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 31(11):3671 – 3698.
148
Fujita, S. and Ramey, G. (2009). e cyclicality of separation and job nding rates. International
Economic Review, 50(2):415–430.
Fujita, S. and Ramey, G. (2012). Exogenous versus endogenous separation. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(4):68–93.
Furlaneo, F. and Groshenny, N. (2016). Mismatch shocks and unemployment during the great
recession. Journal of Applied Econometrics.
Gertler, M., Sala, L., and Trigari, A. (2008). An estimated monetary dsge model with unem-
ployment and staggered nominal wage bargaining. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
40(8):1713–1764.
Gomes, P. (2015). e importance of frequency in estimating labour market transition rates. IZA
Journal of Labor Economics, 4(1):6.
Hagedorn, M. and Manovskii, I. (2008). e cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and
vacancies revisited. American Economic Review, 98(4):1692–1706.
Hall, R. E. (2005). Employment uctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness. American Economic
Review, 95(1):50–65.
Hall, R. E. and Schulhofer-Wohl, S. (2015). Measuring job-nding rates and matching eciency
with heterogeneous jobseekers. NBER Working Paper, (20939).
Hamilton, J. D. (forthcoming). Why you should never use the hodrick-presco lter. e Review
of Economics and Statistics.
Herz, B. and van Rens, T. (2015). Accounting for mismatch unemployment. IZA Discussion Paper
Series.
Hornstein, A. and Kudlyak, M. (2016). Estimating matching eciency with variable search eort.
FRB Richmond Working Paper, (16-13).
Hoynes, H., Miller, D. L., and Schaller, J. (2012). Who suers during recessions? Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 26(3):27–48.
Krause, M. and Lubik, T. A. (2012). On-the-job search and the cyclical dynamics in the labor
market. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper Series.
Krause, M. U. and Lubik, T. A. (2006). e cyclical upgrading of labor and on-the-job search.
Labour Economics, 13(4):459 – 477. Special Issue: European Association of Labour Economists,
2nd World Conference SOLE/EALE, Fairmont Hotel San Francisco, USA, 2-5 June 2005.
Krause, M. U. and Lubik, T. A. (2007). e (ir)relevance of real wage rigidity in the new keynesian
model with search frictions. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(3):706 – 727.
Krause, M. U. and Lubik, T. A. (2010). On-the-job search and the cyclical dynamics of labor
market. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper, (10-12).
149
Kro, K., Lange, F., Notowidigdo, M. J., and Katz, L. F. (2016). Long-term unemployment and the
great recession: e role of composition, duration dependence, and nonparticipation. Journal
of Labor Economics, 34(S1):S7–S54.
Leduc, S. and Liu, Z. (2017). e slow job recovery in a macro model of search and recruiting
intensity. Working Paper.
Lubik, T. A. (2009). Estimating a search and matching model of the aggregate labor market.
Economic aterly, 95(2):101–120.
Martin, D. and Pierrard, O. (2014). On-the-job search and cyclical unemployment: Crowding out
vs. vacancy eects. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 44:235 – 250.
Menzio, G. and Shi, S. (2011). Ecient search on the job and the business cycle. Journal of Political
Economy, 119(3):468–510.
Merz, M. (1995). Search in the labor market and the real business cycle. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 36(2):269 – 300.
Michaillat, P. (2012). Do matching frictions explain unemployment? not in bad times. American
Economic Review, 102(4):1721–50.
Mortensen, D. T. and Pissarides, C. A. (1994). Job creation and job destruction in the theory of
unemployment. e Review of Economic Studies, 61(3):397–415.
Pace, F. D. and Villa, S. (2016). Factor complementarity and labour market dynamics. European
Economic Review, 82(Supplement C):70 – 112.
Petrongolo, B. and Pissarides, C. A. (2001). Looking into the black box: A survey of the matching
function. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2):390–431.
Petrosky-Nadeau, N. (2014). Credit, vacancies and unemployment uctuations. Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics, 17(2):191 – 205.
Pissarides, C. A. (1994). Search unemployment with on-the-job search. e Review of Economic
Studies, 61(3):457–475.
Pissarides, C. A. (2009). e unemployment volatility puzzle: Is wage stickiness the answer?
Econometrica, 77(5):1339–1369.
Poterba, J. M. and Summers, L. H. (1986). Reporting errors and labor market dynamics. Econo-
metrica, 54(6):1319–1338.
Ramo´n Garcı´a, J. and Sorolla, V. (2017). Frictional and non-frictional unemployment in a labor
market with matching frictions. e Manchester School, 85(4):450–465.
Schmi-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (2012). e making of a great contraction with a liquidity trap
and a jobless recovery. NBER Working Paper.
150
Sedla´c˘ek, P. (2014). Match eciency and rms’ hiring standards. Journal of Monetary Economics,
62:123 – 133.
Sedla´c˘ek, P. (2016). e aggregate matching function and job search from employment and out
of the labor force. Review of Economic Dynamics, 21:1628.
Shimer, R. (2005). e cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies. American
Economic Review, 95(1):25–49.
Shimer, R. (2012a). Reassessing the ins and outs of unemployment. Review of Economic Dynamics,
15(2):127–148.
Shimer, R. (2012b). Wage rigidities and jobless recoveries. Journal of Monetary Economics, 59(Sup-
plement):S65 – S77. Supplement issue:October 15-16 2010 Research Conference on ’Directions
for Macroeconomics: What did we Learn from the Economic Crises’ Sponsored by the Swiss
National Bank (hp://www.snb.ch).
Siemer, M. (2014). Firm entry and employment dynamics in the great recession. Working Paper.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2007). Shocks and frictions in us business cycles: A bayesian dsge
approach. American Economic Review, 97(3):586–606.
Stole, L. A. and Zwiebel, J. (1996). Intra-rm bargaining under non-binding contracts. e Review
of Economic Studies, 63(3):375–410.
Tasci, M. (2007). On-the-job search and labor market reallocation. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land, Working Paper. 07-25.
Trigari, A. (2009). Equilibrium unemployment, job ows, and ination dynamics. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 41(1):1–33.
Tu¨zemen, D. (2017). Labor market dynamics with endogenous labor force participation and on-
the-job search. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 75:28 – 51.
Veracierto, M. (2011). Worker ows and matching eciency. Economic Perspectives, 35(4).
Wu, J. C. and Xia, F. D. (2016). Measuring the macroeconomic impact of monetary policy at the
zero lower bound. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 48(2-3):253–291.
Wu, J. C. and Zhang, J. (2017). A shadow rate new keynesian model. Chicago Booth Research
Paper, (16-18).
Xu, H. and Couch, K. A. (2017). e business cycle, labor market transitions by age, and the great
recession. Applied Economics, 49(52):5370–5396.
Zandweghe, W. V. (2010). On-the-job search, sticky prices, and persistence. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 34(3):437–455.
Zhang, J. (2017). Unemployment benets and matching eciency in an estimated dsge model
with labor market search frictions. Macroeconomic Dynamics. Forthcoming.
151
